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This article seeks to understand what role China can and will play in global energy governance by examining how its domestic energy context shapes the country's attitudes toward the multilateral, market and climate change aspects of global energy governance. It finds that China demonstrates a preference for bilateral/regional to multilateral energy...
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Context 1
... reorganizations have dispersed and scat- tered the country's decentralized energy authority among parallel central ministries. Based on the author's tally in Table 1 ( Kong, 2006), there are now 16 ministerial bureaucracies under the State Council -China's cabinet - germane to different segments of energy governance in China. Further, this fragmentation also permeates within central bureaucracies. ...
Citations
... For instance, its influence in Bretton Woods institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was limited for many years, and it has been excluded from major economic groupings such as the G7 (Kent 2002). Furthermore, China's absence from the world's most significant multilateral energy institutions underscores its reluctance to join these restrictive organizations and their lack of engagement with China (Kong 2011). ...
... However, China's engagement is not without its challenges, as it must overcome skepticism about its intentions and a narrow view of its national interest to make a major contribution to global economic governance (Paradise 2016). Furthermore, China's absence from key multilateral energy institutions highlights its reluctance to join restrictive organizations, as well as these organizations' lack of seriousness in engaging with China (Kong 2011). This absence speaks to the broader issue of how international organizations have sometimes marginalized or failed to fully engage with non-Western powers. ...
... However, China's engagement is not without its challenges, as it must overcome skepticism about its intentions and a narrow view of its national interest to make a major contribution to global economic governance (Paradise 2016). Furthermore, China's absence from key multilateral energy institutions highlights its reluctance to join restrictive organizations, as well as these organizations' lack of seriousness in engaging with China (Kong 2011). This absence speaks to the broader issue of how international organizations have sometimes marginalized or failed to fully engage with non-Western powers as reflected by the previous literature (Zhao 2019;Ferchen 2013;Chengqiu 2020;Karapinar 2011). ...
This analysis explores China’s quest for international legitimacy through its leader- ship in the BRICS + expansion, a strategic maneuver to foster a multipolar world that integrates diverse political and economic systems. The evolution into BRICS+is significant, with the collective GDP of member countries reaching $30.76 trillion, accounting for 30% of the global economy. This underscores the alliance’s economic impact and challenges the existing world order. The inclusion of nations like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, and the UAE offers a blueprint for shared benefits and mutual growth. China advocates for an alternative, inclusive pathway to legitimacy, promoting a world order that values sovereignty, cultural identity, and balanced global governance.
... International factors play a crucial role in the development of China's energy market (Kong 2011). The Geopolitical Risk Index is an important indicator of international political risk, which directly affects the supply and demand situation in the international energy market. ...
Risks caused by geo-risk cases, such as regional conflicts, propagate around the world, and this study provides insights into the dynamic and complex interactions of risks between international geopolitical risks, international shipping markets, China's carbon market, and the energy sector. The findings show that international geopolitical risk and international shipping markets are net transmitters of risk with positive net spillover values, indicating that they tend to export risk volatility to other markets. In contrast, the Chinese carbon market and the markets of traditional energy and high-emission sectors exhibit amplified volatility in the face of extreme risk events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This highlights the time-varying nature of risk spillovers in these markets. Notably, the peaks in net spillovers from the Geopolitical Risk Index to the Baltic Dry Index and Shanghai crude oil futures suggest a direct correlation with geopolitical tensions affecting the oil and shipping industries, such as conflicts in oil-rich regions or maritime disputes affecting shipping lanes. These findings highlight the mediating role of international shipping in the transmission of geopolitical risks to regional markets. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for predicting and mitigating the impact of geopolitical uncertainty and shipping markets on energy markets.
... For example, Odgaard and Delman (2014) report that in 2010 the Chinese state-owned oil companies controlled shares in oil fields spreading over 20 countries, accounting for 36% of China's oil imports. Furthermore, China has used its massive foreign exchange reserves to draw up oil-for-credit agreements with Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela (Kong, 2011). ...
China's remarkable economic progress over the past three decades has been complemented by massive energy consumption. Although coal has long been the primary energy source, the rise in crude oil use has been viewed as more contentious, because a large portion of crude oil is imported, whereas the economy is mostly self-sufficient in coal. We examine the role of R&D effort and self-sufficiency on China's oil import function from 1980 to 2020. Using the autoregressive distributed lag model, we find that the R&D effort raises oil imports in the long run. However, we find oil imports to be independent from self-sufficiency in the long run. We also find that China's accession to the World Trade Organization has significantly changed the cointegrating relationship in the oil import function. Our results suggest that the government should continue to incentivize energy-saving measures and fund research projects on renewable energy sources. Furthermore, deregulation in the oil market is quin-tessential to energy security and stable growth in the long run.
