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Relationships between workplace industrial relations actors
Source publication
This article examines the relationship between German trade unions and works councils, adopting a framework that identifies three main influences on the works council; the locus of bargaining, economic conditions and the strength of workplace unionism. The findings of an attitudinal survey of works council chairpersons in the metalworking industry,...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... third, the stability provided by delegating bargaining responsibility to the works council depends upon the organisational strength of the union and the structure of the industry. Workplace industrial relations appear, therefore, to be conditioned by the relationships between external environmental and internal organisational factors, as depicted in Figure 1. ...
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Citations
... According to French (2011), the question is if JCC faithful undermine or reflect union concerns. First, JCC may, in reality, cross the thin line between bargaining and consultation and put unions at risk. ...
The urge for employees to have a voice in the decision-making process at the workplace has made joint consultation imperative. This study examined joint consultation as a determinant of job satisfaction in the insurance sector. The study adopted the survey research method using Krejie and Morgan's sample size determination formula to select a sample size of eighty-six (86) from a population of one hundred and ten employees. Seventy-three copies of the questionnaire were duly completed, and thirteen were not usable. Two hypotheses were tested using the partial least square structural equation model, SMARTPLS 3.2.2. SPSS version 25. The result revealed that joint consultation has an effect on employee job satisfaction. The P values for the two hypotheses tested are less than 0.05 level of significance. Therefore, for the two hypotheses, the alternative hypotheses were accepted. The study recommended, among others, that organizations should see joint consultation as a means of enhancing job satisfaction. In addition, further studies should be conducted on joint consultation using other indicators of job satisfaction.
... Nonetheless, unions are more often associated with gaining higher wages, while works councils tend to be more often associated with higher levels of job satisfaction (Kleiner & Young-Myon, 1997). The relationship between unions and works councils can be complicated and it is influenced by many factors, including economic conditions and the strength of the union (French, 2001). ...
... The right to engage in collective bargaining without state interference was guaranteed in 1953. Since then, the collective regulation of employment contracts has been based on two pillars: one includes bargaining between employers' associations and unions at the industry level and the other is co-determination between management and works councils at the establishment level (French, 2001: 562). Although the management and the works council of the individual firm implement collective agreements within the firm, legal restrictions are laid down by the Collective Bargaining Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz: section 4) and the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz: section 77) to ensure that minimum standards contained in collective agreements cannot be undermined by agreements reached at establishment ...
... level (French, 2001: 576). In this sense, trade unions and works councils have different tasks but over the last 50–60 years the trade unions have had a strong influence on the works councils. ...
By the 1980s, some scholars had already claimed that corporatism, as an expression and institution of the bilateral negotiations between trade unions and employers' associations, had come to an end. This perception is stronger nowadays than it was then. Quite often it is argued that, as a result of economic liberalisation and the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism, industrial relations are under pressure, and that this is accompanied by a weakening of trade union power. In this article, the development of collective negotiations and the new contours of corporatism are analysed with respect to Germany. At the moment we are witnessing a decentralisation of formerly central negotiations and their differentiation in the direction of collective and/or concession bargaining at the level of the firm. At the same time, there is an important trend towards the up-scaling of industrial relations to the European Union level. The central argument of the article, therefore, is that a rescaling of industrial relations is taking place, which does not necessarily mean an end to corporatism but, rather, profoundly new qualities of corporatism. In order to develop the argument, changes in industrial and political organisation are examined.
... This suggests a positive link between collective bargaining coverage and works council introduction . On the other hand, case-study evidence shows that the relationships between councils and unions are not always without conflicts (French 2001; Whittall 2005). Moreover, a theoretical analysis by Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) suggests that collective bargaining coverage may discourage workers from adopting a council. ...
Some recent empirical studies seem to suggest that German works councils engage in rent-seeking activities rather than in the creation of joint establishment surplus. However, those cross-sectional studies do not address the issue of causation. We address this issue by investigating the factors that influence the employees' decision to introduce a works council in their establishment. Councils are more likely to be adopted in establishments with a very poor sales situation and poor employment growth. They are also more likely to be adopted in establishments where management does not pursue an expansive market strategy. Altogether, our results support the hypothesis that employees introduce works councils to protect the quasi-rents they have created by their efforts and human capital investments. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2009.
... While, in some settings (e.g. Germany, Netherlands) works councils are also a an important institutional stakeholder, their power is strongly linked to that of the unions (French 2001: 571). As Wever, (1994) has shown, because works councils are highly dependent on unions for resources and support, the unions " in many ways shape the works councils strategies and actions " . ...
