Figure 4 - uploaded by Johannes Gerschewski
Content may be subject to copyright.
Source publication
Governments routinely justify why the regime over which they preside is entitled to rule. These claims to legitimacy are both an expression of and shape of how a rule is being exercised. In this paper, we introduce new expert-coded measures of regime legitimation strategies (RLS) for 183 countries in the world from 1900 to 2019. Country experts rat...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... use the case-based variant which concerns itself with whether the 'indicator : : : sort(s) cases in a way that : : : fits conceptual expectations' (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 539) by looking at individual countries over time to see if the values generated by the expert surveys are congruent with strongly held beliefs about the case. If we start by looking at legitimacy claims based on the personalistic characteristics of the ruler, the short, dotted blue line in Figure 4, we can clearly identify the rise of strongmen. In line with the recent literature on the personalization of the Cambodian regime (Morgenbesser, 2018), the measure picks up Hun Sen's ascension to the premiership in Cambodia in 1985 and notes a peak in person-based legitimation claims in 2018, when he audaciously commissioned a grand and ostentatious monument to himself (Nachemson, 2018). ...
Citations
... Building on the individual cases discussed earlier, we provide additional evidence for this mechanism using proxies for government responses. Specifically, drawing on the expertise of a wide range of country specialists, Tannenberg et al. (2021) developed a comprehensive cross-national time-series dataset to capture how incumbent governments-both in authoritarian and democratic contexts-assert legitimacy across four dimensions: personalistic, performance-based, rational-legal (procedural), and ideological. These measures have been widely used and examined in recent cross-national studies (e.g., Keremoğlu et al. 2022;Kim 2023;Brunkert and von Soest 2023), though their specific impact on public opinion remains underexplored (for a notable recent exception, see Tannenberg 2023). ...
This study investigates the political effects of corruption convictions involving former heads of government. Drawing on an original dataset of convictions and annual, nationally representative surveys covering over 130 countries from 2006 to 2019, we employ a difference-indifferences approach to analyze how these events shape government approval. Our findings indicate a notable contrast: in less democratic countries, convictions boost support for the government, whereas their effect is negligible in more democratic contexts. We reveal a key mechanism behind this divergence by showing how incumbent governments respond differently to the convictions. In less democratic settings, governments exploit corruption convictions by emphasizing the personal virtues of their leaders. Beyond identifying this critical condition that prompts political elites to adopt personalistic appeals, we also demonstrate how these appeals resonate with the public. These findings have implications for debates on the consequences of anti-corruption efforts and their relationship with populism.
... The reason according to the authors is that governments in democratic political systems were 'less responsive to their citizens' value preferences for freedom, democratic rights, and liberties than governments in autocratic political systems to their citizens' value preference for security' (Saam et al., 2022: 13). Consequently, the authors predict that pandemics like the COVID-19 can potentially strengthen autocratic regimes and weaken democratic political systems as democracies struggle to meet their people's conditions for freedom, while the autocracies respond to their people's security demands and use this as a source of legitimation (Saam et al., 2022;see also, Gerschewski 2023;Tannenberg et al., 2021). ...
How do different regime types execute a security response during a pandemic? We interrogate the politics of monopolistic securitization which we argue to have significantly directed and influenced the COVID-19 policy strategies adopted in the ‘democratic’ United Kingdom (UK) and ‘authoritarian’ Thailand. Despite their stark political differences, we contend that the British and Thai states’ parallel resort to monopolistic securitization as an overarching pandemic approach effectively made them ‘functionally similar’ by producing security responses that differed only in magnitude and scale but not in kind. Integrating securitization and democratic standards violations frameworks, we find out that the British and Thai authorities’ monopolistic securitization of COVID-19 initially constrained the intersubjective process required to socially construct the pandemic as a primary existential threat endangering both countries. This significantly diminished their public audiences’ individual/agential and collective/institutional capacity to deliberate the immediate emergency measures they unilaterally deployed, particularly during the pandemic’s early stages. Consequently, whether it was in the UK with a supposedly robust democracy or in Thailand with at best a hybrid regime if not outright authoritarian, the security responses that emerged constituted varying types and degrees of violations within the illiberal-authoritarian spectrum. Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, the fundamental deliberative-iterative mechanism underpinning securitization enabled the British and Thai public audiences to gradually reclaim their role and space, allowing them to challenge the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing emergency measures, thereby weakening the states’ monopolistic control over the process.
