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The European Union (EU) has made effective corruption control a condition for membership, but it cannot sanction non-compliance once a country has joined. The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was an institutional experiment to compensate the loss of sanctioning power after accession with continued monitoring. Most commentators dismiss t...
Citations
... Centralised mechanisms, often relying on soft enforcement tools, have proven ineffective in countering this strategy of resistance to enforcement measures (Kelemen, 2022;Kochenov, 2019;Pech and Scheppele, 2017;Uitz, 2019). Whilst some authors have affirmed that material sanctions are not particularly effective in cases of democratic backsliding, and rather advocate for improving the transformative power of monitoring and social pressure (Lacatus and Sedelmeier, 2020;Sedelmeier, 2017), most scholars agree on their weaknesses in bringing about compliance in the cases of Poland and Hungary (Priebus, 2022;Uitz, 2019). Whereas the Commission generally holds that dialogue and engagement with breaching authorities may be sufficient to obtain compliance (Closa, 2018), it has been increasingly assertive in recent years (Blauberger and Sedelmeier, 2024;Hernández and Closa, 2023;Kelemen, 2024). ...
Existing literature often attributes non‐compliance to either a lack of resources or implementation costs. However, the rule of law crises in Hungary and Poland present a different picture: a deliberate strategy aimed at not complying with EU enforcement actions. This article differentiates this model from previous ones and terms it ‘defiant non‐compliance’, which is characterised by four types of domestic actions (ignoring the Commission's recommendations and warnings; not complying with Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) rulings; questioning the role of the CJEU as the sole final interpreter of EU law; and impeding national courts' right to raise preliminary questions). A defiant rhetoric questioning the authority and legitimacy of the enforcing authorities accompanies these actions. The article distils defiant non‐compliance by systematising empirical evidence on these governments' reactions to EU enforcement. This model of non‐compliance severely threatens the foundations of the EU, as it erodes the notion of a community of law‐abiding member states' governments.
... In the context of anticorruption reform, the enforcement capacity of local government institutions represents their ability to detect, investigate, prosecute, and penalize corrupt activities. Evidence abounds that by complementing national-level initiatives, local enforcement and anticorruption efforts ensure that top-down policies are effectively implemented on the ground (Gemperle, 2018;Lacatus & Sedelmeier, 2020;Prado & Carson, 2016). For example, scholars employ panel data on corruption convictions and demonstrate that greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, which supports the "system capacity" arguments (Alt & Lassen, 2012). ...
Penalties for corrupt acts are a vital component of integrity management systems within bureaucratic organizations, yet systematic inquiry into specific interventions is lacking. Drawing from the principal–supervisor–agent model, this article explores the criteria for imposing penalties on corrupt bureaucrats at the street level. We examine the impact of various factors on the severity of penalties for corruption, highlighting the influence of top-down anticorruption reform and local enforcement capacity. Utilizing text mining techniques, we build a comprehensive dataset containing 4025 cases of punishing corruption among grassroots officials in China from 2015 to 2023 and use multilevel analysis to explore these dynamics. Findings suggest that anticorruption reform directly led to an increase in the severity of penalties, but with substantial variation across practices. In particular, the analysis reveals a positive correlation between enforcement capacity and the severity of penalties. Moreover, while the relationship between harm and penalty severity represents a generalizable observation, significant disparities exist in the penalties imposed across various types of corruption. This study contributes to understanding the dynamics of multiple punitive measures and the factors leading to penalties imposed on corrupt street-level bureaucrats.
... U kontekstu primanja Hrvatske u članstvo, EU je u procesu pridruživanja imala na raspolaganju instrumente kojima je uvjetovala punopravno članstvo zemljama kandidatkinjama efikasnim suzbijanjem korupcije. Međutim, jednom nakon stjecanja punopravnog članstva, EU nema zakonska sredstva da sankcionira korupciju u državi članici, osim u segmentu pronevjere EU fondova (Lacatus & Sedelmeier, 2020). Recentna istraživanja potvrđuju da je u 13 novih zemalja članica EU-a došlo do povećanja prisutnosti korupcije (Alfano, Capasso & Goel, 2021). ...
