TABLE 4 - uploaded by Niall O'Higgins
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- Probability of cooperation among A and B players- Probit estimates
Source publication
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which allows a deeper insight into the nature of social preferences amongst organized criminals and how these differ from “ordinary” criminals on the one hand and from the non-criminal population in the same geographical area on the other. We provide experimental evidence on cooperatio...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... we are interested in assessing whether individuals who have similar attitudes to cooperation and reciprocity behave differently, according to whether they belong to one or other of the groups under investigation. Table 4, columns I-III, reports the results of Probit estimates of the probability of cooperation run for all participants in both types of treatment. The specification of the model in first column includes only dummies for participant type and treatment type. ...
Context 2
... last two columns in Table 4 which estimates the probability of co-operation separately for camoristi and OCs, allow us to look in more detail at the behaviour and motivations of these two groups. In this case, interaction terms are introduced in the set of the covariates between the attitudinal dummies (namely, "Locus", "Cooperator" and "Reciprocator") and the dummy "TPP". ...
Context 3
... now to Third Parties, Table 5 the excluded dummy refers to both players defeating. The variables Cooperator, Reciprocator, Locus, are defined in Table 4.Notes: ° statistically significant at 20% confidence level; * statistically significant at 10%;** statistically significant at 5%;*** statistically significant at 1%. ...
Similar publications
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which allows a deeper insight into the nature of social preferences amongst organized criminals and how these differ from “ordinary” criminals on the one hand and from the non‐criminal population in the same
geographical area on the other. We provide experimental evidence on cooperatio...
Citations
This paper investigates whether there is a connection between psychopathy and certain manifestations of social and economic behavior, measured in a lab-in-the-field experiment with prison inmates. In order to test this main hypothesis, we let inmates play four games that have often been used to measure prosocial and antisocial behavior in previous experimental economics literature. Specifically, they play a prisoner's dilemma, a trust game, the equality equivalence test that elicits distributional preferences, and a corruption game. Psychopathy is measured by means of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) questionnaire, which inmates filled out after having made their decisions in the four games. We find that higher scores in the LSRP are significantly correlated with anti-social behavior in the form of weaker reciprocity, lower cooperation, lower benevolence and more bribe-oriented decisions in the corruption game. In particular, not cooperating and bribe-maximizing decisions are associated with significantly higher LSRP primary and LSRP secondary scores. Not reciprocating is associated with higher LSRP primary and being spiteful with higher LSRP secondary scores.
