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Fig 6 - Spatial Resilience in Networks

Fig. 6.3 Spatial depiction of an implementation of the prisoner's dilemma game in NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999, 2002). Each pixel in this 150 × 150-pixel world represents an actor who can interact with his/her eight neighbours in each iteration of the model. Actors cooperate (blue) or defect (red) with equal probability at the start of the model. From then on, if an actor has cooperated, its score will be the number of its neighbors that also cooperated; if it defects, its score will be the product of the defection-award ratio and the number of cooperating neighbors (i.e. the actor has taken advantage of the patches that cooperated). For the next iteration of the model, each actor will adopt the strategy of its highest-scoring neighbor from the previous round. In this figure, blue shading means that the actor cooperated in the previous and current round; red, that it defected in the previous iteration as well as the current round; green, that it cooperated in the previous round but defected in the current round; and yellow, that it defected in the previous round but cooperated in the current round. This particular simulation used a defection-award ratio of 1.58, which results in a dynamic pattern with similar proportions of defectors and cooperators. Netlogo can be downloaded or run on-line at http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/4.1.1/ 
3 Spatial depiction of an implementation of the prisoner's dilemma game in NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999, 2002). Each pixel in this 150 × 150-pixel world represents an actor who can interact with his/her eight neighbours in each iteration of the model. Actors cooperate (blue) or defect (red) with equal probability at the start of the model. From then on, if an actor has cooperated, its score will be the number of its neighbors that also cooperated; if it defects, its score will be the product of the defection-award ratio and the number of cooperating neighbors (i.e. the actor has taken advantage of the patches that cooperated). For the next iteration of the model, each actor will adopt the strategy of its highest-scoring neighbor from the previous round. In this figure, blue shading means that the actor cooperated in the previous and current round; red, that it defected in the previous iteration as well as the current round; green, that it cooperated in the previous round but defected in the current round; and yellow, that it defected in the previous round but cooperated in the current round. This particular simulation used a defection-award ratio of 1.58, which results in a dynamic pattern with similar proportions of defectors and cooperators. Netlogo can be downloaded or run on-line at http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/4.1.1/ 
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