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Regression Coefficients (S.E) for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority, Ethnic Minority, and Total Population in Russia
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This article investigates mechanisms underlying anti-immigrant sentiment in post-socialist Russia in particular, and in societies undergoing a search for new national identity borders in general. We argue that when the borders of national identity are drawn and redefined, the forces that drive anti-immigrant attitudes differ meaningfully for member...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... believe that self-definition is the most suitable operationali- zation of ethnic minority/majority variable for the purpose of the present research. Appendix Table A1 includes descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the study for the pooled sample (four rounds altogether) for ethnic majority and ethnic minorities separately. ...
Context 2
... descriptive statistics results (presented in Appendix Table A1) demonstrate some differences in sociodemographic composition of ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups, mostly related to residential patterns and religiosity. Specifically, a much higher percentage of ethnic minority members (43.7 percent) lived in rural areas, as compared to ethnic majority members (21.4 percent). ...
Context 3
... order to examine whether, and to what extent, self-interests and perceived collective vulnerability affect anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic majority versus ethnic minority populations, we esti- mated three series of linear regression models: first, for ethnic majority; second, for ethnic minority; and third, for the total population. All models presented in Table 1 and 2 are estimated on the pooled data and include year of survey for control purposes. Model 1 (for ethnic majority and for ethnic mi- nority groups) includes sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, rural versus urban residential area, and perception of neighborhood safety), indicators of socioeconomic position, and conservative views and ideologies (as proxies of self-interests). ...
Context 4
... did so, examining perceived collective vulnerability, first, in each realm separately, and second as general concept. To streamline the presentation of plenteous results and for the sake of brevity, in Table 1 we present all regression coefficients from Model 1 and Model 2; in Table 2 we display only the coefficients for "ethnic minority," an indicator of "perceived vulnerability" in the respective realms and an interaction term between them from Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d. ...
Context 5
... first discuss results related to the explanatory power of the models, and then proceed to inter- pretations of the regression coefficients. The results presented in Table 1 (Model 1) and Table 2 (Models 2a-2d) reveal that each indicator of the perceived state's vulnerability explained a bigger share of the variance in anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians than the entire set of charac- teristics related to self-interests included in the study (as implied by R square and changes in R square). Specifically, the explanatory power of each indicator of collective vulnerability was almost twice as high as the explanatory power of socioeconomic position, conservative views and sociodemo- graphic characteristics altogether. ...
Context 6
... to the pooled data, the results of Model 2 in Table 1 demonstrated that the index of perceived state vulnerability (calculated as a mean value of four indicators) added 10.2 percent to the explained variance of anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority population as compared to only 3.2 percent among the ethnic minority population. ...
Context 7
... the same time, self-interests are more influential in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic minority groups than among the majority group. 6 We now turn to the discussion of the regression coefficients (presented in Table 1). The results presented in Model 1 reveal that higher educated ethnic Russians tended to perceive immigrants in slightly less negative terms, as implied by a negative and statistically significant coefficient of years of education (b ¼ À.03). ...
Context 8
... negative and statistically significant interaction terms between ethnic minority status and each indicator of perceived collective vulnerability (in Models 2a-2d for the total population) demonstrate that the perceived state vulnerability in each sphere, indeed, affected ethnic majority anti-immigrant attitudes to a greater degree than ethnic mi- nority anti-immigrant attitudes. Consequently, in Model 2 ( Table 1) the effect of the perceived col- lective (state) vulnerability index was found to be bigger on anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians (b ¼ .39) than on such attitudes among non-ethnic Russians (b ¼ .23). ...
Context 9
... inclusion of the perceived state vulnerability index in the model for the ethnic majority group also changed the coefficients related to the effect of political orientation (Table 1). Once the level of the perceived state's vulnerability is included, most differences in the level of anti-immigrant views be- tween ethnic Russians who felt closer to United Russia (the ruling party) and those who felt closer to other parties, or had no party which they felt close to, disappeared. ...
