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The Relationship between Identity Undermining and Victim Blaming among Participants with Low Ingroup Essentialisation and High Ingroup Essentialisation 

The Relationship between Identity Undermining and Victim Blaming among Participants with Low Ingroup Essentialisation and High Ingroup Essentialisation 

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The current study aims to understand victim blaming of Ahmadiyya group by majority Sunni Islam in Indonesia. We included ingroup essentialisation, outgroup essentialisation, identity undermining and belief in conspiracy theory as predictors of victim blaming. Results of a survey among 147 Muslims majority Sunni Islam shows that the relationship bet...

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... examine the role of ingroup essentialisation in moderating the rela- tionship between identity undermining and victim blaming, we used Probing Interaction Procedure or MODPROBE created by Hayes and Matthes (2009). In this procedure, victim blaming was entered as depend- ent variable, identity undermining (mean-centred) as focal predictor, ingroup essentialisation (mean-entered) as moderator variable, and all demographic variables as covariates. Overall, this analysis resulted in a significant regression equation, R 2 = 0.21, F(7,138) = 5.17, p = 0.000. This analysis also revealed that identity undermining and ingroup essen- tialisation significantly interacted to affect victim blaming, b = -0.20, se = 0.08, t = -2.49, p = 0.014. A simple slope analysis (see Figure 1) demonstrated that among participants with low perceived ingroup essen- tialisation (-1SD below the Mean), identity undermining was positively related to victim blaming, b = 0.45, se = 0.09, t = 4.86, p = 0.000, 95 per cent LLCI = 0.26, 95 per cent ULCI = 0.63. However, the relation- ship between identity undermining and victim blaming was no longer significant among participants with high perceived ingroup essentialisa- tion (+1 SD above the Mean), b = 0.13, se = 0.10, t = 1.39, p = 0.167. When outgroup essentialisation was specified as moderator, the same analysis procedure revealed that identity undermining and outgroup essentialisation did not significantly interact to affect Victim Blaming, = 0.09, se = 0.06, t = 1.42, p = 0.159. These findings were thereby in support of Hypothesis 1 predicting that ingroup essentialisation, but not outgroup essentialisation, moderated the relationship between identity undermining and victim ...

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... Analytic strategies. We tested hypotheses in the current research by means of path model using Mplus version 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2015. The data in the current research contained missing values and did not meet the assumption of multivariate normality (Skewness = 2.21, M = 0.66, SD = 0.13, p < .001; ...
... SD = 0.85, p < .001). We accordingly used MLR as an estimator, as this is considered suitable for dealing with missing values data which violates the assumption of multivariate normality (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2015. ...
... ii Power was calculated by means of Monte Carlo simulation using Mplus version 7.4 in which the data was resampled 10.000 times (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2015. ...
Article
Politics in the current era are replete with unreliable media stories which lack evidence, sometimes disparagingly dubbed ‘fake news’. A survey on a sample of Muslims in Indonesia (N = 518) in this work found that participants’ endorsement of collective action in of support issues with little to no empirical evidence (i.e., post-truth collective action) increased as a function of their belief in fake news and prejudice against the outgroup (i.e., non-Muslims). Belief in fake news stemmed from participants’ generic and specific conspiratorial thinking, whereas prejudice was positively predicted by relative Muslim prototypicality, denoting how much Muslims in Indonesia view that their group is more representative than non-Muslims of the superordinate Indonesian identity that encompasses both groups. Additionally, our findings revealed that generic conspiratorial thinking and relative Muslim prototypicality were positively predicted by collective narcissism, which in turn spurred participants’ support for collective action by augmenting belief in fake news.
... However, we also see that if there is evidence showing identifiable members of the ingroup as culprits, the group may respond by ostracising them and by playing out the so-called 'Black Sheep' method (Marques & Paez, 1994;Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995). These processes can be expected to be particularly prevalent in religious groups, where members deviating from the dominant orthodoxy often will be judged as heretics and apostates and, hence, will be punished and ostracised (Putra, Mashuri, & Zaduqisti, 2015). The same is true for imposters or infiltrators who are not perceived as rightful members of a group. ...