... By legitimacy, we mean the capacity of a leader or regime to be seen as appropriate and proper in society. In real-world politics, legitimacy is fought over, with different actors seeking to legitimize or de-legitimize actors, actions, or structures (see Nullmeier et al., 2012;Tannenberg et al., 2021). The central goal of this inquiry is to better understand the nature of autocratic leadership in the advanced twenty-first century, the status of followers, and the difference they may make. ...
p>Leadership and followership have long been considered to be defining features of democratic politics. However, more recently, both conceptual redefinitions and real-world developments have put issues of leadership and followership in regimes from beyond the family of established liberal democracies center-stage. This article looks into the nature of authoritarian leadership and followership from a comparative perspective and in light of theories of democratic political leadership. As the inquiry suggests, the rise and nature of leadership activities in contemporary authoritarian regimes reflects both the turn towards more competitive types of autocracy and the aspiration of many authoritarian powerholders to be seen as democratic. At the same time, some of the most spectacular manifestations of autocratic leadership relate to democratic rather than established authoritarian regimes. While followers of autocratic leaders can control their leaders only to the extent that a regime provides mechanisms of vertical accountability, authoritarian followers, even in established autocracies, are not in all regards less important or powerful than their democratic counterparts. Many authoritarian followers do not just support autocrats, but actively attack and chase non-followers or followers of other leaders, and thus play an independent role in the legitimation or de-legitimation of leaders and regimes.</p
... Autorzy podkreślają jednak rozbieżne postrzeganie wskazanych kwestii przez różnych interesariuszy, a także występujący przy tej okazji chaos terminologiczny związany z ujęciem wyzwań klimatycznych. Tannenberg et al. [2021] zwracają w analizowanym kontekście uwagę na zróżnicowane (także w sferze rolnictwa) konsekwencje rozwoju odnawialnych źródeł energii. Nowak et al. [Nowak et al. 2023] przeanalizowali konflikty przestrzenne dotyczące odnawialnych źródeł energii w Polsce. ...
Celem monografii jest przedstawienie dotyczących prawa planowania przestrzennego uwarunkowań związanych z wdrażaniem wyzwań klimatycznych w Polsce. W pięciu rozdziałach zostały wyodrębnione kluczowe z tej perspektywy płaszczyzny tematyczne. W rozdziale pierwszym M. Bera i M. J. Nowak dokonują szerszego przeglądu literatury, podejmując próbę określenia, w jaki sposób w uniwersalnej międzynarodowej dyskusji wiąże się temat planowania przestrzennego z odpowiedzią na wyzwania klimatyczne. Należy oczywiście przy tej okazji uwzględniać specyfikę poszczególnych krajów: zarówno systemową, jak też związaną z intensywnością określonego rodzaju problemów. Niemniej, dzięki syntezie kluczowych tez i poglądów można wyodrębnić wspólne płaszczyzny, stanowiące także istotny punkt odniesienia dla Polski. W drugim rozdziale P. Śleszyński określił, w jakim stopniu stan zaawansowania prac planistycznych, (pokrycie i struktura obowiązujących aktów planowania miejscowego) oraz specyfika struktury demograficzno-osadniczej odpowiada na problemy i wyzwania związane z aktualnymi i spodziewanymi wyzwaniami klimatycznymi i hydrologicznymi w Polsce. W szczególności autor stara się odpowiedzieć na pytania, związane z dostępnością do zieleni wysokiej, zagrożeniami dla starszej populacji, w tym w zakresie ubóstwa i wykluczenia energetycznego. W tym celu zostały wykorzystane szczegółowe dane o rozmieszczeniu ludności, strukturze planów miejscowych i satelitarne bazy pokrycia terenu. Zidentyfikowano regiony i miasta o wysokim ryzyku niekorzystnych uwarunkowań. Rozdział trzeci został poświęcony problematyce odnawialnych źródeł energii: inwestycji, które można zaliczyć do kluczowych z perspektywy udzielania szerszej odpowiedzi na wyzwania klimatyczne. Zapewne jest to ta sfera z pogranicza prawa planowania przestrzennego oraz wyzwań klimatycznych, która najszerzej uwzględniana jest w polskich regulacjach, powodując jednocześnie największą liczbę dylematów. Autorzy (A. Brzezińska Rawa, J. Goździewicz-Biechońska, K. Rokicka- Murszewska, K. Rogatka) podjęli próbę usystematyzowania wskazanych problemów, stawiając jednocześnie pytanie o adekwatność krajowych i unijnych regulacji względem występujących wyzwań. W rozdziale czwartym A. Fogel zajmuje się tematem obejmującym sferę relacji ochrony dziedzictwa kulturowego z wyzwaniami klimatycznymi. Wyodrębnia kluczowe pola konfliktu pomiędzy ochroną zabytków a działaniami adaptacyjnymi i mitygacyjnymi w zakresie zmian klimatu, rozważając zarówno istotę tych konfliktów, jak też sposoby ich rozwiązywania z perspektywy regulacyjnej. Ostatni, piąty rozdział dotyczy sfery środowiskowo-przyrodniczej. A. Kukulska-Kozieł, K. Rogatka, J. Gorzelany oraz T. Noszczyk koncentrują się na temacie dotyczącym zieleni publicznej na terenach podmiejskich, zastanawiając się m.in. nad tym, czy (i jak) obowiązujące regulacje prawne umożliwiają zrealizowanie niezbędnych, identyfikowanych z perspektywy wyzwań klimatycznych potrzeb.