... U Bugarskoj i Rumunjskoj se nakon pridruživanja EU-u 2007. godine provedba antikorupcijske politike i reformi nastavila u sektorima gdje je na snazi bio monitoring Europske komisije i utemeljeni rizik od sankcija EU-a (Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2020;Lacatus & Sedelmeier, 2020). Zajedničko je da nakon ulaska u EU, osim vrlo ograničene nadležnosti tijela EU-a u kontroli korupcije, političke elite u novim zemljama članicama postojeći problem korupcije ignoriraju te da ne postoji predanost borbi protiv korupcije (Martin-Russu, 2022 ...
Rad istražuje stavove hrvatskih građana, percepciju korupcije i povjerenje u institucije prije i nakon ulaska Hrvatske u Europsku uniju. Empirijsko je istraživanje provedeno usporedbom odgovora ankete iz 2022. s istim pitanjima iz anketa 1999., 2008., 2010. i/ili 2017. godine. U Hrvatskoj je percepcija korupcije u javnosti u porastu nakon ulaska u Europsku uniju. Korupcija postaje najvažniji problem, koruptivna su ponašanja javnih djelatnika česta i u porastu kao i učestalost koruptivne prakse u javnim institucijama. Korupcija najviše obuhvaća lokalnu i središnju vlast, političke stranke i sudstvo. Visoke percepcije raširenosti korupcije prati negativno mišljenje o prijavljivanju korupcije i stav da je korupcija katkad jedino sredstvo postizanja cilja. Opravdanost korupcije povezana je s nepovjerenjem u institucije, posebno u najviše institucije izvršne, zakonodavne i sudbene vlasti: Vladu Republike Hrvatske, Hrvatski sabor i sudstvo. Rezultati pružaju uvid u smjer i intenzitet promjena tijekom 20 godina, doprinose literaturi o povezanosti korupcije u zemljama članicama i institucionalnog okvira EU-a i osnova su za preporuke mjera politike.
... On the one hand, the EU's joint initiatives to combat illegal and unlawful practices are expected to reduce corruption, but on the other hand, there are reasons to believe that corruption may increase due to the lack of EU enforcement of the (national) anti-corruption institutions and policies (Alfano/Capasso/Goel 2021). Essentially, the EU has made effective corruption control a condition for membership, but it does not have the legal means to effectively sanction non-compliance once a country is an EU member (Lacatus/Sedelmeier 2020). The recent studies of the Eastern enlargement and the Croatian accession in 2013 have shown that after the accession of Croatia to the EU, corruption actually increased (Kartal 2014;Alfano/Capasso/Goel 2021). ...
The pervasiveness of corruption in Croatia is documented by corruption perception indicators and surveys, yet there is no comprehensive knowledge about corruption and informality in the private sector. This quantitative study uses primary survey data of Croatian business actors to determine business perceptions and attitudes towards corruption and informality. The results show that Croatian businesspeople express low trust in institutions, but do not see them as obstacles to doing business. Similarly, Croatia’s EU membership is perceived as insignificant in the fight against corruption and informality. The SMEs are allegedly suffering more due to corruption, whereas the large companies are seen as the main generators of corruption. Corrupt behaviour and informal practices in everyday business are more accepted and used by the owners and managers working in small and micro firms. This study thus contributes to research on doing business and managerial behaviour and offers policy recommendations to mitigate the harmful effects of corruption and informality.
... In addition, the fact that it comes at an early stage of the process of reformulating the policy choices that will emerge within the newly established rule of law reporting framework, at a point in time when scholarly articles with similar objectives are still in short supply, may be thought of as a contribution in itself. While an extensive scholarly literature addresses the reform of the Romanian Judiciary under the influence of CVM (Parau, 2015;Mendelski, 2016;Iancu, 2017;Mungiu-Pippidi, 2018;Selejan-Gut̗ an, 2018;Dimitrova 2020;Lacatus & Sedelmeier, 2020;Dimitrov & Plachkova, 2021;Mendelski, 2021;Chrun, 2023, to cite just few examples), attempts at ex post summarisation or studies touching to the transition towards the Rule of Law Report Assessment mechanism and its foreseeable pitfalls are yet to come. ...
