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Reporting Intentions to the SEC Portal 

Reporting Intentions to the SEC Portal 

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Article
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There are many unanswered questions and concerns regarding the consequences of the fraud whistleblowing environment created by the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts. While SOX requires audit committees to implement anonymous internal reporting channels, the Dodd-Frank Act offers substantial monetary incentives that encourage reporting to the...

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Context 1
... The independent variables are presence of an internal incentive and evidence strength. The results for the AMI internal channel are presented in Table 2; the results for the SEC channel are reported in Table 3. 9 RQ1 examines whether employees' reporting intentions to internal and external channels differ in the presence of an internal incentive. ...
Context 2
... 2 indicates that evidence strength does not significantly influence reporting intentions to AMI's internal hotline, (F 1,68 ¼ 1.53, p ¼ 0.22). However, Table 3 indicates a significant main effect for evidence strength on SEC reporting intentions (F 1,68 ¼ 5.78, p ¼ 0.02). Participants indicated a significantly higher (t 70 ¼ 2.18; p ¼ 0.04; one tailed) reporting intention to the SEC portal in the strong evidence condition (l ¼ 4.84) relative to the weak evidence condition (l ¼ 3.85). ...
Context 3
... 2 reports that the interaction between internal incentive and evidence strength is not significant for reporting intentions to AMI's hotline (F 1,68 ¼ 0.63, p ¼ 0.43). For SEC reporting intentions, Table 3 reports a significant interaction between internal incentive and evidence strength (F 1,68 ¼ 4.36, p ¼ 0.04). A graphical depiction of this interaction is presented in Panel B of Figure 1. ...
Context 4
... graphical depiction of this interaction is presented in Panel B of Figure 1. An examination of Figure 1 along with the cell means in Panel B of Table 3 indicates that the impact of an internal incentive on reports to the SEC portal is contingent on evidence strength. When an internal incentive is absent, there is no difference between reporting intentions to the SEC under weak or strong evidence (l ¼ 4.24 and l ¼ 4.37, respectively). ...

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