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R.A. Fisher smoking a pipe, 1956.
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Statisticians R.A. Fisher and Joseph Berkson have become infamous for ending up on the "wrong" side of the debate over the evidence linking smoking and lung cancer during the 1950s, and scholars have speculated about their personal motives in the controversy. But there were many senior biostatisticians and epidemiologists voicing similar concerns a...
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... crucial experiment Joseph Berkson and R.A. Fisher have become infamous for their stubborn opposition to the emerging evidence about the dangers of cigarettes (Fig. 1). Both argued that biological knowledge was essential and statistical methods limited, but their aim was ultimately to defend a particular kind of statistical expertise -that of the biostatistician who designed and interpreted randomized controlled experiments. Berkson reinforced the central role of biological knowledge in guiding ...
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... have struggled to understand the scientific and personal factors that drove prominent biostatisticians Ronald Aylmer Fisher and Joseph Berkson to the ‘wrong’ side of the debate over smoking and lung cancer in the 1950s. They both maintained a strong skeptical stance towards the mounting evidence far beyond, some suggest, the point of reason. Viewing the debate retrospectively, it is all too easy to divide the participants into those who were right and those who were wrong, or those who were against cigarettes and those who were for them. But, of course, that is too simplistic. While Berkson and Fisher stand out in the debate because of their professional stature and their strong rhetoric, a substantial number of biostatisticians and epidemiologists shared their concerns. For these scientists, it was not merely tobacco that was at stake, but the role of biostatistics and epidemiology as scientific disciplines. The debate over the epidemiological data linking smoking and lung cancer during the 1950s provides an excellent case study to understand the tensions in methodology that were emerging at this time. The epidemiological tools used in the early cigarette studies were relatively new and perhaps it is unsurprising that they were misunderstood and viewed suspiciously by pathologists, physicians and others lacking statistical training [1,2]. But the suspicions of statisticians and epidemiologists themselves cannot be put down to the ignorance of the na ̈ve laboratory researcher. ‘Now I should be the last person to attack evidence for being merely statistical,’ Fisher acknowledged [3]. The epidemiologists and biostatisticians who participated in this debate differed on what were sometimes subtle points of methodology, but these difference had substantial implications for characterizing the potential hazards of cigarette smoking. All of the participants saw the need for explicit and rigorous standards for evaluating etiological hypotheses, but they held conflicting views about what those standards should be. The differing opinions on the evidence reflect two different models of research – controlled experiment as the crucial, objective test of a causal hypothesis versus inferential judgment based on a diverse body of evidence. The first half of the 20th century saw the development of two distinct but parallel approaches to etiological research – the randomized controlled experiment and the analytic epidemiological survey. The first approach came out of biostatistics, developed and vigorously promoted by Fisher, whose Statistical Methods for Research Workers [4] and The Design of Experiments [5] became the standard textbooks. Followers of Fisher, including Major Greenwood and Austin Bradford Hill, took these tools into the field of medical research and promoted what they called ‘experimental epidemiology’, which initially meant testing epidemiological hypotheses in animal experiments [6]. The experimental approach (albeit without true randomization) was also taken up by public-health researchers for evaluating the efficacy of new vaccines. At the same time, some influential public-health investigators emphasized the role of the epidemiologist as one of assembling a diverse body of facts from different sources into a coherent explanation. American epidemiologist Wade Hampton Frost wrote that ‘epidemiology is something more than the total of its established facts. It includes their orderly arrangement into chains of inference which extend more or less beyond the bonds of direct observation.’ [7]. Instead of emphasizing a particular experimental design or statistical method, Frost stressed the importance of analytical skills and knowledge of a wide range of facts. These two approaches – experimental and inferential – are not mutually exclusive, but they do represent two distinct trends, and this subtle divide was crucial in the debate over cigarettes and lung cancer. This debate began in 1950, with the publication of five case-control studies that compared the smoking habits of lung cancer hospital patients with non-lung cancer patients [8– 12]. Case-control studies were especially useful at the early stages of the investigation, when several potential causes were being investigated. Yet the method clearly did not meet Fisher’s requirements for experimental design. A group of about a dozen biostatisticians in the Biometry Branch of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) played a leading role in advancing new methods for the analysis of case-control data and in building the case against cigarettes [13,14]. Large cohort studies, which compared cancer rates in smokers and nonsmokers over time, also provided crucial epidemiological support, although some biostatisticians also questioned these more rigorous studies. Joseph Berkson and R.A. Fisher have become infamous for their stubborn opposition to the emerging evidence about the dangers of cigarettes (Fig. 1). Both argued that biological knowledge was essential and statistical methods limited, but their aim was ultimately to defend a particular kind of statistical expertise – that of the biostatistician who designed and interpreted randomized controlled experiments. Berkson reinforced the central role of biological knowledge in guiding research: ‘if biologists permit statisticians to become arbiters of biological questions, scientific disaster is inevitable.’ However, knowledge of biological mechanisms was important not as an end in itself, but primarily because it suggested experiments. ‘The most important consideration with respect to a theory is not whether it appears plausible, but whether it suggests experiments, and what experiments are suggested.’ [15]. Fisher clung to the possibility that lung cancer and the smoking habit may both be produced by some common genetic trait. The statistical association between smoking and cancer, he insisted, did not imply that one must cause the other. Only a randomized controlled experiment could rule out the common cause hypothesis, he argued [3]. But Fisher was not alone in taking this hypothesis seriously. In fact, even Charles Cameron, president of the American Cancer Society, proposed that hormonal differences might explain both smoking habits and cancer susceptibility [16]. Moreover, studies conducted during the 1950s provided evidence that smokers did in fact differ in several ways from nonsmokers, including personality, hospitalization rates, occupation, diet and physical characteristics [17,18]. Two of these studies were conducted by epidemiologists, one by Clark Heath, with tobacco industry funding, and one by Abraham Lilienfeld, then at Roswell Park Memorial Institute. But this debate rested on more than a pet hypothesis. While Berkson and Fisher were especially outspoken and uncompromising in their views, their concerns were shared by a substantial number of senior biostatisticians at the time, including Donald Mainland at New York University, Antonio Ciocco at the University of Pittsburgh, and K.A. Brownlee at the University of Chicago. This debate was going on while the randomized controlled trial was a recent development in medical research and its place was still in doubt. Biostatisticians and clinical trialists were trying to persuade the medical establishment that their expertise was vital to research and that their scientific methods were comparable in validity to laboratory experiments [19,20]. Simple procedures like the test of statistical significance had worked their way into medical research, but statisticians objected that they were often naively applied by those without statistical training. Fisher himself probably contributed to this tendency by strongly emphasizing tests of statistical significance in his textbooks and showing an interest only in the interpret- ation of the results of single trials and not from a diverse body of evidence. In short, it was not just tobacco that was at stake in the debate, but the authority of the biostatistician in medical science. Jacob Yerushalmy, a biostatistician at Berkeley, later took a similar critical stand in response to studies showing a link between maternal smoking and infant mortality. Here he argued that the data were equally consistent with competing interpretations, that either the smoking or the constitution of smokers could explain an association between maternal smoking and low birth weight. Non- randomized studies simply were helpless to resolve the conflict. Yerushalmy made it clear that the problem was not with the statistical form of the results. ‘The evidence may not be convincing, but not because it is ‘only statistical’, rather because the evidence is nonstatistical in the sense that the method of study which produced the evidence violates the basic principles for valid statistical inference.’ [21]. Statisticians also argued that smokers and nonsmokers in epidemiological follow-up studies might differ in ways other than in their smoking habits, because smokers (or nonsmokers) might be more or less inclined to participate in a voluntary study, thus introducing selection bias [22]. Experienced public-health research methodologists were likely aware of earlier discussions over the problems of using volunteers in vaccine studies. Additionally, some statisticians criticized E. Cuyler Hammond and Daniel Horn’s use of 22 000 American Cancer Society volunteers to recruit and interview subjects for their smoking study. Mainland argued that researchers, particularly untrained volunteers, were likely to select a particular type of individual for the study; he conducted a survey of his students to demonstrate that they did indeed suffer from this procedural bias [23]. Most epidemiologists and statisticians, including those who defended the link between cigarettes and lung cancer, admitted that a controlled experiment, when it was available, offered the strongest evidence that any ...
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... For Polanyi, science remains objective, not in the detachment of the knower from the known, but in the power of science to establish contact with a hidden reality based in the skills and commitment of the knower (e.g., Personal Knowledge, pp. [299][300][301][302][303]311)." ...
... The two should not be confused.53 It was a source of great controversy between statistician R A Fisher and his peers when Fisher denied any causal link between smoking and lung cancer, even though the data showed a strong correlation between the two[302]. ...