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... Quantitative work demonstrates the prevalence in the ethnic Russian population of negative attitudes toward non-European immigrants (Bessudnov, 2016;Gorodzeisky, 2019;Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2017;Gorodzeisky et al., 2015). A survey of immigrant women from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in three Russian cities that features a subsample of native-born ethnic Russian women demonstrates higher levels of harassment and workplace disadvantages among the immigrants, with some variations by legal status, country of origin, and other factors (Agadjanian et al., 2017;Gorina et al., 2018). ...
The collapse of the USSR in late 1991 inspired social science research on levels, patterns, and trends in inequality within Russia, due to theoretical interest in how market transition affects social stratification. The start of the Putin regime in 2000 marked a new era in Russia's post‐Soviet political economic trajectory: in contrast to the 1990s, the economy first took off, then stagnated, while the state rolled back institutions of democracy and civic freedoms. In short, Russia became a consolidated market economy under authoritarian rule. In this context research has continued to produce insights into social stratification. The labor market featured high levels of employment but with downward wage flexibility, modest decreases in earnings inequality, and persistent returns to education, gender wage gaps, and locality‐based differences. Waves of labor migration to Russia, resurgent traditional gender norms, shrinking population, housing inequality, health disparities, and a small contingent of ultra‐rich represent additional noteworthy developments. Although market transition is no longer an intriguing theoretical lens through which to view social stratification in Russia, the topic nonetheless holds broader theoretical interest because inequality became closely intertwined with Russia's political economy, social policies, and geopolitical actions, including those that culminated in Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.
... (Gorodzeisky, Glikman and Maskileyson, 2015;Bessudnov, 2016). Further, the ethnic Russians are more hostile towards the immigrants compared to other ethnic minorities in Russia, often influenced by racial prejudices (Gorodzeisky and Glikman, 2017;Gorodzeisky, 2019). However, studies or surveys do not suggest any evidence between 1996 and 2012 for any growth or fall in any tendency of xenophobic attitudes towards the immigrants in Russia (Chapman et al., 2018). ...
After the de-centralisation and collapse of the Soviet Union, the aftermath brought chaos, and the major challenge was the manifestation of serious conflict on ethnic lines. The emergence of the Russian Federation was not peaceful, and violence remained a core character in the making of the Russian Federation in the aftermath of Post Soviet Russia. The series of issues brought major ramifications of newly formed states carved out from the large Society federation as an independent entity. The collapse of the Soviet federation created fifteen independent states amidst ethnic tension across the federation. The outcome was chaos, political disintegration and struggle for autonomy in the making of power transition.
... This perspective emphasizes the broader principles of democracy and inclusion, highlighting the importance of supporting the rights and well-being of all citizens, regardless of their background. The positive attitudes towards immigrants exhibited by citizens who embrace democratic values and perceive their country as stable and secure (Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2018) can be attributed to the belief that diversity can enrich society rather than threaten it. When people feel confident in their country's stability and security, they are more likely to view immigrants as potential contributors to the nation's growth and development rather than as sources of disruption. ...
The academic literature showed an increasing interest in studying the link between national identity and anti-immigrant sentiment. This work is based on ten countries from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) dataset for two different waves: 2003 and 2013. The paper aims to analyse the influence of the three facets of national identity (nationalism, political patriotism, and cultural patriotism) and other socioeconomic traits on attitudes towards immigrants (ATI). Untried methods in social science based on the fuzzy-hybrid analysis (FHA) and the fuzzy clustering are used first to analyse citizens according to their levels of openness towards immigrants, nationalism, cultural patriotism, and political patriotism. Then, the ordered probit model is applied to thoroughly examine the intricate relationships connecting the three facets of national identity and individual sociodemographic characteristics with ATI. The results show that the national identity and cultural patriotism constructs negatively influence ATI, while political patriotism positively influences ATI. In addition, country, political orientation, age, religion, economic situation, gender, place of birth, principal status, and education are crucial factors that explain ATI.