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This paper presents an analysis of interviews of participants in a political manifestation in Indonesia about the reasons for the rally and the resulting riot. The rally was held in the middle of the Jakarta gubernatorial election, against a non-Muslim incumbent who was accused of having insulted the Quran. We argue that there is a deep relationship between social identities and religion, which has implications for societal togetherness and political freedom. Using a snowball technique, we interviewed 16 Muslims who had participated in this rally. The findings suggest that 1) even though the rally was held in the middle of an election, the demonstrators denied that the rally was politically motivated; 2) Those demonstrators who thought that intruders had infiltrated the rally, maintained that the intruders are to be held responsible for any violence, but not the ‘actual’ participants. 3) Interviewees claimed that their actions were not motivated by anti-Chinese prejudice, although traces of racist thinking can be found in their statements. The findings are discussed before the background of social representations, social identity, theories of collective action, and the black sheep effect.
... Still, these protections are biased and do not contain valid justice for women. The perception of women as being the focus of fault, such as in cases of rape, domestic or public violence, and others vial incidences can be seen in the general reality of the society (Putra, Mashuri, and Zaduqisti 2015). For example, in the case of rape, women have sometimes been the party to blame in Indonesia. ...
... Supporting this, studies have shown that people tend to dehumanize (and demonize) outgroup members, often in order to claim ingroup superiority (e.g., feeling their group is smarter, greater, kinder, more civilized, etc.; see Bilewicz & Bilewicz, 2012;Tajfel, 1982). Part of this effect is that the values of the dehumanized/demonized group are considered incompatible with ingroup values (Putra, Mashuri, & Zaduqisti, 2015;Sindic & Reicher, 2009). For example, Aryan people have seen themselves as superior and more human and viewed other groups as inferior and less human (e.g., Jewish people as rats). ...
Article
In 4 studies (Ns = 392, 199, 138, and 308), we address whether priming people with the idea that human nature is good (vs. evil or neither good nor evil) can lead them to see outgroups more positively. The first 3 experiments showed that priming a positive spin on human nature influenced people to see others more positively and to endorse more prosocial values. Across all 4 studies, results demonstrated that the more participants believed that human nature is good, the more they viewed a specific outgroup’s nature as good, and the more they saw all people as sharing a common human identity. These studies support the idea that a positive view of human nature can aid in rehumanizing outgroup members as well as supporting general altruism (i.e. prosocial values) and cultural diversity.
... In primo luogo, condividono un generale anti-elitarismo; inoltre sono caratterizzate dalla percezione di mancanza di potere (Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Infine, la sensazione di perdita di identità è associata tanto alle credenze complottiste (Putra, Mashuri, & Zaduqisti, 2015) che quelle populiste, con una conseguente tendenza alla riappropriazione dell'identità nazionale e all'ostilità verso l'out-group. ...
Article
L’immigrazione è stato uno dei temi più rilevanti nelle campagne politiche relative al referendum sulla Brexit, alle presidenziali americane e alle elezioni parlamentari italiane ed europee (es. Zappettini, 2019; Faris, Roberts, Etling, Bourassa, Zuckerman, & Benkler, 2017). In particolare si è potuto assistere a un incremento di consensi per i gruppi politici più avversi agli immigrati/e e ai flussi immigratori (Muis e Immerzeel, 2017). In questo studio indaghiamo, attraverso l’analisi testuale di 1000 tweet appartenenti ai principali leader politici italiani, quali tematiche sono associate prevalentemente a contenuti negativi o positivi nei confronti dell’immigrazione. I risultati mostrano che i messaggi negativi sono associati, in un modello di regressione lineare logistica, a uno stile di comunicazione populista e all'idea della presenza di complotti. Inoltre, una network analysis rivela che messaggi anti-immigrazione sono associati ai temi di sicurezza e giustizia, mentre i messaggi pro-immigrazione sono associati alla tematica dei diritti civili, cultura ed Europa. Vengono quindi discussi gli elementi stilistici propri della comunicazione populista e complottista in relazione alla diffusione di contenuti anti-immigrazione e le possibili conseguenze per la trasmissione e la formazione di valori nel contesto dei social media.