In the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, it is asserted that science is merely another belief system, and should not be accorded any credibility above other belief systems. This assertion shows a complete misunderstanding of how both science and philosophy work. Not only science but all logic-based philosophies become pointless under the belief system hypothesis.
Science, formerly known as natural philosophy, is not a set of facts or beliefs, but rather a method for scrutinising ideas. In this it is far closer to a philosophical tool set than to an ideology. Popper’s view, widely endorsed by scientists, is that science requires disprovable propositions which can be evaluated using available evidence. Science is therefore not a system of belief, but a system of disbelief, which is a very different thing indeed.
This paper reviews the origins of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, discusses the numerous flaws in its fundamental premises and revisits the views of Michael Polanyi and Karl Popper who have been falsely cited as supporters of these premises. Two appendices are included for reference: one on philosophies of science and one on history of scientific methods. A third appendix on ethics and science has been published separately.
... Since the 1970s, epidemiology and biomedical science have looked for the causes of chronic and noninfectious diseases, and in particular for the mechanics of carcinogenesis, beyond purely physiological factors, by developing multifactorial causalistic scenarios (Parascandola 2004(Parascandola , 2011. This approach is closely connected to the notion of the epidemiological transition. ...
This chapter investigates the new insights that social sciences can bring to the question of racial categorizations by examining the etiology of complex diseases, which are thought to be triggered or exacerbated by an individual’s life path and exposure to a “high-risk environment”. The authors aim to contribute to an ongoing debate in life science, especially in epigenetics where some scholars highlight a “molecularization” of both the biography and the environment. These discussions interrogate the boundaries between disciplines (and their respective taboos), without however implying that these boundaries could be easily abolished.
... Let's call 'experimentalism' the view that randomised experiments are the gold standard of causal inference. This view is widely held in the biomedical sciences (going back to biostatisticians such as Ronald Fisher, Joseph Berkson, Jacob Yerushalmy and others; see Parascandola 2004) and, more recently, also across the social sciences (Shadish et al. 2002; for economics, see for instance Angrist and Pischke 2010). We can distinguish between a conservative and a liberal form of experimentalism. ...
Francesco Guala once wrote that ‘The problem of extrapolation (or external validity as it is sometimes called) is a minor scandal in the philosophy of science’. This paper agrees with the statement, but for reasons different from Guala’s. The scandal is not, or not any longer, that the problem has been ignored in the philosophy of science. The scandal is that framing the problem as one of external validity encourages poor evidential reasoning. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative—an alternative which constitutes much better evidential reasoning about target systems of interest, and which makes do without (much) consideration of external validity.
... A prominent role in the emergence of chronic disease epidemiology has been given to lung cancer research, especially to case-control studies in the UK and the US from the late 1940s, as well as the subsequent debate over the causal role of cigarette smoking that continued into the 1960s (Berlivet, 2005;Parascandola, 2004Parascandola, , 2011Talley, Kushner and Sterk, 2004). However, it was the research on cardiovascular disease, especially in the context of the famous Framingham Heart Study, that introduced the notion of risk factor into medicine and public health and shaped modern risk factor epidemiology (Aronowitz, 1998(Aronowitz, , 2011Giroux, 2013;Oppenheimer, 2005Oppenheimer, , 2006Rothstein, 2003). ...
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in explaining the current situation. By analysing the parallel development of cardiovascular
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epidemiology, which accentuates risk and prevention in disease management. However,
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contexts of treatment and prevention. Consequently, minor at-risk conditions have
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Keywords
depression, heart disease, mental health care, psychiatry, risk factor epidemiology
... Serious concerns about the case-control method were voiced by prominent methodologists, including Joseph Berkson and R. A. Fisher, who were later known to be tobacco industry consultants; consequently, cohort studies were implemented soon after the initial reports from the case-control studies (14). These studies were started with remarkable rapidity; Doll and Hill implemented the cohort study of British physicians in 1951 and reported the first results in 1954 (15). ...
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of the utility of observational designs and important parameters (the odds ratio and the population attributable risk), guidelines
for causal inference, and systematic review approaches. I also cover unintended and adverse consequences for the field, including
the strategy of doubt creation and the recruitment of epidemiologists by the tobacco industry to serve its mission. The paradigm
of evidence-based action for addressing noncommunicable diseases began with the need to address the epidemic of tobacco-caused
disease, an imperative for action documented by epidemiologic research.
