Marginal effects for the moderating effect of collective bargaining on the relationship between pay inequality and trust.

Marginal effects for the moderating effect of collective bargaining on the relationship between pay inequality and trust.

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High levels of economic inequality are widely viewed as a key challenge facing both advanced industrial and developing economies. Country-level studies have consistently shown a negative link between income inequality and trust in others. This is typically attributed to greater social distance within unequal societies. Do we observe similar relatio...

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... 4a was thus supported: employee collective voice positively moderates the association between pay inequality and employee trust in managers. The marginal effects in Figure 6 illustrate the importance of collective employee voice for the relationship between pay inequality and trust. In workplaces where no employee is covered by collective bargaining agreements, trust falls slightly as pay inequality increases while it increases in workplaces with a higher proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining. ...

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... The influence of trade unions beyond workplace boundaries is well-documented in the employment relations literature (Budd et al., 2018;Lamare, 2010), particularly at a time of economic crisis (Hickland & Dundon, 2016;Johnstone et al., 2019;Roche & Teague, 2012). It is underscored by the predisposition of collective bargaining to deliberative decision-making, democratic, cooperative behaviors in the workplace underpinned by trust between employers, employees, and their representatives (Schulz et al., 2021;Wilkinson et al., 2014;Wilkinson & Wood, 2012). Job support schemes during the pandemic were contingent on employers' cooperation and willingness to partake (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020;Stuart et al., 2021). ...
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