Unlike all other former socialist countries admitted as EU members before or after them, Romania and Bulgaria entered a particular supervision regime under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, which was supposed to help them to consolidate the rule of law and to actively impede corruption and organized crime. Years later, after the reforms it inspired engendered fierce political battles, the CVM came to an end. Should its policy instruments be abandoned or not after this sudden conclusion, it is increasingly obvious that their success or failure did not depend on technical decisions only, but also on multifaceted political intricacies of domestic partisanship and power struggles. Through the means of the political analysis, using a context-driven interpretative approach, this article underlines several crucial politically contested issues that have risen over the years and should be taken into consideration in any judicious assessment concerning the reform of the Romanian judiciary. Drawing from the observation of institutional change and public narratives, it distinguishes three persistent tensions: the uneasy relationship between judicial independence and autonomy, the problematic overemphasis of the role of public prosecutor's offices as agents of reform within a liberal-democratic normative framework and the prominence of mediatized contention at the expense of administrative problem-solving.
Keywords: EU driven reforms, judiciary, rule of law, corruption, Romanian politics, judicial activism, judicial bureaucracy, court management
... Lacatus and Sedelmeier maintain that for Romania the persistent CVM monitoring had a positive impact on state compliance, in spite of the lack of material sanctions. It stimulated the domestic institution-building process, that is strong anti-corruption institutions considered a powerful base for the fight against corruption, even if they are still seen as vulnerable to governmental interference (Lacatus and Sedelmeier 2020). ...
This article identifies what is specific about Romania’s differentiated integration (DI) into European institutions. It outlines Romania’s expectations and priorities towards the European Union (EU) across three time periods: 1990–2000, 2001–2006 and 2007 onwards. Through this, it evaluates multiple perspectives on EU membership: DI; the development of macro-economic indicators; and Romanian attitudes towards European integration. In some areas, Romania has recorded substantial progress; in others it is still behind other Central and East European member states. Romania remains one of the most determined supporters of EU integration, as membership is considered a key impulse for economic stability and growth. Even if Romania is still outside the Schengen area and the eurozone, it continues to adhere to its accession objectives.
... Studying the anti-corruption policy in Indonesia, Nurhidayat and Kusumasari (2018: 141-150) concluded that effective means of combating corruption should be based on human and ethical culture, policy, anti-corruption legislation, legal protection, organizational structure, as well as legal procedures and processes that include the specifics of Indonesia. Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020: 1236-1240 analysed national anticorruption policy of Bulgaria and Romania. They concluded that the effective anti-corruption policy is not possible without constant monitoring and transparent justice. ...
An effective national anti-corruption policy is one of the means of improving the legal mechanisms of compliance with the guarantees of human rights and freedoms at the national level. The corruption rate in the public sector reflects the state of development of Ukraine as an economic and legal state and its place in the international arena. The aim of the study was to analyse the state anti-corruption policy of Ukraine and the effectiveness of its implementation mechanisms. Empirical and theoretical methods of scientific knowledge, as well as the method of comparative analysis, were used for a comprehensive study of the issue under research. The system of measures for the implementation of Ukraine’s anti-corruption policy has become an effective tool for preventing and countering corruption. Effective anti-corruption measures in Ukraine were: coordinated state anti-corruption strategy; the newly created structure of anti-corruption bodies; virtuous public service; implemented electronic systems for public procurement and property management; regular public reporting; independence of the prosecutor’s office and judiciary; monitoring and control of civil society. Further studies may focus on determining and justifying the impact of the anti-corruption policy on the comprehensive development of the state with the purpose of providing practical recommendations for the implementation of anti-corruption measures.
... Although many projects encountered challenges during their implementation, some project beneficiaries were able to address implementation difficulties, while other project teams struggled to do so. This difference is often associated with previous administrative capacity and initial reform decisions, which clearly points to the importance of removing institutional deficiencies to achieve a more effective reform implementation (Chardas, 2012;Incaltarau et al., 2020;Lacatus and Sedelmeier, 2020). This is particularly important for larger and more ambitious projects due to the political, technological and social complexities of their environmentstheir delivery requires more robust planning, building stronger project teams and effective collaborations with different stakeholders. ...
Purpose
Despite the growing volume of European Union (EU) investments into reforms and public administration, how EU support contributes to administrative reform and capacity building at domestic level is still unclear. The article explains the EU's influence, domestic politicisation and previous administrative capacity on organisational change whilst implementing European Social Fund-financed projects during the programming period 2014–2020.