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In the early 1900s, numerous seminal publications reported that high rates of cancer occurred in certain occupations. During this period, work with infectious agents produced only meager results which seemed irrelevant to humans. Then in the 1980s ground breaking evidence began to emerge that a variety of viruses also cause cancer in humans. There is now sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in humans for human T-cell lymphotrophic virus, human immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C virus, human papillomavirus, Epstein-Barr virus, and human herpes virus 8 according to the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). Many other causes of cancer have also been identified by the IARC, which include: Sunlight, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, hormones, alcohol, parasites, fungi, bacteria, salted fish, wood dust, and herbs. The World Cancer Research Fund and the American Institute for Cancer Research have determined additional causes of cancer, which include beta carotene, red meat, processed meats, low fibre diets, not breast feeding, obesity, increased adult height and sedentary lifestyles. In brief, a historical review of the discoveries of the causes of human cancer is presented with extended discussions of the difficulties encountered in identifying viral causes of cancer.
... A historical illustration of the tension between evidence from observational studies and from clinical trials is provided by the debate over the association of cigarette smoking with lung cancer in the 1950s. Two prominent statisticians, Ronald Fisher and Joseph Berkson, criticized the belief that smoking causes lung cancer because of the lack of experimental evidence (from controlled clinical trials) and because of the possibility of confounding (Parascandola, 2004). The theory that smoking is a major risk factor for lung cancer was ultimately accepted without any clinical trial evidence, prompted major public health interventions, and led to a sizeable decline in the risk of lung cancer over half a century (Parascandola, 2004;Sommer, 2009 ...
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The neuroprotective effects of estrogen have been demonstrated consistently in cellular and animal studies but the evidence in women remains conflicted. We explored the window of opportunity hypothesis in relation to cognitive aging and dementia. In particular, we reviewed existing literature, reanalyzed some of our data, and combined results graphically. Current evidence suggests that estrogen may have beneficial, neutral, or detrimental effects on the brain depending on age at the time of treatment, type of menopause (natural versus medically or surgically induced), or stage of menopause. The comparison of women who underwent bilateral oophorectomy with referent women provided evidence for a sizeable neuroprotective effect of estrogen before age 50 years. Several case-control studies and cohort studies also showed neuroprotective effects in women who received estrogen treatment (ET) in the early postmenopausal stage (most commonly at ages 50-60 years). The majority of women in those observational studies had undergone natural menopause and were treated for the relief of menopausal symptoms. However, recent clinical trials by the Women's Health Initiative showed that women who initiated ET alone or in combination with a progestin in the late postmenopausal stage (ages 65-79 years) experienced an increased risk of dementia and cognitive decline regardless of the type of menopause. The current conflicting data can be explained by the window of opportunity hypothesis suggesting that the neuroprotective effects of estrogen depend on age at the time of administration, type of menopause, and stage of menopause. Therefore, women who underwent bilateral oophorectomy before the onset of menopause or women who experienced premature or early natural menopause should be considered for hormonal treatment until approximately age 51 years.
... Based on their widespread use, it is not surprising that some form of Bradford Hill's causal criteria are, according to Weed, "arguably the most commonly-used method of interpreting scientific evidence in public health" [88], and that, according to Parascandola, the Bradford Hill criteria are "routinely cited as authoritative statements of the proper method for assessing a body of etiological evidence" [89]. Indeed, Shakir and Layton even go so far as to write that Bradford Hill's Presidential Address, in which the nine criteria ("aspects of association") were identified and described, was one "of the most important papers published in the 20th century with thoughts on the epidemiological basis of disease causation" [77]. ...
As noted by Wesley Salmon and many others, causal concepts are ubiquitous in every branch of theoretical science, in the practical disciplines and in everyday life. In the theoretical and practical sciences especially, people often base claims about causal relations on applications of statistical methods to data. However, the source and type of data place important constraints on the choice of statistical methods as well as on the warrant attributed to the causal claims based on the use of such methods. For example, much of the data used by people interested in making causal claims come from non-experimental, observational studies in which random allocations to treatment and control groups are not present. Thus, one of the most important problems in the social and health sciences concerns making justified causal inferences using non-experimental, observational data. In this paper, I examine one method of justifying such inferences that is especially widespread in epidemiology and the health sciences generally - the use of causal criteria. I argue that while the use of causal criteria is not appropriate for either deductive or inductive inferences, they do have an important role to play in inferences to the best explanation. As such, causal criteria, exemplified by what Bradford Hill referred to as "aspects of [statistical] associations", have an indispensible part to play in the goal of making justified causal claims.