... At the same time, ethnic Russians tend to view foreigners' effects on Russian society in more negative terms than what members of ethnic minorities do. The role of individual characteristics in explaining anti-immigration attitudes is indeed larger within ethnic minorities (Gorodzeisky and Glikman 2018). Although Russians' opinions about immigrants are largely shaped by the media, they also stem from concerns about cultural, demographic, and social shifts as perceived by respondents in their daily life, especially in urban areas (Kosmarskaya and Savin 2016;Blackburn 2021). ...
... It was especially prominent among titular nationalities in Russia's republics (Alexseev 2010). While non-Russian minorities are generally less hostile to those considered nonnative than the dominant ethnic group is (Alexseev 2010, 116;Gorshkov 2011, 211-212;Gorodzeisky and Glikman 2018), they can also be the instigators of ethnic and/or antimigrant violence, as shown by the riots in Yandyki in August-2005 and Yakutsk in March 2019. ...
Rejection of immigration has become a major political factor in many countries throughout the world. The notion of nativism can be used to analyze forms of this rejection insofar as it involves promoting the interests and way of life of “natives” at the expanse of migrants. This article adopts a twofold approach to conceptualize the nativist phenomenon in contemporary Russia. First, I consider discursive expressions of nativism as observed among ethnonationalist actors as well as in the rhetoric of the authorities (especially in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine), against a background of widespread xenophobia. This reflection draws on interpretations of the slogan “Russia for the Russians.” Second, I consider popular expressions of nativism, including those linked to ethnic violence. I analyze a series of antimigrant riots since the 2000s based on surveys, analysis of the media, and field data. These riots, often supported by organized nationalist actors, involve claims that can be defined as nativist in that they concern protection of natives ( korennye ) from “foreigners,” understood in ethnic or racial terms and deemed to be the cause of social ills. Overall, this article contributes to comparative studies of nativism in countries that face mass internal or foreign migration.
... Previous research suggested that the attitudes toward immigrants among majority ethnic group and among members of minority ethnic groups in Russia are driven by different mechanisms with regard to the position of an in-group. At the national level, they to a varying degree rely on perceptions of collective interests and vulnerabilities, with attitudes of ethnic Russians to a greater extent dependent on the group position-related factors (Gorodzeisky and Glikman 2018). At the subnational level, in turn, they proved to be differently related to the in-group position. ...
This article analyzes the relationship between the relative position of an ethnic group, as measured by its majority/minority status at a subnational level, and attitudes of its members toward immigrants of different origins. Based on the Russian case, it addresses the question whether the effects of in-group majority status within a region on attitudes toward the general category of immigrants hold regardless of out-group origin and, if not, what may drive this variation. Using data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of the Higher School of Economics and Bayesian hierarchical structural equation modeling, the study demonstrates that the relative position of an ethnic in-group is of varying importance as a predictor of attitudes toward migrant groups of European versus non-European origin in Russia. A group’s majority status within a region proved to play a role in predicting attitudes toward migrants originating from the “south” (encompassing North and South Caucasus; Central Asia; and China, Vietnam, and Korea) but not toward migrants coming from the “west” (Ukraine and Moldova). We draw on arguments related to the source and the level of threat induced by the out-groups, ethnic hierarchies, and group cues to explain this pattern of results.
... Studies found that socio-economic vulnerability is associated with negative attitudes towards both immigrants and asylum seekers (McKay, Thomas and Kneebone, 2012; Hercowitz-Amir, Raijman and Hercowitz-Amir and Raijman, 2020;Czymara, 2021). Although the effect of membership of an ethnic and/or religious minority on attitudes towards asylum seekers was not examined, these variables have been found to be robust predictors of positive attitudes towards immigrants as a generic group (see Fetzer, 2000;Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016;Gorodzeisky and Glikman, 2018). Likewise, numerous studies have found that individuals who prioritize universalism in their value system express greater support to immigrants and immigration (Davidov, Schmidt and Schwartz, 2008;Davidov et al., 2014). ...
