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Path analysis of direct and indirect effects of prior attitude and prime manipulation on posterior anti-immigration policy evaluations.
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We offer a theory of motivated political reasoning based on the claim that the feelings aroused in the initial stages of processing sociopolitical information inevitably color all phases of the evaluation process. When a citizen is called on to express a judgment, the considerations that enter into conscious rumination will be biased by the valence...
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Context 1
... first step in this indirect causal pathway replicates affective contagion with a new experiment and sample, while the second step completes the indirect causal process we call affective mediation. Figure 4 reports a path-regression analysis for anti-immigration policy statements, and Figure 5 shows the same analysis for pro-immigration statements. 4 The pro and anti policy statements must be analyzed separately because in our theory pro and anti statements are predicted to trigger different affects and considerations, and we would not be able to observe these theorized differences if we combined these into a single dependent variable. ...
Context 2
... Because these are the first-step coefficients in the path analysis, we simply compared the coefficients in which the dependent variable is the number of thoughts whereas the affective prime and the prior attitude are the independent variables. For instance, in Figure 4, the effect of affective prime on positive thoughts about anti-illegal immigration is 3.76 as opposed to the effect of the prior-attitude coefficient, -.63. There is a six-fold difference for this comparison. ...
Context 3
... thoughts about a policy reduce support for that policy, while positive thoughts increase support, and these effects propagate the influence of both prior attitudes and the affective prime onto the policy evaluations collected at the end of the experimental session. For anti-immigration policies (Figure 4), the indirect effect of the prime on support is 1.13, while the indirect effect of prior attitude is -.31. Since the direct effect of prior immigration attitudes on evaluations of anti-illegal immigration policies is -1.01, the total effect of prior attitudes is -1.32. ...
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Citations
... Given the important role of partisan media in exacerbating polarization worldwide, this study aims to address the gap and advance the literature by examining emotional responses to partisan media outlets as a potential mediating mechanism between political knowledge and affective polarization. Specifically, partisans with higher knowledge levels demonstrate higher emotional responses to partisan media outlets, which could be transferred to feelings toward other related political objects (Erisen et al., 2014). ...
... A growing body of research has recognized emotion as an essential part of individuals' mental processes to political objects (Erisen et al., 2014;Marcus, 2000). As an important class of political objects, partisan media are widely discussed in academia and news reports in different contexts (Hameleers, 2019;Jurkowitz et al., 2020;Levendusky, 2013;Young, 2023). ...
... Partisans with higher levels of political knowledge are not only more likely to but also more capable of denigrating counter-attitudinal political information (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Motivated reasoning happens because humans process information automatically through affective mechanisms, with the more controllable cognitive process kicking in later down the road (Erisen et al., 2014;Kraft et al., 2015). As partisans with greater political knowledge could experience stronger affective responses to disagreements, it requires more effort for them to revise their initial attitudes, resulting in an enhanced tendency for motivated reasoning (Erisen et al., 2014). ...
Drawing on a two-wave national survey conducted in the United States, this study examined an emotion spillover mechanism underlying the link between political knowledge and affective polarization. Results indicate that partisans with high political knowledge demonstrated more negative emotions toward opposing partisan media outlets and more positive emotions toward congruent partisan media outlets. Gaps in emotional responses toward partisan media outlets spill over to affective polarization. Specifically, the gap in negative emotional response toward counter- and pro-attitudinal media outlets spills over to affective polarization toward individual partisans. We discuss how partisan media exacerbate polarization and propose possible remedies.
... Likewise, many of Tversky and Kahneman's own experiments were not about equivalency framing; they instead attempted to manipulate reference points in order to mimic varying real-world circumstances and demonstrate the contrasting reactions to gains vs. losses. (Slovic et al. 2002) and mood effects (Erisen, Lodge and Taber 2014); evaluations become biased either through direct affect transfer or by bias in the valence of the thoughts that come to mind. ...
While there is a large political science literature on framing effects, almost none of it has focused on equivalency framing of actual problems and potential solutions. We investigate whether the public expresses more concern about societal problems when logically equivalent information concerning their prevalence is framed in negative rather than in positive terms, and whether support for ameliorative policies changes when policies are framed as reducing the incidence of bad outcomes as opposed to increasing the incidence of good ones. From experiments covering a diverse set of issues, we find that equivalency frames have a consistent effect on the public’s evaluation of social problems: negative frames provoke substantially more negative emotional reactions to problems and lead to judgments that the problems are more serious and deserving of government attention. At the same time, we find no differences in support for gain-framed versus loss-framed policies designed to ameliorate these problems.
... Second, when it comes to which malign actor is perceived to be behind an information operation, accessibility bias is likely to come into play. The intense focus on Russia's interference in 2016 and Russia's association with disinformation in general creates a direct pathway for people primed to think about disinformation to implicate Russia (Erisen et al., 2014). By contrast, although China has been demonized among politicians and in the media in the US in recent years, it has less often been associated with producing or spreading disinformation. ...