... Barnes et al. (1995), Glantz et al. (1995b) and Glantz et al., (1996). 8 See, for example, the review of and the work of Parascandola (2004) and Parascandola et al. (2006). 9 See, for example, Fisher (1957Fisher ( , 1958 and Berkson (1955Berkson ( , 1958 At that time Hahn was as Chairman of the Committee. ...
This paper examines the response of the American tobacco companies to the health scare surrounding tobacco harm between 1953 and 1964, through an analysis of the operations of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC). We consider the reasons for the TIRC's establishment and subsequent conduct in the context of a series of external pressures which built up on the tobacco industry prior to, and during, the period in question. These include the increase in deaths from cancer which had occurred during the first half of the twentieth century, accumulating epidemiological evidence suggesting that tobacco use was harmful to health, progressively more grave statements that were being made by public health bodies and scientists to the same effect, falling sales of cigarettes and faltering stockholder confidence. We consider the TIRC's contribution to restoring confidence in tobacco products, what motivated scientific advisors to sit on, and resign from, its Scientific Advisory Board and the legitimacy of the argument that the controversy surrounding tobacco harm continued until the mid-1960s
... 5 Parts of Berkson's argument also seemed to be advanced more out of logical possibility than actual plausibility; something that he was aware of and overtly defended with reference to the general lack of knowledge of the disease mechanisms that ought to leave openness for suggestions in all directions: H. Andersen: History and Philosophy of Modern Epidemiology Based on a talk delivered at the &HPS Conference, Pittsburgh, October 2007 Although Fisher and Berkson have become notorious for their strong opposition to the hypothesis of a causal relation between smoking and lung cancer and for their strong rhetoric in defence of their position, their concerns were shared by several other biostatisticians. As argued by Parascandola (Parascandola 2004a;Parascandola 2004b), part of the debate was aimed at defending the authority of the biostatistician in medical science by emphasizing both the importance of a rigorous empirical methodology and the dangers of the inferential reasoning employed by the epidemiologists. In a lecture Fisher stressed that "I should be the last person to attack evidence for being merely statistical, because for a great part of my work I have been concerned with the problem of how experimentation should be carried out, how reasoning processes should be applied to the data supplied by experimentation or by survey so as to really give conclusive answers" (Fisher 1958b). ...
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Epidemiological studies of chronic diseases began around the mid-20th century. Contrary to the infectious disease epidemiology which had prevailed at the beginning of the 20th century and which had focused on single agents causing individual diseases, the chronic disease epidemiology which emerged at the end of Word War II was a much more complex enterprise that investigated a multiplicity of risk factors for each disease. Involved in the development of chronic disease epidemi-ology were therefore fundamental discussions on the notion of causality, especially the question when causal inferences could be justified. In this paper, I shall analyze the implicit normativity of these de-bates. First, I shall give a brief overview of the historical background on which chronic disease epi-demiology emerged and describe how the pioneer studies on smoking and lung cancer became icon of the major challenge that the emerging chronic disease epidemiology was facing: the impossibility of proving that statistical associations reflected causal relations. Next, I shall describe how the develop-ment from the monocausal enterprise of infectious disease epidemiology to the multicausal enterprise of chronic disease epidemiology gave rise to intense discussions of the possible criteria by which to establish causal relationships between a given factor and a particular disease. I shall show how the necessary and sufficient conditions expressed in the so-called Henle-Koch criteria that had proved useful for the 19th century investigations of infectious diseases remained an ideal, although clearly an unobtainable one. Thus, I shall show how 20th century chronic disease epidemiologists on the one hand were searching for a new set of general principles which would provide a logical framework for their investigations, but on the other hand admitted that they would have to accept something more "pragmatic". I shall analyze the various positions in this debate, arguing that the implacability of the debate was due to unrecognized normative issues. I shall argue that many insisted on a distinction between science and application that was untenable, but that due to this distinction the values in-volved in deciding whether or not to act on the basis of a hypothesis were rarely explicitly discussed and the decision therefore continued to appear as a matter of taste rather than the result of a cogent normative analysis.