We explore determinants of subsidiary autonomy in setting human resource management (HRM) practices within US-parented multinational enterprises (MNEs), in Europe and Australia. We examine both the effect of strategic context and the effect of the institutional location of the subsidiary. We find that US MNEs show greater centralisation of control over HRM where the subsidiary faces global markets, in coordinated market economies vs liberal market economies, and where union density is low. Journal of International Business Studies (2008) 39, 151–166. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400313
... As French (2001) notes, the issues are whether WCs/JCCs faithfully undermine or reflect union concerns and how unions assist WCs/JCCs. Three areas of difficulty exist under French's first issue. ...
... Under certain circumstances, works councils may become an alternative locus of collective representation, eclipsing traditional bargaining practices (Schmidt et al., 2003). For example, there is some evidence to suggest that, in Germany's eastern neue La¨nder, weaker unions have enabled management to shift the role of councils away from policing sectoral agreements and towards building greater employee compliance with management wishes (Artus, 2003;French, 2001;Schmidt et al., 2003). It has been suggested that in this respect German employers are using the neue La¨nder as a 'laboratory' for practices to be introduced later in the west (Brinkmann, 2003). ...
This article assesses whether the operation of works councils or joint consultative committees (JCCs) is inimical to unionization in different business systems. An extensive transnational survey reveals that both works councils and JCCs are positively associated with a union presence; there is no evidence from this sample that either is used to any significant extent as a substitute for unions. The finding holds true irrespective of business system. Its implications for industrial relations actors are examined.
... While, in some settings (e.g. Germany, Netherlands) works councils are also a an important institutional stakeholder, their power is strongly linked to that of the unions (French 2001: 571). As Wever, (1994) has shown, because works councils are highly dependent on unions for resources and support, the unions " in many ways shape the works councils strategies and actions " . ...
... The theoretical arguments and linkages follow along the same lines as discussed in some length in the section on unions (see above). However, these advantages should become more pronounced in the German co-determination system because its particular features should foster comparatively higher degrees of co-operation, trust, and longer-term perspectives (for a more detailed discussion see Frege, 2002;French, 2001;Bertelsmann Stiftung/ Hans Böckler Stiftung, 1998;Müller-Jentsch, 1995). The mandatory (though not automatic) nature of works councils reinforces the credibility of employers' commitment to take into account the interests of labour. ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether works councils (WCs) in Belgium have a positive effect on firm performance, notably productivity and profitability, while taking the role of trade unions into account.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors first introduce the typical Belgian industrial relations system, discussing the similarities and differences with neighboring countries. This is followed by a brief overview of the relevant literature. Subsequently, the impact of Belgian employee representation on firm performance is estimated by means of OLS, using a newly developed questionnaire administered among Belgian CEOs. Special attention is given to moderating and mediating effects.
Findings
The authors find that Belgian WCs have a small (direct) significantly positive effect on labor productivity, but not on profitability. The additional results of the mediation test show tentatively that WCs might affect profitability indirectly, through their impact on productivity. Despite trade unions’ dominance in practice, the findings reveal that their impact is insignificant.
Research limitations/implications
Although nationwide, rich and representative, as well as statistically valid, the data set is rather small (196 usable observations). The data set offers ample opportunities to further explore what makes effective Belgian WCs different from their non-effective counterparts.
Originality/value
The data set is unique, and combines subjective CEO with objective performance data. The data offer the opportunity to do a first study into the special case of Belgium, which has a distinct union-dominated IR regime. In this study, the focus is furthermore on the rarely studied WC-trade union interaction. In addition, subtle moderation and mediation effects are estimated.
This paper brings a comparative aspect to the analysis of direct involvement as the foundation for partnership. It considers how various forms of direct involvement can represent components of a broader partnership paradigm of people management, or a limited shallow partnership concession to facilitate the diffusion of top-down human resource management policies. Through the use of survey evidence, we explore the settings in which involvement is more likely to be encountered. Contrary to predictions in much of the literature as to their universal applicability, we found that they tended to be concentrated in specific locales, organisational types and sectors, as part and parcel of wider cooperative production paradigms; in practical terms, if involvement is a prerequisite for meaningful partnership, then the latter is more likely to be encountered in more coordinated varieties of capitalism. This does not suggest, however, that ‘shallow’ or instrumentalist partnerships do not occur, or that in infertile ground genuine partnerships are not possible. On one hand, national variations encountered were broadly on the lines of the literature on comparative capitalism. On the other hand, there was much diversity within national settings; we identify the contexts in which such engagement is more or less likely and consider the implications.
