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Fulani herder and farmer relationships in West Africa have always been troublesome as a result of farmers’ fundamental rejection of the herders’ inroads into their areas and also because of increased competition for available resources. In countries such as Ghana, local and even national campaigns have been launched to expel the herders but they pe...
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... study was conducted in Ghana's Tallensi-Nab- dam district (Upper East Region) ( Fig. 1), in the villages of Datoko, Namoranteng, Zanwore and Dig- are and associated ''village forests'' in an area we refer to as the Namoranteng-Digare belt (Fig. 2). The Namoranteng-Digare belt, situated in the Eastern Wildlife Corridor, doubles as a migration route for herders, increasing their settlements as well as farmer- herder contact near corridor villages. The herders in this study migrated from the Burkina Faso provinces of Gourma, Nahouri, Namentenga, Sanmatenga and Zoundwéogo to tend their cattle and enter herding contracts with Ghanaian cattle owners to exploit their cattle-raising ...
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The phenomenon of farmer-‐‑herders conflict across West Africa has prompted
management strategies by several governments across the subcontinent. One of the
conflict resolution mechanisms has been the policy of expulsion, which the Ghanaian
state adopted as a response to incessant conflict between the settled agriculturalists and
migrating Fulani...
Citations
... For instance, in West Africa, Fulani herders are frequently seen as strangers, and disputes arise when they demand equal rights to common-resources . The rejection of herders' activities in certain communities further exacerbates these tensions (Bukari, 2017;Yembilah & Grant, 2014). ...
Transhumant pastoralism and sustainable development are two concepts that have long been treated as mutually exclusive elements in research on agriculture and livestock production. This study, therefore, aimed to establish the critical link between the two concepts by exploring the effects of transhumant pastoralism on economic, environmental and social sustainability, thereby conceptualising it within the broader sustainable development discourse. The study adopted a systematic literature review methodology to synthesise 145 studies related to the role of transhumant pastoralism in sustainable development in sub‐Saharan Africa. The paper employed thematic analysis to investigate the nature of transhumance and its implications for sustainability. The thematic analysis was based on the tripartite dimensions of sustainability—social, economic and environmental. The findings indicate that transhumance substantially impacts economic sustainability through the preservation of livelihoods, the creation of employment opportunities, and the generation of revenue. Nonetheless, it also poses challenges such as crop damage and the spread of zoonotic diseases, adversely affecting economic stability. Socially, transhumance promotes ethnoreligious cooperation and integration, enhancing social cohesion, but it also contributes to conflicts and security concerns. From the environmental perspective, transhumance has the potential to mitigate overgrazing and facilitate ecosystem regeneration. However, it is also linked to water contamination, deforestation, and the proliferation of invasive species. The study concluded that sustainable transhumant pastoralism must be conceptualised holistically, addressing the dimensions of sustainability simultaneously. It is recommended that effective stakeholder collaboration and comprehensive policy interventions be used to harness the benefits of transhumance while minimising its adverse effects.
... This real or perceived corruption eroded the trust that people had in the authorities and their ability to be neutral interveners (Benjaminsen et al 2009). Informants in other studies said that police were outsiders to the situation (Setrana and Kyei 2021), favored herders (Yembilah and Grant 2014b), took both cash and in-kind bribes (Benjaminsen et al 2009, Vahyala 2021, were slow to respond to conflicts (Kugbega and Aboagye 2021), and often failed to reconcile conflict parties (Setrana and Kyei 2021). ...
... In reviewing these articles, we noted inconsistencies in the use of terminology that further exemplified these identity-based tensions. Authors identified farmers as smallholders (Kuusaana and Bukari 2015), settlers (Alhassan 2017, Kugbega andAboagye 2021), or indigenes (Barre 2012, Yembilah andGrant 2014b) in Ghana or by their ethnicities, such as Dogon in Mali (Benjaminsen and Boubacar 2021) or Ewe (as opposed to the Kwahu chiefs) in Ghana (Alhassan 2017). Herders were described as Fulani (Bukari et al 2018, Benjaminsen and Boubacar 2021, Setrana and Kyei 2021, semi-nomadic herders (Brottem 2016), or pastoralists (Kugbega and Aboagye 2021). ...