Design/methodology/approach
By going beyond the EU-centred approach and based on different strands of the new institutionalism, the authors offer three explanations on the influence of EU support. The authors performed the qualitative content analysis of 29 case studies and matched the implementation of the projects with the authors' explanations.
Findings
The authors' research results indicate that progress in the implementation of the projects was determined by domestic factors rather than EU conditionalities. The influence of domestic politicisation was found to be mixed, but higher levels of initial administrative capacity proved to be most important to achieving organisational change.
Research limitations/implications
The authors' judgement of the project implementation and their success was based on the information provided in the case studies at the time of implementation.
Practical implications
The authors' research points to the essential need for the initial and gradual development of administrative capacity to achieve good reform results.
Originality/value
Based on the different logics of the new institutionalism, we developed specific mechanisms for organisational change. The authors' research results deepen the understanding of how politicisation positively or negatively shapes reform implementation, as well as how pre-existing administrative capacity and further development of pre-existing administrative capacity dynamically occurs through a process of socialisation and learning.
... They rely on both the idea of broader and stronger compliance-inducing mechanisms, with an extended conditionality for Romania and Bulgaria, and on the idea of a path-dependency inherent in the European policy-making process. 27 Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020), Anghel (2020), and Börzel and Fagan (2017). 28 Rich sources of data are the reports published by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Freedom House Nations in Transit, or the V-Dem Democracy Reports. ...
... 91 Closa and Kochenov (2016). 92 Papadimitriou and Gateva (2009), Spendzharova and Vachudova (2012), Vachudova (2016), Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020). unprecedented postponement clause, which allowed accession to be delayed in case the candidate proved to be unprepared. ...
... .104 Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020: 1252).105 Mendelski (2012),Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020).106 ...
With this chapter, Martin-Russu starts her empirical analysis by examining the structural factors that influence the composition and conduct of the Romanian political elite. The observed high level of fragmentation of this elite during the last decades results from a narrow and shallow pattern of elite renewal, from conflicting institutional or organizational interests and from a lack of value consensus among elite members. All these factors exacerbate a struggle for power, they work in favour of a pursuit of narrow particular interests at high levels of decision-making, leading to the failure of democracy even where democratic institutions are in place.
The chapter shows a political environment in which the major Romanian political parties experience numerous splits and mergers, several opportunistic coalitions are forged in the run-up to or midway between parliamentary elections, and numerous party members abruptly change their affiliation in order to obtain secure political positions. It provides a revealing example of over-fragmentation: a political climate of distrust, uncertainty and unpredictability that favours self-interested behaviour, and in which elected elites can be bound neither to take account of the preferences of their own party, nor to take into account the concerns of their electorate.
... They rely on both the idea of broader and stronger compliance-inducing mechanisms, with an extended conditionality for Romania and Bulgaria, and on the idea of a path-dependency inherent in the European policy-making process. 27 Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020), Anghel (2020), and Börzel and Fagan (2017). 28 Rich sources of data are the reports published by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Freedom House Nations in Transit, or the V-Dem Democracy Reports. ...
... 91 Closa and Kochenov (2016). 92 Papadimitriou and Gateva (2009), Spendzharova and Vachudova (2012), Vachudova (2016), Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020). unprecedented postponement clause, which allowed accession to be delayed in case the candidate proved to be unprepared. ...
... .104 Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020: 1252).105 Mendelski (2012),Lacatus and Sedelmeier (2020).106 ...
To grant more plausibility to the theoretical argument, Martin-Russu includes a second case study in her empirical analysis: an inquiry into Romania’s nature conservation reform and the framework regulating the protection of environmentally significant habitats and species. The evaluation of the legislative performance of the Romanian political elite in the field of nature conservation shows a questionable use of procedures, but this time coupled with a far higher level of responsibility and responsivity to societal concerns.
The chapter reveals a reality at odds with the expectation that limited capacities lead to non-compliance; it shows how the lack of institutional capacities led, through the involvement of civil society actors, to a gradual improvement of EU-driven reforms. Martin-Russu provides a detailed account of how the expansion of protected areas in preparation for EU membership generated an increased need for their effective management, which translated into a legislative solution that allowed civil society organizations and the scientific community to assume responsibility for the administration of protected areas on an equal footing with the government. This, Martin-Russu argues, allowed citizens to pursue their interests through the actions and reactions of civil society, promoting the latter’s growth and gradually strengthening its voice.