... Both thoughts and feelings are constructed in our brain (Barrett 2017), and research suggests we can vote according to our policy preferences by only remembering how we felt about political leaders (Coronel et al. 2012). Affective processing happens in milliseconds after exposure to stimuli, and these initial affective processes often color our attitude formation, a process known as affective contagion (Taber and Lodge 2006;Erisen et al. 2014). But our prior attitudes also determine the emotional response we experience (Barrett 2017), and even non-political physiological states such as heart rate have even been found to influence leadership preferences (Tsakiris et al. 2021). ...
In political representation, the concept of feeling represented has garnered significant attention in recent years. However, the prevailing conceptualization of feeling represented is limited in its scope and has effectively conflated a perception of being represented with feeling represented. We argue that such a conflation undermines our understanding of political representation, especially in the face of the constructivist turn in representation. Constructivist scholars have theoretically elaborated that representation results from a process in which a linkage is created between represented and representative. We argue that feeling represented is an essential part of establishing this representative relationship. By drawing on the recent constructivist turn in representation and applying key insights from psychology, we develop and test a reconceptualization of feeling represented. Through an online survey, American prolific users ( N=605 N = 605 ) were asked a number of questions related to feeling represented after witnessing representative claims by unelected representatives. Through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we establish that feeling represented is a multidimensional concept consisting of instrumental, expressive, and aversive dimensions. Thus, feeling represented is a subjective state consisting of clearly emotional components, and it can be measured as a response to unelected representation. Acknowledging this goes beyond the current constructivist account of representation and sets the stage for future research.
... The presence of some contextual stimuli related to political life causes a position taking that, far from being rationally founded, must be explained as the result of unconscious emotional reactions, even if they are reasoned and grounded as if they were the result of a process of conscious rational analysis (Lau and Redlawsk 1997;Baum and Jamison 2006;Redlawsk 2006;Haidt 2013;Erisen, Lodge, and Taber 2014). Among the stimuli that can give rise to relevant emotional reactions, the visual ones stand out. ...
... This kind of exposure can activate "trait concepts," which are a network of meanings, values, or feelings that allow the subject to offer a coherent response to them (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996;Kam 2007). For example, even if the flag is just a piece of cloth, its exhibition activates a series of representations, meanings, or emotions (trait concepts) capable of modifying subjects' behavior, but only in a coherent way with previously learned patterns (Janssen and Verheggen 1997;Erisen, Lodge, and Taber 2014). ...
Political objects, like national flags, arouse emotions even when they are subliminal stimuli. Through two experiments that show subliminal stimuli to the subjects, this article analyzes if those emotions are positive or negative ones—that is to say, if they enhance an inclusive reaction or an excluding one. Besides, the article compares the intensity of the flag’s emotional effect with that of the emoticons, which are figures intended to represent emotional reactions or states. Findings confirm that the Spanish flag, as a subliminal stimulus, influences the opinions of the participants. However, it has had a lower effect than that obtained in previous, similar experiments. Emoticons produce a much more intense type of response than flags. The experiments (n = 85; n = 126) enlarge the knowledge about the emotional effects of political objects of nonconscious perception. Besides, we present an original methodological contribution: the use of emoticons to alter political views.
... And in recent years, perhaps the worst news for advocates of communicative action comes from a large body of empirical research suggesting that human beings are not rational (i.e., not persuaded by good reason), may be psychologically incapable of objective reasoning about politics, and instead process political information in entirely affect-driven, biased ways (e.g., Erisen et al. 2014;Lodge and Taber 2013). From a theoretical perspective, this research suggests an "affect" model for human cognition, which means that unconscious emotions have primacy over and precede all conscious thinking processes. ...
... Neuroscientific research supports the automaticity and speed of this response-even arbitrary group distinctions can lead people to process ingroup faces differently than outgroup faces in as little as 170 milliseconds (Ratner and Amodio 2013). Information processing is thus biased by an initial affect valence, which automatically directs/motivates reasoning processes toward conclusions that result in "affective congruence" (Erisen et al. 2014). In what seems like a fatal blow to deliberative democracy, Lodge and Taber (2013) conclude that "political behavior is the result of innumerable unnoticed forces, with conscious deliberation nothing more than a rationalization of the outputs of automatic feelings and inclinations" (p. ...
A growing body of research suggests that the contemporary media environment enables motivated reasoning, which intensifies affective polarization. This is especially the case in the U.S., where elections are capital-intensive and media are largely commercially owned. From a normative perspective, these commercial forces may interfere with authentic communication by hijacking the “lifeworld” and thus undermining the sincerity of our speech. From a psychological and empirical perspective, this means we are an affective public steeping in “hot cognitions” that unconsciously motivate us toward processing (mis)information in biased and distorted ways. This kind of cognitive limitation intensifies as current affairs heat up, but starts well before, as a function of media market boundaries aligning with human psychology. Through a synthetic literature review of theory and empirical research, this essay argues that “social identity complexity” may help to overcome some of the worst outcomes of motivated reasoning, pointing toward a developmental basis for more authentic communication in the public sphere.