Resource scarcity and insecurity due to climate change, coupled with ethnic, religious, and identity politics, have strained peaceful coexistence between farmers and herders in West and Central Africa over the last few decades. Violent farmer-herder clashes now pose a significant threat to security and stability in the Sahelian and savannah dryland regions. Despite the large and increasing literature on these conflicts in recent decades, no comprehensive reviews or syntheses of knowledge on these conflicts have been published. We review empirical studies on farmer-herder conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa published from 2000 to 2021, focusing holistically on drivers, impacts, and the opportunities and limits of the main resolution and peacebuilding strategies different actors use to manage the conflicts. Most of the studies focused on Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mali and mainly covered conflict dynamics, political ecology, agriculture, climate change, conflict management, governance, land tenure, and peacebuilding. The majority were cross-sectional and relied on qualitative data and mixed methods. The reviewed literature shows that main drivers of farmer-herder conflicts are climate-induced environmental factors, land tenure insecurity, resource competition and intergroup conflicts and prejudices. Conflict control and prevention strategies fell along a spectrum of aggressive, through passive, to constructive tactics. The main conflict management strategies used included third-party intervention (mediation and arbitration), litigation, and direct negotiations for damage compensation. Key actors involved in peacebuilding efforts included farmers and herders themselves, community leaders, community-based organizations, police and courts, and informal community groups. Our findings and discussion advance broader understanding of farmer-herder conflicts, establish the opportunities and limits of various resolution approaches, and highlight gaps and directions for relevant future research.
... Matters in contention are so central that each party resists any attempts at their reduction or devaluation and often refuse to negotiate or compromise concerning such issues, fuelling mutual fear and attack (Hogg, 2016). Like some countries in Africa, Ghana, over the years has been battling with many devastating farmer-herder conflicts (Bukari et al, 2020;Yembilah & Grant, 2014;Agyemang, 2017;Tonah, 2007). The intractable nature of these conflicts is principally attributed to improper democratic structures, political and economic competition over land, government interference, and compromised positions of traditional chiefs (Anamzoya & Tonah, 2012;Awedoba, 2009). ...
... Their study found that the imagery of citizenship together with politics and resource scarcity explains the intractability of the farmer-herder conflict in Central Nigeria. Yembilah and Grant's (2014) in an environment where natural resource access and use rights are tied to common property principles. In another study involving 160 respondents, Johnson and Taofik (2017) found that the persistence of herders in Central Nigeria is related to mainly territoriality and citizenship where Fulani herders are perceived as being aliens and non-indigenes and as such have no claims to any parcel of lands in Central Nigeria. ...
Cultural factors underpin most of the intractable farmer-herder conflicts in Africa, as in Ghana. Nonetheless, these factors gained limited scholarly attention. This paper examines the infamous farmer-herder conflict in the Asante-Akyem District of the Ashanti Region. Four hundred respondents cumulatively were randomly and purposely selected in a mixed study design. A cross-tabulation was ran to determine the extent to which differences in nationality, religion, norms, values, and stereotyping played roles in the conflict. The study found that; 94.7% of farmers, 88.7% of herders, 87.9% of middle persons' group, and 83.3% of chiefs and cattle owners respectively, agreed that the differences in these variables are the prime cultural factors that have sustained the conflict and impeded its resolution. The study recommends a re-socialisation of Fulani herders and their host communities by conflict experts and other stakeholders through workshops to foster healthy coexistence in their diversities.
... Media coverage of violent clashes between herders and farmers and successive intervention policies has failed to curb the menace in Ghana (Issifu, et al., 2022;Yembilah and Grant, 2014). From 2009 to 2018, farmer-herder conflicts intensified in several areas in Ghana, such as Gushiegu, in 2011, where 14 herders were killed by local farmers. ...
... Cattle owners' and herders' powerful connections help them penetrate communities in the midst of conflict. There are alliances with chiefs, security agencies (police), community elders, politicians and key community members to ensure their settlement (see Yembilah and Grant 2014) and help to access resources. Fulani pastoralists offer gifts to, and care for the cattle of, politicians, community leaders, chiefs and some government officials, thereby forging ties and connections that position them in the community and grant them access to resources (see Yembilah and Grant 2014). ...
... There are alliances with chiefs, security agencies (police), community elders, politicians and key community members to ensure their settlement (see Yembilah and Grant 2014) and help to access resources. Fulani pastoralists offer gifts to, and care for the cattle of, politicians, community leaders, chiefs and some government officials, thereby forging ties and connections that position them in the community and grant them access to resources (see Yembilah and Grant 2014). From an actor-oriented political approach, power relations and political actions of various actors influence interactions/relationships and conflicts between farmers and herders. ...