The article studies over-time changes in public attitudes towards asylum seekers, from a cross-national comparative perspective. The article applies the ‘hierarchical age-period-cohort’ model to data from the European Social Survey collected in 17 European countries. The findings demonstrate that cross-cohort variations play a negligible role in the over-time changes in attitudes towards asylum seekers in Europe; and that most of these over-time changes can be attributed to period-related effect. The main findings reveal that not only exposure to an actual high inflow of asylum seekers (i.e. living in a country with an especially high inflow of asylum seekers) is associated with exclusionary attitudes towards asylum seekers, but also exposure to the potential of such an inflow (i.e. living in a country bordering countries with a high inflow of asylum seekers).
... We will simultaneously examine two different explanations that have been shown to be relevant for the formation of perceptions of threat and exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants in other contexts, but not yet tested in Israel. The first mechanism is individuals' evaluations of the state's economic, social, and political conditions, which Gorodzeisky and Glikman (2017) denote perceived collective vulnerability. The second mechanism is human values, in particular, universalism and conformity/tradition, which we predict to be of particular significance in Israel's unique immigration context. ...
... Several cross-national comparative studies have stressed the importance of economic circumstances in the country, minority group size, and political climate for the emergence of perceived group threat and opposition to immigration (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019;Meuleman et al., 2019;Quillian, 1995;Semyonov et al., 2006). Given that we are focusing on a single country, in our study we take a different approach and measure individuals' evaluations of, or satisfaction with, the state's socio-economic conditions and view them as indicators of collective vulnerability (Gordon, 2015;Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2017). ...
... Theoretically, higher perceptions of collective vulnerability lead to higher perceptions of socioeconomic threat derived from the presence of immigrants. Furthermore, Gorodzeisky and Glikman (2017) maintain that in the case of ethnic majority groups, questions of collective vulnerability tend to affect perceptions of threat even more than individual vulnerability (e.g., income). Indeed, higher perceptions of collective vulnerability might lead individuals to search for scapegoats who can take the blame for the bad situation, leading to higher levels of perceptions of threat (Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2017) and stronger rejection of different immigrant groups . ...
We investigate whether the attitudes of the Israeli majority toward migrants reflect the double standard embedded in Israel’s immigration regime, differentiating Jewish from non-Jewish migrants. We compare attitudes toward ethnic migrants (Jews), non-ethnic migrants (non-Jews), and asylum seekers, considering three explanations: values, collective vulnerability, and perceived threat. Our findings show that perceived vulnerability increases threat due to immigration. Values play an important role in predicting opposition to both Jewish and non-ethnic immigrants. Perceptions of threat are more relevant for the explanation of opposition to non-ethnic immigrants than to that of Jewish immigrants. We discuss our findings in light of existing theories.
... We will simultaneously examine two different explanations that have been shown to be relevant for the formation of perceptions of threat and exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants in other contexts, but not yet tested in Israel. The first mechanism is individuals' evaluations of the state's economic, social, and political conditions, which Gorodzeisky and Glikman (2017) denote perceived collective vulnerability. The second mechanism is human values, in particular, universalism and conformity/tradition, which we predict to be of particular significance in Israel's unique immigration context. ...
... Several cross-national comparative studies have stressed the importance of economic circumstances in the country, minority group size, and political climate for the emergence of perceived group threat and opposition to immigration (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019;Meuleman et al., 2019;Quillian, 1995;Semyonov et al., 2006). Given that we are focusing on a single country, in our study we take a different approach and measure individuals' evaluations of, or satisfaction with, the state's socio-economic conditions and view them as indicators of collective vulnerability (Gordon, 2015;Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2017). ...