... From a broader perspective, scholars of political emotions recognize that emotions can be conceptualized in various ways, including long-term affective responses with downstream action tendencies (Brader et al., 2008;Frijda, 1986), collectively shared emotions (Capelos & Chrona, 2018;Hatfield et al., 1994), affect-driven reactions (Erisen, Lodge, & Taber, 2014), and temporary responses to political stimuli (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). Research into the complexity of emotions has relied on different approaches with distinct conceptual foundations. ...
Individual-level indicators of populist attitudes vary from basic demographic factors to complex psychological dimensions. However, only a handful of studies have examined how emotions shape populist attitudes. To address this gap, and using observational data from Turkey, a context driven by strong polarization and populist politics, this study first examines how emotions—specifically, anger and enthusiasm—motivate distinct routes to populist attachment. It then explores the conditional effects of emotions in connection with political ideology and a conspiracy mindset. The results demonstrate, first, that anger is closely related to populist attitudes in contrast to enthusiasm, which is associated with weaker populist attitudes. Second, in the context of Turkey, where a populist party has been in power, there is an ideological asymmetry in that those on the political right are more influenced by anger than enthusiasm. Third, these emotions are potentially more effective in altering the populist views of those with low levels of conspiratorial mindset. Contributing to the literature on the connection between emotions and populism, this study presents evidence on how anger and enthusiasm influence populist preferences in a polarized country.
... In recent decades, partisanship has become a more salient social identity in the United States (Iyengar et al., 2012;Mason, 2018), and research suggests it can influence affective polarization (Levendusky, 2018;Wojcieszak & Garrett, 2018). We expand on this work by drawing on the affective contagion hypothesis (Erisen et al., 2014) to show that social identities can indirectly shape affective polarization through emotions aroused by political symbols. ...
... The causal mechanism by which we expect visual symbols to influence affective polarization is found in affective contagion theory (Erisen et al., 2014). Based in priming, it says that subtle cues will, either consciously or unconsciously, trigger affective reactions, which will then bias the downstream processing in a congruent direction, linking these feelings to thoughts and behaviors (Lodge & Taber, 2005). ...
... We have expanded on theoretical concepts in the affective contagion hypothesis (Erisen et al., 2014) to show that social identities can indirectly shape affective polarization through emotions that are aroused by subtle political symbols, in this case, visuals. Specifically, we add to theory by showing that viewing partisan symbols as compared to national ones can evoke feelings associated with partisan identities, leading to increased anger and anxiety, and decreased enthusiasm. ...
... Because people are often more motivated to protect their cherished ingroup beliefs and identities than they are motivated to be accurate (Kahan et al., 2017;Kunda, 1990), the process of politically motivated moral reasoning is directional, tipping the scale toward the desired conclusion (Chen et al., 1999;Erisen et al., 2014;Taber & Lodge, 2006). One way that people may build a psychological case for their preferred moral conclusion is by appealing to different moral principles depending on what principle justifies the conclusion they favor Uhlmann et al., 2009). ...
As more of our lives take place online, it is increasingly common for public figures to have their current image tarnished by their mistakes and transgressions in what is often the distant past. Three experiments ( N = 2,296) found that judgments of a public figure who tweeted racist statements in the past were less harsh when more time had passed and when the public figure was younger at the time of the tweet. However, politics also played a powerful role. Independent of time and age, liberals allowed less possibility of redemption for anti-Black tweets, while conservatives were less forgiving for anti-White tweets. Such partisan differences extended not only to moral judgments of the individual, but also general moral principles and participants’ subjective perceptions of the situation itself, including subjective temporal distance from the tweet, the subjective age of the public figure, and the current relevance of the past statements.
... Social psychologists and social epistemologists have known for some time now that individuals (and groups and institutions) are susceptible to "motivated reasoning, or the drive to see the world in ways that are consistent with one's attitudinal predispositions" and that normative orientations play a role in epistemic limitations (Barker et al., 2020, p. 40;Erisen et al., 2014;Jost, 2020;Marietta & Barker, 2019;Taber & Lodge, 2006). Additionally, there has been significant research conducted on anti-intellectualism versus intellectualism. ...
Students in teacher education programs are often faced with perceived threats to their epistemological heritages. According to System Justification Theory, when faced with these perceived threats, individuals may become more defensive, epistemically resistant, and cognitively rigid. More specifically, due to a palliative psychological need, students may become motivated to justify what they conceive of as the status quo, or system justifications, to defend their episte-mological heritage and socializations. Students may face perceived threats to their social and epistemological heritages in courses which are critically focused, such as foundations of education courses, and courses where there are requirements for both dialogical and dialec-tical engagement. System Justification Theory offers the potential to be utilized as a way of understanding student teachers' epistemologi-cal resistance and epistemic vices while informing teacher educators' pedagogy.