This paper presents evidence from two cases in Ghana (Agogo and Gushiegu) to examine why farmer–herder conflicts escalate into violence. It argues that aside from resource competition, and crop damage, there are multi-faceted and dynamic processes and factors involved. The cases show that such violent conflicts can be explained by a constellation of actors, politics, land access and citizenship contestations. Many actors are important in this escalation. Local citizenship discourses and framing of conflicts are intricately linked to struggles over access to land and resources through which actors mobilize for violence. Both farmers and herders see cattle owners, chiefs, politicians, local groups and government officials as responsible for mobilizing and inciting violence and clandestinely using politics and citizenship in access to resources. At the same time, farmer–herder conflicts generate internal struggles between those who have interests in cattle (herders/businessmen and chiefs/elders) and those who have no such interests (young first-comer “cattleless” farmers).
... In the opinion of many Fulani herders, they were only caretakers, although some of them owned a few of the cattle. A sizeable number of livestock under Fulani care belonged to Ghanaian stockowners, including chiefs, who continued to employ Fulani to manage their animals (Yembilah & Grant, 2014;Olaniyan et al., 2015;Soeters et al., 2017). ...
... This also gave the Fulani herders some form of political connections to both local and national politicians who also helped them to penetrate farming communities, ensure the security of their settlements and give them opportunities to access land resources (Yembilah & Grant, 2014). Yembilah &Grant (2014) argue that, the herders' networks with community leaders give them access to pastureland, which then hinders the promotion of peace among farmers and herders in ATA. ...
... This also gave the Fulani herders some form of political connections to both local and national politicians who also helped them to penetrate farming communities, ensure the security of their settlements and give them opportunities to access land resources (Yembilah & Grant, 2014). Yembilah &Grant (2014) argue that, the herders' networks with community leaders give them access to pastureland, which then hinders the promotion of peace among farmers and herders in ATA. Once again, the question is asked how legitimate are these local elite and traditional powers? ...
Recently, communities in Agogo Traditional Area (ATA) have witnessed an increasing spate of violence leading to loss of lives, loss of livelihoods, insecurity and severe injury among others. This article explores the “local” in peacebuilding by addressing the following research questions: first, how do Agogo indigenes in the diaspora contribute to peacebuilding in Agogo Traditional Area? Second, in which ways do the engagement of Fulani herders and indigenous farmers influence the process of peacebuilding in Agogo Traditional Area? The article employed in-depth interviews, participant observation, key informant interviews and focus group discussions in the data collection process. From an interdisciplinary perspective, the research has introduced the activities of transnational migrants into the discourse of peacebuilding as it positions Ghanaians in the diaspora as local actors engaged in the farmer-herder conflict in ATA. This study has shown that in the case of ATA, despite the potential benefits of the local peacebuilding including the contribution of the diaspora, it is bedeviled with challenges such as mistrust and inadequate resources. The article recommends that local peacebuilding be detached from adjudication in the court of law because the local actors perceive the court as external and ambivalent to the cultural context of local conflicts.
... Other scholars (e.g. Olaniyan et al., 2015;Soeters et al., 2017;Yembilah and Grant, 2014) have also highlighted the fact that there is the involvement of some Ghanaian elites in the cattle business, and a sizeable proportion of livestock under Fulani herders' care belong to Ghanaians, including chiefs, who continue to employ Fulani to manage their animals. This also gives the Fulani herders some type of political connections to both local and national politicians who help them to penetrate farming communities. ...
... This also gives the Fulani herders some type of political connections to both local and national politicians who help them to penetrate farming communities. These influential personalities ensure the security of their settlements and give them opportunities to access landed resources (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). Chiefs and community leaders who have lost out on the rent of herders' settlements instigate negative sentiments that lead to calling for their expulsion, while farmers use overt aggression to maximise farming opportunities (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). ...
... These influential personalities ensure the security of their settlements and give them opportunities to access landed resources (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). Chiefs and community leaders who have lost out on the rent of herders' settlements instigate negative sentiments that lead to calling for their expulsion, while farmers use overt aggression to maximise farming opportunities (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). Tonah (2006) similarly notes that in farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana's Volta Basin, chiefs, landowners, cattle owners, and livestock traders have formed strong networks with herders, while farmers, youth, community members, and government officials are networked in opposition to them, hence escalating violent conflicts. ...