... The literature on conspiracy beliefs has focused extensively on the United States and Europe, as nearly 80% of all studies were conducted on those two continents. Only four studies included exclusively non-western societies (Swami, 2012;Mashuri and Zaduqisti, 2015;Putra et al., 2015;Mashuri et al., 2016). Participants were recruited online (39.8%) or via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk; 15.7%) with the remaining 44.6% being recruited in offline, face-to-face settings. ...
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In the last decade, the number of investigations of the beliefs in conspiracy theories has begun to increase in the fields of social, differential, and experimental psychology. A considerable number of variables have been suggested as predictors of conspiracy beliefs, amongst them personality factors such as low agreeableness (as disagreeableness is associated with suspicion and antagonism) and high openness to experience (due to its positive association to seek out unusual and novel ideas). The association between agreeableness, openness to experience and conspiracy beliefs remains unclear in the literature. The present study reviews the literature of psychological studies investigating conspiracy beliefs. Additionally, the association between Big Five personality factors and conspiracy beliefs is analyzed meta-analytically using random-effects models. Ninety-six studies were identified for the systematic review. A comprehensive account of predictors, consequences, operationalization, questionnaires, and most prominent conspiracy theories is presented. For meta-analysis, 74 effect sizes from 13 studies were extracted. The psychological literature on predictors of conspiracy beliefs can be divided in approaches either with a pathological (e.g., paranoia) or socio-political focus (e.g., perceived powerlessness). Generally, there is a lack of theoretical frameworks in this young area of research. Meta-analysis revealed that agreeableness, openness to experience, and the remaining Big Five personality factors were not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs if effect sizes are aggregated. Considerable heterogeneity in designs and operationalization characterizes the field. This article provides an overview of instrumentation, study designs, and current state of knowledge in an effort toward advancement and consensus in the study of conspiracy beliefs.
... Likewise, focusing on societal states and influenced by a social identity perspective, a study conducted by Putra, Mashuri, and Zaduqisti (2015) showed that the reason why Ahmadiyya members are blamed is because the Sunni Muslim participants think that Ahmadiyya has undermined Islamic values and conspired to abolish Islam. From a social identity perspective (Tajfel, 1982;Tajfel & Turner, 1979), a person is seen as part of a reflexive group in which the members of the group "know their affiliation and have criteria available to decide who else is also a member" (Wagner, 1995, p. 127). ...
... A large group with many members usually has sub-groups or even sub-subgroups (Putra et al., 2015). Groups are considered to be part of a superordinate group or a common ingroup as long as their members share core values or goals (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2010;Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, et al., 1993). ...
... Under certain conditions, such a group can be regarded as 'deviant' or as 'heretic' in the case of a religious group. Ahmadiyya, for some reason, is categorized as strongly divergent from Sunni Islam (Putra et al., 2015;Burhani, 2014). ...
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Conducted in Indonesia, this study analyzes how a religious group accused of being heretical ended up receiving threats and a number of violent reactions, a situation in which the victims were considered to have caused the violence. The study presented here focused on this case of the Ahmadiyya, a minority Muslim group in Indonesia that are the most frequently reported as being victims of violence. In total, 309 Sunni Muslims participated in filling out open-ended questions, and 10 Sunni Muslims (all male) participated in interviews discussing the Ahmadiyya and interreligious groups. We found that a substantial number of majority Sunni Muslims think that the values of the Ahmadiyya group are incompatible with common, mainstream Muslim values. As a consequence, their existence is considered a threat and a disruption to the Muslim community. Therefore, violence is justified if the group insists upon continuing their religious activities. In the eyes of these Sunni Muslims, Ahmadiyya members undermine the coherence within the Muslim community, and occurrence of violence against Ahmadiyya members is thus thought to be the victim’s own fault.