... Gerschewski's seminal work on how autocracies justified and stabilized their mode of government led to increasing scholarship on theorizing authoritarian legitimation (Backes and Kailitz 2016;Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017;Gerschewski 2013;Von Haldenwang 2017). Most recent quantitative studies assess how these mechanisms legitimize authoritarian regimes (Keremoğlu, Hellmeier, and Weidmann 2022;Maerz 2020;Tannenberg et al. 2021;Von Soest and Grauvogel 2017). Meanwhile, qualitative studies focus on analyzing state discourse, actions and mechanisms of authoritarian leaders (Isaacs 2014;Ngoun 2022;Omelicheva 2016;Schatz and Maltseva 2012). ...
... In this article we identify four major mechanisms, defined as the set of claims and actions that autocratic regimes make, to justify their rule (Keremoğlu, Selteyev, and Almaganbetov 2022). Existing studies identified a range of legitimation mechanisms but do not consider digital activism as an integral part of this process (Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017;Keremoğlu, Selteyev, and Almaganbetov 2022;Lorch and Bunk 2017;Maerz 2020;Tannenberg et al. 2021). Drawing on existing research we develop a framework to explain how autocracies incorporate digital activism into a wider strategy of legitimation. ...
... Claims based on a country's recognition abroad, such as participation and membership in international events or organizations, is an example of the final type of legitimacy claims identified by von Soest and Graugovel (2017, 291). These various ways of claiming legitimacy, either traditionally or digitally, are rarely applied separately, but are rather combined and reinforced using complementary tactics that help accumulate a strategy for political survival (Tannenberg et al. 2021). ...
... As the analysis above demonstrates, the Belarusian regime utilizes a wide range of the forms of digital repression identified by Feldstein (2021). In fact, all five of Feldstein's types are utilized as complementary means (Tannenberg et al. 2021) and shape the regime's policy of incorporating technology and digital platforms to increase the effectiveness of repression against dissenters (Feldstein 2021;Gunitsky 2015). ...
In the summer of 2020, the Belarusian regime experienced an unprecedented challenge to its power. Large-scale demonstrations erupted across the whole country as a response to a rigged election and police violence against protest participants. Social media and messaging platform Telegram assisted in maintaining and coordinating the protests and played a significant role in the mass mobilization. The Belarusian regime predictably reacted with repression against protest participants, as well as censorship of media and digital platforms. At the same time, in a reaction against the protests and the activation of digital platforms, the Belarusian regime expanded its repertoire by co-opting technology. This included utilizing a sophisticated system to shut down the Internet, developing a network of pro-governmental Telegram channels, spreading false information about the opposition leaders, and intensifying control over the Internet via legal regulations. This article aims to explore the digital repression and legitimation claims of the Belarusian regime in the aftermath of the 2020 post-electoral protests. I argue that, alongside the growing incorporation of social media and digital platforms into the protest movement, the Belarusian regime employed an advanced authoritarian toolkit and supplemented “negative control” with proactive strategies of legitimation. The article seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of how post-Soviet autocracies incorporate technology to make digital legitimacy claims and reinforce political repression.
... Methodologically, research on legitimacy and legitimation in autocracies has applied state-of-the-art approaches including expert surveys, survey experiments, and (automated) text analyses (e.g., Boussalis, Dukalskis, and Gerschewski 2023 ;Buckley et al. 2023;Tannenberg et al. 2021;Williamson 2021). There is insightful work on list experiments, for instance on self-censorship and regime support in China (Robinson and Tannenberg 2019) and President Putin's real popularity in Russia (Frye et al. 2017). ...
