Figure 4 - uploaded by Kelebogile Zvobgo
Content may be subject to copyright.
Predicted probability of treaty ratification, by number of demanding obligations, democracies versus autocracies.
Source publication
International relations scholarship assumes that states weigh the costs and benefits of treaty ratification. In human rights, the worse a particular state’s record, the higher the presumptive costs of ratification and the lower the likelihood of ratification. But prior work neglects variation in the extent of obligation that different treaties crea...
Similar publications
International relations scholarship assumes that states weigh the costs and benefits of treaty ratification. In human rights, the worse a particular state's record, the higher the presumptive costs of ratification and the lower the likelihood of ratification. But prior work neglects variation in the extent of obligation that different treaties crea...
Citations
... At the same time, member states refrain from ratifying when treaties impose sovereignty costs in the form of coercive instruments, such as independent regional courts. Less powerful states and those with a common-law legal tradition can also be expected to be more mindful of sovereignty costs (Hafner-Burton et al., 2015Hathaway, 2007;Mulesky et al., 2020;Simmons, 2009). ...
... On the one hand, states incur sovereignty costs depending on how treaties are designed. Several studies have introduced measures of how demanding treaty provisions are for member states (Hafner-Burton et al., 2015Mulesky et al., 2020;Thompson et al., 2019). 4 Ultimately, the logic behind these approaches is that treaty provisions can be added up. ...
Over the past 50 years, regional international organizations have adopted several treaties on human rights. By ratifying them, member states can signal their commitment to the norms codified in the respective documents. Yet ratification patterns vary greatly across both states and treaties. Extant studies of commitment to human rights focus on the impacts of reputational benefits and sovereignty costs. These arguments, however, are largely based on studies of ratification behavior in Europe and the UN system. We extend this logic to treaties created in the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (OAU/AU). Between them, the two organizations have adopted 15 human rights agreements, giving their member states ample choices about (non)ratification. We apply event-history analysis to newly collected data on treaty commitment. This reveals variation in line with regional differences in how treaties are elaborated. Benefits from commitment expected by democratic and democratizing states play an important role in the member-state driven process in the OAS, but this is not the case in the OAU/AU. In the expert-driven context of the OAU/AU, in contrast, concerns about sovereignty costs related to treaty design and the relative power of member states are more pronounced.
... 129 Mulesky et al examined the nine core UN human rights treaties, labelled as 'demanding' those obligations that are 'strong, precise, and that require domestic action', and saw how that affected ratification and efficacy. 130 Deprived of regular enforcement options (reciprocity, reputation, and retaliation), human rights treaties rely on 'domestic accountability processes, including political mobilization and litigation, [that] are more effective at inducing governments to comply'. 131 They indicate that domestic actors 'will be better able to rely on, for either judicial or political action, treaty law that establishes strong and precise obligations.' ...
The process to elaborate a legally binding instrument on Business and Human Rights started in 2014. The stated ambition animating UN process is to deliver a broad-spectrum treaty that significantly increases remediation for victims. However the treaty has polarized opinion from the very beginning. To come closer to genuine points of disagreement and possible paths forward, this chapter explains and contextualizes the treaty process by unpacking the notion of 'governance gaps'. The analysis identifies the multiple purposes pursued through this treaty that correspond to twelve governance gaps. Furthermore, several potential models and treaty precedents are discussed to draw attention to noteworthy regulatory dynamics. Drawing on documents generated through the negotiation process-especially treaty drafts and annual reports-and related academic commentary, the chapter invites reflection on the question: will the UN be able to deliver a viable treaty meeting its stated aspirations?
... We evaluate our hypotheses against an original dataset measuring international human rights treaty obligations (Mulesky, Sandholtz, and Zvobgo 2020) and reservations. Treaty provisions have three levels: treaty, article, and paragraph. ...
International relations scholarship has made significant strides in explaining how states design treaty obligations and why they accept treaty commitments. However, far less attention has been paid to factors that may influence states’ modification of their treaty obligations via reservations. We theorize that states will be more likely to enter reservations when treaty obligations increase compliance costs and policy adjustment costs. More specifically, we expect that demanding provisions, i.e., provisions that create strong, precise obligations requiring domestic action, will enhance the likelihood of reservation. To test our theory, we exploit an original dataset that codes reservations at the provision (treaty–article–paragraph) level for the ten core international human rights treaties. Consistent with our expectations, we find that states are more likely to enter reservations on more demanding treaty provisions. In contrast to prior studies, our results indicate that reservations are not driven purely by state-level characteristics such as regime type or the nature of the legal system. Rather, it appears that states weigh individual treaty obligations and calibrate their commitments accordingly.
... We evaluate our hypotheses against an original dataset measuring international human rights treaty obligations (Mulesky, Sandholtz, and Zvobgo 2020) and reservations. Treaty provisions have three levels: treaty, article, and paragraph. ...
International relations scholarship has made significant strides in explaining how states design treaty obligations and why they accept treaty commitments. However, far less attention has been paid to factors that may influence states’ modification of their treaty obligations via reservations. We theorize that states will be more likely to enter reservations when treaty obligations increase compliance costs and policy adjustment costs. More specifically, we expect that demanding provisions, i.e., provisions that create strong, precise obligations requiring domestic action, will enhance the likelihood of reservation. To test our theory, we exploit an original dataset that codes reservations at the provision (treaty–article–paragraph) level for the ten core international human rights treaties. Consistent with our expectations, we find that states are more likely to enter reservations on more demanding treaty provisions. In contrast to prior studies, our results indicate that reservations are not driven purely by state-level characteristics such as regime type or the nature of the legal system. Rather, it appears that states weigh individual treaty obligations and calibrate their commitments accordingly.
How do states react to adverse decisions resulting from human rights treaties’ individual complaint procedures? While recent scholarship has shown particular interest in states’ reactions to international court judgments, research on state behavior vis-à-vis an increasing treaty body output remains scarce. I argue that states generally want to avoid the costs implied by adverse decisions, or ‘views’. Rising numbers of rebukes lead them to update their beliefs about the costliness of complaint procedure acceptance in a Bayesian manner. As a result, states become less inclined to accept further petition mechanisms under different human rights treaties. I test these assumptions on an original dataset containing information on individual complaint procedure acceptance and the distribution of 1320 views for a total number of 169 countries ranging from the year 1965 to 2018. Results from Cox proportional hazards regressions suggest that both the number of views against neighboring states and against the examined state itself decrease the likelihood of acceptance of most of the six individual complaint procedures under observation. I also find evidence that this effect is exacerbated if states are more likely to actually bear the costs of implementation. Findings indicate that the omission of further commitment can be a negative spillover of the treaty bodies’ quasi-judicial output.