... The investigation of intergroup variables is important for getting a better understanding of practical strategies to decrease belief in conspiracy theories. This is especially the case given that at a group level, prior studies have cited the conspiracy theories belief as a catalyst of a host of negative intergroup behaviours against those suspected as the conspirators, including group ostracism (Räikkä, 2009), discrimination (Bilewicz & Krzemiński, 2010) and victim blaming (Putra, Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015). With reference to integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Renfro, 2002), we show that Muslims believe in anti-West conspiracy theories because they perceive the West as posing a symbolic and realistic threat to Muslims' group entity. ...
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Indonesian Muslims believe in conspiracies suggesting that the West is behind terrorist attacks in Indonesia. This belief persists despite overwhelming evidence that Islamist radicals were the true perpetrators. The current research examines the role intergroup threats and negative emotions have in moulding this type of conspiratorial belief and how this role is dependent upon the level of Muslims’ perceived identity subversion, that is, a sense that the Western ways of life have fundamentally changed Islamic identity. Data from 246 Indonesian Muslim students revealed that negative emotions of dejection-agitation towards Western ways of life significantly mediated the effects of both symbolic and realistic threats on belief in anti-West conspiracy theories. The effects of intergroup threats and dejection-agitation on belief in conspiracy theories, as predicted, were contingent on Muslim participants’ perceived identity subversion. Higher symbolic threat, realistic threat, and dejection-agitation indeed positively predicted the belief, but only when the degree of identity subversion was high. Identity subversion moderated the roles of dejection-agitation in mediating the effect of symbolic and realistic threats in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. More specifically, the empirical evidence of these mediating roles of dejection-agitation was only among Muslim participants with high identity subversion. Finally, theoretical implications and study limitations of the current findings were discussed.
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This article aims to understand how discourses about Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are supported and/or rejected by radical Islamic groups. Data were collected from two Islamic news website: Voa-Islam and Arrahmah. Both websites are categorised as radical Islamic sites. By using the discursive psychology approach, it was found that when ISIS is viewed as a group that actualised the establishment of an Islamic State, it is praised and supported. However, when ISIS is deemed to have killed other fellow Muslims, it is opposed and its movement is considered to be ‘out of Islamic corridors'. Practical implications of these findings are identified and discussed.
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Separatist movements are a social phenomenon that spread in many countries across the world, threatening the stability of established political entities due to its violent and intractable nature. Deescalating conflict and establishing peace among the disputing parties is of paramount importance. Despite the pressing need, there is a notable dearth of social psychological research that has made reconciliation in such conflicts the focal point of its empirical investigation--and even less so pertaining to social-psychological interventions conducive to reconciliation. The aim of this dissertation was to address these gaps, offering an examination of the social-psychological factors and interventions that can promote reconciliation in separatist conflict. The empirical studies presented in this dissertation assume that separatist conflicts involve two disputing parties harbouring contrary points of view: the majority that resists separatism and the separatist group that advocates its demand for autonomy. I investigated how majority and separatist groups alike think and feel about their involvement in conflict. Uncovering these perspectives has helped me through this dissertation in gaining a better insight into the social- psychological factors that facilitate or hinder support for reconciliation among the majority and separatist groups. This dissertation also examines the effectiveness of social-psychological interventions in attenuating the majority’s defensive reactions to its harm against the separatist group and, in turn, in promoting reconciliation among members of this non-separatist group. Finally, this dissertation confirms that the nature and the dynamics of reconciliation are complex. In this regard, I interpret reconciliation as a multidimensional construct that bears within it attitudinal, affective, intentional, and behavioural components, and assess the relations among these components. This dissertation provides answers to several important research questions. Some limitations remain, however, raising new questions, and potential directions for future research have been outlined accordingly. I hope that by addressing these remaining gaps in our knowledge, follow-up studies will provide a more in-depth account concerning the underlying mechanisms of reconciliation in separatist conflict. These future studies can hopefully provide scholars and practitioners with further insight into social-psychological interventions that are effective in promoting reconciliation not only among members of the majority, which is the focus of this dissertation, but also among those of the separatist group.