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![Network model [8].](publication/385399829/figure/fig1/AS:11431281287748099@1730381084399/Network-model-8.png)
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![FIGURE 1. Network model [8].](publication/385399829/figure/fig1/AS:11431281287748099@1730381084399/Network-model-8_Q320.jpg)
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV), a subset of the Internet of Things (IoT) within the transportation sector, enhances driving safety and comfort by utilizing intelligent transportation systems to facilitate communication among vehicles and other entities. In this context, communication extends beyond vehicles and roadside units (RSUs), supporting int...
Contexts in source publication
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... model includes a variety of devices, such as vehicles, RSUs, wireless sensors, mobile devices, and infrastructure. Five communication models are supported, facilitated through DSRC, Wi-Fi, or 4G/5G technologies, encompassing V2V, V2R, V2I, V2M, and V2S communications, as depicted in Figure 1. The IoV server is responsible for registering all devices before their deployment in the network. ...
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... í µí± $ needs global information, í µí± $ can connect to the infrastructure by the following steps, as shown in Figure 10. ...
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... verification results demonstrate that our proposed protocols resist multiple attacks, including impersonation, replay, and password guessing attacks, while providing strong anonymity and secrecy. The results of our simulations are shown in Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13, respectively. ...
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... verification results demonstrate that our proposed protocols resist multiple attacks, including impersonation, replay, and password guessing attacks, while providing strong anonymity and secrecy. The results of our simulations are shown in Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13, respectively. ...
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... verification results demonstrate that our proposed protocols resist multiple attacks, including impersonation, replay, and password guessing attacks, while providing strong anonymity and secrecy. The results of our simulations are shown in Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13, respectively. ...
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... we tested the secrecy of the session key and í µí± ℛℰ by issuing commands "query attacker (SSkey_v)", "query attacker (SSkey_i)," and "query attacker (new MRE)". The results of this simulation, illustrated in Figure 14, show that even if the secret value ℎ(í µí±í µí°¾ ∥ í µí°¼í µí± () ∥ í µí±¥) is known by the adversary, he/she cannot obtain the session key shared between the vehicle user and the infrastructure. ...
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... using these claims and the SPDL language, Scyther can formally model and verify the security properties of a protocol. The results of our simulations are shown in Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17, respectively. An "OK" status indicates that the protocol satisfies the specified property, while a "Fail" status means it does not. ...
Context 8
... using these claims and the SPDL language, Scyther can formally model and verify the security properties of a protocol. The results of our simulations are shown in Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17, respectively. An "OK" status indicates that the protocol satisfies the specified property, while a "Fail" status means it does not. ...
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... using these claims and the SPDL language, Scyther can formally model and verify the security properties of a protocol. The results of our simulations are shown in Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17, respectively. An "OK" status indicates that the protocol satisfies the specified property, while a "Fail" status means it does not. ...
