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Relationship between recommended punishment and age by condition (where 1 no punishment, 2 community service/picking up trash on the highway, 3 $5,000 fine, and 4 1-5 years in jail). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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These studies are based on the assumption that when adults, adolescents, or children identify someone as the “guilty” one (the person who committed the act), they are not only making an identification based on memory and thinking, but also a moral decision. This is because, by the act of identifying or not identifying someone, the eyewitness runs t...
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Context 1
... punishment. However, in sharp contrast, when asked what punishment would be most appropriate, the youngest (7- to 9-year-old) children did not differentiate between the intended and unintended acts at all, whereas the 10-to 12-year-olds and the two adolescent groups did, as expected ( Figure 3). Treating the four alternatives as a 4-point scale (0 -3), we found a significant effect of condition, F(1, 137) 20.5, p .0001, p 2 .136, and a borderline interaction effect between age and condition, F(1, 137) 2.13, p .10, p 2 .047. Figure 3 suggests that the condition effect might be greatest for the 10-to 12-year-olds, but nonexistent for the 7-to 9-year-olds, thus paralleling the pattern for eyewitness decision- making ...
Context 2
... punishment. However, in sharp contrast, when asked what punishment would be most appropriate, the youngest (7- to 9-year-old) children did not differentiate between the intended and unintended acts at all, whereas the 10-to 12-year-olds and the two adolescent groups did, as expected ( Figure 3). Treating the four alternatives as a 4-point scale (0 -3), we found a significant effect of condition, F(1, 137) 20.5, p .0001, p 2 .136, and a borderline interaction effect between age and condition, F(1, 137) 2.13, p .10, p 2 .047. Figure 3 suggests that the condition effect might be greatest for the 10-to 12-year-olds, but nonexistent for the 7-to 9-year-olds, thus paralleling the pattern for eyewitness decision- making ...
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Citations
... In our past research (Spring, Saltzstein & Peach, 2012;Spring & Saltzstein, & Vidal, 2015;Spring & Saltzstein, 2017) , involving six separate studies, we have found that the way in which the event (film) is described or framed (e.g., the act was intended but caused little material damage vs. unintended but caused major material damage) interacts with the age of the eyewitness to affect the rate of false positives, so that younger children (10-12 years of age) had lower decisional bias scores (reflected in more false alarms) than did older children (13-15 years of age) when major damage was done even if it was unintended. Whereas the reverse was true when the act was intended but led to little material damage. ...
... The findings indicate that the effect of age on decisional bias is robust. While prior research (Spring, Saltzstein & Peach, 2012;Spring & Saltzstein, & Vidal, 2015; Spring & Saltzstein, 2017) using an eyewitness investigation task involving a male perpetrator and male foils has demonstrated the effect of age on decisional bias, this study shows that the same effect occurs when a female perpetrator and foils are involved. ...
In this study, 232 (89 11- to 12-year-olds, 71 13- to 14-year-olds; 72 15- to 16-year-olds) students recruited from grades 6th–11th in an urban public high school participated in a study of eyewitness identification. The focus of this study was on the effects of age, gender and moral orientation on decisional bias and, as a secondary outcome, on accuracy (using signal detection analysis).The primary purpose of this and previous studies in this series is to uncover implicit moral decision-making in decisional bias. In this study the perpetrator, the bystanders and the foil were all females. Prior to completing the eyewitness identification task, participants were given instructions that emphasized either (a) fairness and crime prevention, or (b) neither. These instructions had no discernible effect on accuracy but, as in past studies, younger participants (below the age of 13) had lower decisional criteria, resulting in a higher rate of false alarms/positives. Further, those who judged the transgression as worse had a lower decisional criterion, indicating more false alarms. Females were more accurate than the males in identifying the female perpetrator and scored significantly higher on how bad they would feel if they were the victim than did the males.
... Response options for these five items ranged from 1 "not at all" to 10 "absolutely" (cf. [28][29][30]). To analyze the structure of these items, we used principal-component factor analyses with varimax rotation in each variation of the final factor. ...
... The ADC-model provides an account in which the use of all three components is a hallmark of sound moral judgment. In immature and under-developed individuals, moral evaluation is rigid [16,28,51], whereas in certain populations (most notably with frontal lobe pathology) it seems to be guided by only a subset of morally relevant aspects, notably consequences [52-54], which in turn leads to aberrant judgment and behavior. ...
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0204631.].
... Response options for these five items ranged from 1 "not at all" to 10 "absolutely" (cf. [28][29][30]). To analyze the structure of these items, we used principal-component factor analyses with varimax rotation in each variation of the final factor. ...
... The ADC-model provides an account in which the use of all three components is a hallmark of sound moral judgment. In immature and under-developed individuals, moral evaluation is rigid [16,28,51], whereas in certain populations (most notably with frontal lobe pathology) it seems to be guided by only a subset of morally relevant aspects, notably consequences [52][53][54], which in turn leads to aberrant judgment and behavior. ...
Moral evaluations occur quickly following heuristic-like intuitive processes without effortful deliberation. There are several competing explanations for this. The ADC-model predicts that moral judgment consists in concurrent evaluations of three different intuitive components: the character of a person (Agent-component, A); their actions (Deed-component, D); and the consequences brought about in the situation (Consequences-component, C). Thereby, it explains the intuitive appeal of precepts from three dominant moral theories (virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism), and flexible yet stable nature of moral judgment. Insistence on single-component explanations has led to many centuries of debate as to which moral precepts and theories best describe (or should guide) moral evaluation. This study consists of two large-scale experiments and provides a first empirical investigation of predictions yielded by the ADC model. We use vignettes describing different moral situations in which all components of the model are varied simultaneously. Experiment 1 (within-subject design) shows that positive descriptions of the A-, D-, and C-components of moral intuition lead to more positive moral judgments in a situation with low-stakes. Also, interaction effects between the components were discovered. Experiment 2 further investigates these results in a between-subject design. We found that the effects of the A-, D-, and C-components vary in strength in a high-stakes situation. Moreover, sex, age, education, and social status had no effects. However, preferences for precepts in certain moral theories (PPIMT) partially moderated the effects of the A- and C-component. Future research on moral intuitions should consider the simultaneous three-component constitution of moral judgment.
Decisional bias (false alarm rate) when judging the guilt/innocence of a suspect is offered as an implicit measure of moral judgment. Combining two data sets, 215 participants, ages 10-12, 13-15, and 16-18 watched the visually identical film involving a person setting a fire, framed either as (a) intentional but not resulting in a fire (BI-NF), (b) unintentional but resulting in a major fire (NI-F), or (c) intentional and resulting in a major fire (BI-F). After watching the film, participants identified seriatim who of six individuals was the perpetrator and how certain they were. The data were subjected to a signal detection analysis. Participants also explicitly judged "how bad" the perpetrator and act were. The implicit measure fit Piaget's claim of moral realism, shifting from judging wrongness according to the outcome to judging according to the actor's intentions, better than the explicit traditional measures.