Issues of indigeneity and citizenship rights for second-generation pastoralist migrants across the West African States have received little to no attention in migration and pastoralist studies. This article explores this under-researched area in the field of migration studies and revisits the highly contested migration–citizenship nexus among Fulani herders in the Shai-Osu-Doku and Agogo traditional areas of Ghana. The article captures the crises of citizenship facing descendants of Fulani herders and families, particularly in relation to their integration into local host communities. I argue that second-generation migrants remain at the margins, spatially and socio-politically defined, of both development and society. While they do not have any ties with their ancestral “home countries,” they are also considered non-citizens and face growing hostility in the places they call home. Being a citizen is not simply a static legal position, but a status developed through routine practices, building relations, and shared experiences.
... 77 However, under conditions of increasing resource competition, this social and political distance can shift towards mutual intimidation, and, in times of crisis, become a more hostile "foreigner", ethnicized discourse. 78 This dynamic is not universal across the region but appears particularly in contexts in which there is a seasonal influx of livestock from outside the country. Sources in this review highlight this discourse not only in conflict-affected countries such as the CAR 79 and Nigeria 80 but also in comparatively stable countries such as Ghana. ...
This report is a cross-sectoral review of research intended to synthesize the principal debates and trends on conflicts relating to pastoralism across Sudano-Sahelian West and Central Africa. The findings below represent overarching takeaways from this
review, which manifest differently across the various contexts included in this study.
... Fulani pastoralists in West Africa are continually depicted as sources of contention and conflict with local farmers (Bukari & Schareika, 2015;Yembilah, 2012;Yembilah & Grant, 2014). The modern migration of Fulani pastoralists from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to Ghana started as early as the 1960s (Tonah, 2003). ...
With an increasingly global demand for higher education, countries are competing for international students. Popular destinations like the United States are facing a decreasing number of international student enrollments due to restrictive policies that are perceived as unwelcoming to foreign guests. Regional hubs are emerging as alternative destinations for international students. Ghana, today considered one of West Africa’s most stable democracies and an important destination country in the region, receives many foreign guests including economic migrants, students, tourists, and refugees. Ghana is also emerging as a regional hub for educational migrants. How are these foreign guests received, integrated, and ultimately trained as global citizens? More specifically, this research asks, how are ECOWAS students in higher educational institutions welcomed within Accra, Ghana? This study relies on data from 47 semi-structured interviews with foreign students and Ghanaians and direct observations sessions at public and private universities. The study examines the receptivity of foreign guests by stakeholders in Ghana, focusing on tertiary-level student migrants from throughout the West African region. Findings indicate that the educational setting generally has a positive receptivity climate as supported by the data. The positive receptivity climate is intentional with associated government and institutional policies and practices. Francophone students experience less positive reception than Anglophone students do as a result of language barriers. Receptivity of foreign guests may be one significant way for developing countries to achieve sustainable growth and positive development outcomes. As such, this research develops a new migration model that enhances receptivity through education. Policy implications include the strengthening of regional ties and migration channels related to education circulation and the ongoing promotion and development of human capital and a human economy. An example of the development of human capital is the West Africa Centre for Crop Improvement (WACCI) based at the University of Ghana, Legon, which since its inception in 2007, has trained fifty-two multinational postgraduates who are working toward lessening food insecurity in the sub-region.
... In the studied area, exclusion takes place in two forms: One, dry season farmers are excluded due to the extensive crop damages done by increasing cattle numbers owned by local elites and Fulani pastoralists in a dam community, as happened in Takpo. From the Takpo case it is clear that the Fulani invest into 'leadership alliances' (as [34]) with the Tendamba and/or landowners, bypassing the chief if necessary as a strategy to secure their stay. Two, in another case Fulani pastoralists were not allowed to own cattle and Fulani from outside the village territory were fended off to use the dams in order to protect the dry season crops (Goli). ...
Agro-pastoral dams (APDs) are an increasingly popular method of adaptation interventions improving communal water supply in rural West Africa. However, APDs are often constructed in areas where culturally heterogeneous pastoralists and farmers compete for similar land and water resources. Lifting open access water abundance is likely to change if not intensify ongoing tensions between farmers and settling Fulani herders. The extent of collective action and inclusivity of 6 APDs in Northern Ghana are analysed, combining theory from common-pool resource management and equity and justice in climate change adaptation into a proposed Inclusive Collective Action (ICA) model. Practically, the article demonstrates that neither fully excluding Fulani pastoralists nor making dams openly accessible results in inclusive APD usage and management where collective action is successful, and more dynamic forms of regional inclusion and exclusion are needed. Theoretically, the article identifies some of the limitations of applying the enabling conditions for collective action of common-pool resource theory as it tends to overlook negative aspects of excluding certain user groups in culturally heterogeneous contexts from managing and using a commons.