... In addition, it conceives of ideology and performance as important sources for autocracies' claims to legitimacy. Drawing on pioneering research on the "multidimensional" nature of legitimacy (Alagappa 1995), scholars contend that authoritarian regimes do not rely on a single claim alone (inter alia, Omelicheva 2016; von Soest and Grauvogel 2017;Tannenberg et al. 2021). In that sense, autocracies' claim making features "highly complex variations, transitional forms, and combinations" (Weber 2004, 34) of the various ideal types. ...
... Hitherto, expert surveys have often represented the second-best method to collect observational data and overcome knowledge gaps (Tannenberg et al. 2021) . They serve to produce generalizable findings across different countries and time with respect to questions of legitimacy and legitimation (von Soest and Grauvogel 2017; Thyen and Gerschewski 2018). ...
This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online. For more information, please read the site FAQs.
... In this chapter, I have looked at how international actors affect domestic autocratization processes as well as at how autocratizers themselves shape the international arena discursively, most notably via image-building and disinformation campaigns. Further research analyzing this communicative aspect of autocratization should examine the international factors shaping related legitimation strategies (Tannenberg et al., 2021). Identifying under what conditions -in conjunction with outright disinformation campaigns in democratic societies -they are successful on the international level is essential. ...
... Regimes with strong anti-imperialist ideologies can even turn it to their advantage to create a rally-round-the-flag effect (Galtung 1967) and quell internal dissent. Such an effect occurs when the sanctioned government can portray that external pressure as an attack on the entire country and thus successfully appeals to the solidarity of its population (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014;Tannenberg et al. 2021). This is particularly relevant for regimes that have a strong ideological foundation, for instance as a result of past revolutions or wars of liberation (Goldstone 2001;Levitsky and Way 2022 On the whole, however, current experimental evidence suggests that such a rallying effect is rarely caused by external pressure alone. ...
This chapter analyses the nature and effects of external pressure imposed on authoritarian regimes. Around three-quarters of all countries under United Nations, United States and European Union sanctions are authoritarian, and “democracy sanctions” that aim at improving democratic and human rights in targeted countries constitute the biggest sanctions category. Yet, authoritarian regimes represent particularly problematic targets as they more easily shield themselves from external pressure than their democratic counterparts do. Authoritarians have a tighter grip on the public discourse and the struggle over the meaning of sanctions. They often even use them to their own advantage, denouncing sanction senders as “imperialist” and blaming them for their economic woes. The chapter presents trends in the application of sanctions pressure against authoritarian regimes, reviews mechanisms of how economic and diplomatic restrictions work, and examines authoritarian targets’ attempts to engage in pressure proofing.
... This is consistent with the findings of this study, namely the prolonged dual system of government among the former and current presidents of Kazakhstan, which suspended the processes of democracy development and legitimisation of the political regime. Governments usually justify why the regime they rule has the right to exist (Tannenberg et al., 2021). For example, the American researcher S.E. ...
The research relevance is determined by the fact that many post-communist countries have faced and continue to face problems in building a sustainable democratic system that would fully meet the needs of society. The research aims to analyse the ways and methods by which political regimes in post-communist countries were legitimised and to determine their effectiveness. To achieve the research objective, the methods of hermeneutics, deduction, analysis, and synthesis were used. The study found that the methods, ways and effectiveness of legitimisation of political regimes in Ukraine and Kazakhstan differ from each other, although they began their development at the same time (1991) and on the same basis (the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Poland, after the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989, embarked on the path of developing democratic institutions and civic engagement. In Ukraine, the way to legitimise the political regime was through democratic elections and transparency, and in Kazakhstan ̶ through economic development and propaganda. The effectiveness of the methods within the chosen paths resulted in the following democracy indices for the countries: Ukraine ̶ 5.42 (hybrid regime), Poland ̶ 7.04 (imperfect democracy), Kazakhstan ̶ 3.08 (authoritarian regime). In other words, all three countries are at different levels of development, depending on the analysed issues, with Poland being the best positioned. Therefore, it can be concluded that countries need to improve the legitimation of the political regime on the way to full democracy. The practical significance of this study is that the findings of the study are useful for policymakers, researchers and the public interested in the processes of democracy and legitimisation in the post-communist context