... Theoretically, higher perceptions of collective vulnerability lead to higher perceptions of socioeconomic threat derived from the presence of immigrants. Furthermore, Gorodzeisky and Glikman (2017) maintain that in the case of ethnic majority groups, questions of collective vulnerability tend to affect perceptions of threat even more than individual vulnerability (e.g., income). Indeed, higher perceptions of collective vulnerability might lead individuals to search for scapegoats who can take the blame for the bad situation, leading to higher levels of perceptions of threat (Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2017) and stronger rejection of different immigrant groups . ...
We investigate whether the attitudes of the Israeli majority towards migrants reflect the double standard embedded in Israel’s immigration regime, differentiating Jewish from non-Jewish migrants. We compare attitudes towards ethnic migrants (Jews), non-ethnic migrants (non-Jews), and asylum seekers, considering three explanations: values, collective vulnerability, and perceived threat. Our findings show that perceived vulnerability increases threat due to immigration. Values play an important role in predicting opposition to both Jewish and non-ethnic immigrants. Perceptions of threat are more relevant for the explanation of opposition to non-ethnic immigrants than to that of Jewish immigrants. We discuss our findings in light of existing theories.
... A limited number of studies have extended the analytic concepts based on Western data to non-Western contexts (Barcelo, 2016;Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2018;Ruedin, 2019;Shim & Lee, 2018;Tsai & Tzeng, 2014). Some are case studies and others take a more comparative approach; some confirm earlier findings from North American and European samples (e.g., Green & Kadoya, 2015), while others deviate from them (e.g., Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2018). ...
... A limited number of studies have extended the analytic concepts based on Western data to non-Western contexts (Barcelo, 2016;Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2018;Ruedin, 2019;Shim & Lee, 2018;Tsai & Tzeng, 2014). Some are case studies and others take a more comparative approach; some confirm earlier findings from North American and European samples (e.g., Green & Kadoya, 2015), while others deviate from them (e.g., Gorodzeisky & Glikman, 2018). In addition to providing additional empirical light, this study's goal is to offer conceptual insights on the dynamics of immigration-related public opinion. ...
A large body of research exists concerning determinants of public opinion on immigration and immigrants, primarily based on Western countries. Given that South–South migratory flows have increased dramatically in recent decades, we contribute to the literature by analyzing cross-national probability data in the Asian context. Using multilevel modeling, we derive and test economic and cultural hypotheses concerning natives’ support for restrictive immigration policy. Results show that at the individual level, along with xenophobic tendency, personal financial insecurity, unequal material distribution in society, and sociotropic economic concern all significantly predict the outcome. As a theoretical contribution, contextual effects are also reported: living in a subnational region with more national pride and with higher parochialism is positively associated with it.
... Antiimmigrant sentiment is stronger in Russia than in most other European countries, whereas the explanatory power of the models that try to predict attitudes towards immigrants with the indicators of socio-economic position and the attitudinal variables is much lower (Gorodzeisky, Glikman and Maskileyson, 2015;Bessudnov, 2016), although explanations based on group threat and economic competition theories cannot be dismissed (Bahry, 2016). Ethnic Russians are on average more negative about immigrants than ethnic minorities (Gorodzeisky and Glikman, 2017), and the opposition towards immigration is often based on racial prejudice (Gorodzeisky, 2019). There is little evidence of a strong trend towards increasing or decreasing xenophobia between 1996 and 2012 (Chapman et al., 2018). ...
Field experiments have provided ample evidence of ethnic and racial discrimination in the labour market. Less is known about how discrimination varies in multi-ethnic societies, where the ethnic composition of populations is different across locations. Inter-group contact and institutional arrangements for ethnic minorities can mitigate the sense of group threat and reduce discrimination. To provide empirical evidence of this, we conduct a field experiment of ethnic discrimination in Russia with a sample of over 9,000 job applications. We compare ethnically homogeneous cities and cities with ethnically mixed populations and privileged institutional status of ethnic minorities. We find strong discrimination against visible minorities in the former but much weaker discrimination in the latter. These findings demonstrate how institutions and historical contexts of inter-group relations can affect ethnic prejudice and discrimination.