... Although energy governance actors in Asia are gradually improving, they still face several problems. On the one hand, there is a disconnect between central policy and actual implementation of state governance, such as the fragmentation of the current state of energy governance in China, which has led to overlap and confusion in energy governance, lengthy and contentious bureaucratic bargaining and infighting [5]. On the other hand, international organizations such as the ASEAN countries face serious energy security issues and the complexity of national energy governance makes the formal charter of ACE overly broad. ...
The outbreak of the COVID-19 has had a huge impact on the world's energy market, and the global energy governance situation is not optimistic. As an important region of energy consumption, Asia's demand for energy governance has increased. At the same time, it has also produced many problems, such as energy structure imbalance, backward energy infrastructure, environmental pollution caused by energy and difficulty in ensuring energy security. Taking Turkey and Maldives as examples, the article shows that the Asian infrastructure investment bank tries to improve the current situation of energy governance in the Asia Pacific region by promoting energy infrastructure construction, promoting energy transformation and participating in multilateral cooperation. These measures conform to the new trend of energy development in the post epidemic era and promote the reconstruction of energy order in the Asia Pacific region and even the whole world. At the same time, the article points out the possible problems of the AIIB in energy governance and put forward improvement suggestions on these problems.
... Over the last 15 years, China has become the world's largest net importer of oil, a major gas importer, and a significant player in seaborne coal markets (BP 2015). It is also the world's largest exporter of wind and solar energy equipment (Kong 2011). The overseas investment by its energy companies exceeds US$200 billion (Humphreys 2015). ...
While there is a proliferation of studies on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there is a gap in the literature in terms of an exploration of the costs and benefits from the perspective of the energy sector, in both the areas of sectoral development and energy transition. This paper uses Australia as a case study. The paper is the first to quantify the impact of the BRI in the energy sector, and the analysis informs the current debates on the BRI in Australia. We find that energy cooperation under the BRI enhances the performance of energy companies, but the Chinese energy investment in Australia faces mounting challenges. We suggest some areas for cooperation and such cooperation could be extended to third countries. Amid the increasing trade and political tensions, the two countries need continued, level-headed discussions and debates about the potential cooperation areas at all levels.
... The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is among the most important energy authorities at the national level. The NDRC is responsible for the general macro-economic management rather than the energy sector in particular and oversees economic reorganizations with the aim of sustaining China's economic and welfare growth (Downs, 2008, p. 42;Kong, 2011;Zhou, Levin & Prince, 2010). Supplementary, various ministries participate in the development of energy policies. ...
To capture the economic developments of the last decade, this study aims to contribute to the academic debate with a comprehensive and timely assessment of Sino-Russian relations from 1991 until 2021. This research analyses bilateral cooperation ties in the diplomatic, economic and military sphere, delegating high focus to the China-Russia energy cooperation. For the theoretical framework, most previous studies have relied on assumptions from the grand theories of IR. As these are deemed inadequate to explain the current state of Sino-Russian relations, this study turns to critical geopolitics and utilizes Geopolitical Economy Theory. Findings show that Sino-Russian relations have progressed from pragmatic partnership policies from 1991 until the mid-2000s to strategic ones after the global economic crisis of 2008. However, the groundworks for strategic bilateral cooperation were already laid before 2008, facilitated through diplomatic and security initiatives such as the forming of the strategic partnership in 1996 and the creation of the SCO and signing of the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty in 2001. But even so, significant obstacles persisted that have hindered Sino-Russian relations from blossoming to the strategic level and were only overcome after the mid-2000s. This research reveals prior misconceptions of the partnership and emphasizes both the limitations as the converging factors of the bilateral cooperation. It nevertheless argues that the relationship is best described as a strategic partnership and foresees strategic tendencies to grow. In the foreseeable future, both countries will likely continue to deepen diplomatic, economic and military ties and seek further international collaboration. On the regional sphere, platforms like the SCO, the BRI and the EAEU will most likely further integrate and accelerate collaboration. Both countries have been strong proponents of a multilateral world order and will likely continue their efforts to contend the liberal world order.
... The disadvantage, however, is the limited availability of fossil energy and inherent environmental problems that the extraction and use of chiefly oil and coal brings with. Major actors on the world-stage, like China and the European Union, have been trying to reduce pollution and bind themselves to the 2016 Paris Agreement (Kong, 2011;Boffley & Nelsen, 2017). This has resulted in a renewable energy transition in which, however, in the coming decades fossil fuels will still play a huge role, mainly in the form of natural gas. ...
... The increasing sense that fossil fuels are posing a vulnerability for China, urges the central government to strictly guide NOC's in foreign energy security rather than to delegate it solely on market forces (Kong, 2011, p. 59). Secondly, the statist approaches for NOC's are justified due to exacerbated concerns regarding increased 'resource nationalism' by many countries in the world (Kong, 2011). In addition, when major NOC's experienced significant setbacks in their appliance of market approaches to compete major western International Oil Companies (IOC's), China became sure to tighten the lines between the state and the market forces (Kong, 2011, p. 60 (Li-Wen & Milhaupt, 2013, p. 707). ...
... Divisional ministries that previously controlled energy sectors' operation were abolished. So, energy governance became increasingly decentralized (Kong, 2011). Moreover, political and administrational functions became separated from commercial functions (Suding, 2007, p. 28). ...
China increasingly needs to secure energy supplies cross-borders, mainly natural gas, due to its rapidly expanding industrial development, limited resource reserves and the necessity to counter environmental pollution. China’s National Oil Companies (NOC’s) and state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) operationalize the geopolitical and geo-economic objectives of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, through which energy supply security is pursued. Simultaneously, other actors, like the EU, increasingly need natural gas and energy supply diversification. Qatar is a country that is able to provide natural gas in the form of LNG for the coming decades to both China and the EU. This study aims (1) to determine the Chinese energy supply security strategies and their challenges in Qatar in the framework of the BRI, and (2) to determine the geopolitical and geo-economic risks that these strategies pose for the European Union’s LNG supply security from Qatar. The Chinese energy supply security strategies in Qatar are determined and analyzed through the Chinese activities of the State and its market forces (NOC’s, SOE’s) within the geo-economic objectives of the BRI (trade, investments and finance). To test the hypotheses and answer the main research question of this thesis, the investigation is based on both a qualitative and quantitative methodology. Herein, an in-depth case study of the Chinese activities in Qatar within the BRI is complemented with quantitative data and regression analyses to test the influence of these Chinese energy supply security strategies on the European Union’s LNG supply security from Qatar. The results have shown that the Chinese energy supply security strategies in Qatar consist of both direct and
indirect strategies to secure LNG: long-term contracts (direct), equity acquisition (direct) and obtaining economic influence over Qatar through the BRI (indirect). The challenges for China for the functioning of the BRI are about regional instability in the Middle East, the mutually beneficial results of the BRI, and the political-economic and social-demographic structure of Qatar. The import of LNG by China from Qatar through the strategies framed within the BRI, shows a significant statistical effect and multiple geopolitical and geo-economic risks for the EU in LNG supply security from Qatar.
... However, some experts raise the opposing argument that OFDI has enhanced China's energy security only marginally or not at all. Incidental observations suggest that China's equity oil has not necessarily been returned to China (Downs, 2007;Leung, 2011;Zhang and Sinton, 2011;Zhang, 2012) and that the NOCs' behaviour is profitdriven (Kong, 2011;Odgaard and Delman, 2014). ...
China's soaring outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in the energy sector has attracted increasing attention, which is arguably intended to enhance China's energy security given its large oil deficit. This study attempts to empirically examine whether OFDI in the energy sector can help to enhance China's energy security by conducting an econometric analysis using a micro-level dataset. The results show that China's OFDI in energy does enhance its energy security by increasing the volume of oil imports from host countries for the investment and by diversifying China's sources of imports. On average, a 1% increase in energy OFDI to a country leads to a 1.2% increase in the probability of importing from that country and a 0.071% increase in the firm-level import volume. In addition, we find that the effects do not differ by investment mode (i.e. mergers and acquisitions or greenfield investments) but do differ by country type, as investments in developing countries can positively contribute to oil imports, whereas investments in developed countries do not have the same effect.
... Argentine economic dependence on China may increase enlarging as local authorities become reliant upon Beijing for financial support. So indeed, Argentina´s urgencies represent an opportunity for China, always obsessed with the idea of food (Veeck 2013;Kuteleva 2016;Zhou 2016) and energy security (Zweig and Jianbai 2005;Downs 2007;Kong 2011;Jiang and Sinton 2011;de Graaf 2014). Argentina's actual macroeconomic circumstances (low asset prices, recession, and local private firms in trouble) offer Chinese firms a golden opportunity at bargain prices (and cheap bargaining) for gaining a foothold in the natural resource value chain (ecc 2018). ...
... Argentine economic dependence on China may increase enlarging as local authorities become reliant upon Beijing for financial support. So indeed, Argentina´s urgencies represent an opportunity for China, always obsessed with the idea of food (Veeck 2013;Kuteleva 2016;Zhou 2016) and energy security (Zweig and Jianbai 2005;Downs 2007;Kong 2011;Jiang and Sinton 2011;de Graaf 2014). Argentina's actual macroeconomic circumstances (low asset prices, recession, and local private firms in trouble) offer Chinese firms a golden opportunity at bargain prices (and cheap bargaining) for gaining a foothold in the natural resource value chain (ecc 2018). ...
The beginning of diplomatic relations in 2007 and the signing of the fta in 2010 constitute the institutional arrangements that the government of Costa Rica has implemented to promote a closer relationship with China. A decade later, economic results and Chinese capital investments in the country have not produced the expected results. Although commercial relations have grown, they do not present the pace or intensity required to transform investment patterns and cooperation in sectors in which both countries
have interests (Arias and Vargas 2017).
