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6 Map of Operation Rah-e-Nijat, 2009-2010

6 Map of Operation Rah-e-Nijat, 2009-2010

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Beginning in 2001, Pakistan conducted a range of operations against militant groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of Pakistan. Because of Pakistan's nuclear status and the presence of international terrorist organizations, such as al Qa'ida, Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign significantly affects the security...

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... Initially, the FM radio and motivational speeches of TNSM stimulated the general masses to support the extremist elements in Swat [12]. Imperatively, this occurrence in Swat can simply be attributed to the strong ideological based narrative, which was delicately blended with political motives of TNSM [13]. It was a typical militant methodology, one which identifies and stresses the "traditional politics, i.e., injustice, poverty, access to resources, exploitation and corruption for the public attention" [14]. ...
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Unlike other faith-based conflicts, the militancy in Swat seems unique, as militants used religion for promoting their agenda and giving voices to the grievances of the poor people through a popular narrative likely without knowing narratology. Using narratives and narratology as a theoretical framework, this qualitative study is an effort to understand the essence of militants' narrative in Swat and the mechanism through which they steered it up until the time it gained verisimilitude. Conducting 73 semi-structured interviews, the study finds that it was a planned strategy of the militants that popularized them in Swat, while they later lost this support due to their atrocities against general populace. The militants used the socially and culturally constructed narrative through FM radio and motivated the masses to follow their ideology and brand of Islamic Sharia. The study concludes that the formulation and popularization of social narratives play vital roles in social movements and conflicts to muster popular support for promoting vested interests that can be used against the state and general public.
... Soon after the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, and Pakistan's support for the United States, a policy shift towards the Pashtun tribal areas meant that the Pakistani state was forced to formally send its military to the region on the US-backed international pressure. Initiation of these military operations, without exhausting the option of a peace dialogue, and local engagement, with the Pashtuns, coupled with US/CIA drone strikes and proliferation of multiple conflicts, transformed the tribal region into one of the most dangerous places on earth (Nawaz, 2009;Jones and Fair, 2010). This proved destructive not only for the Pakistani state and its strategic allies but also created fissures among local Pashtun tribes, whereby their centuries-old traditional institutions and local customs were gradually eradicated by a newly-found religious radicalism and militarism (Aman, 2013). ...
Article
There is growing recognition and appreciation of traditional approaches towards peace and conflict resolution across the world. This article aims to highlight the crucial role and consequential importance of traditional mechanisms of peace and conflict resolution in Pakistan’s terror-hit Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas, formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These ‘peripheral’ areas of Pashtun tribes stand in relative isolation from the ‘centre’ of the Pakistani ruling establishment. Moreover, with the onset of militancy since 2001 in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, the situation has turned worse for the local Pashtun tribes. The article discusses the changing role of traditional mechanisms and local structures of peace and conflict resolution, arguing that colonial legacies have failed to prevent, manage, resolve or transform conflicts in post-colonial states such as Pakistan. Furthermore, the Pashtun cultural code of Pashtunwali, along with its various tenets and structures, especially Jirga (Pashtun tribal council) and Lashkar (tribal militia), is also discussed in the article. The article concludes that the changing socio-political situation, along with the rise of the secular Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), is presenting a challenge to ‘tribal’ Pashtun patriarchal values as well as traditional structures like Jirga in the region.
... The tribal areas of Pakistan are experiencing a protracted violent conflict since the US invasion of Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 incident, which led to the retreat of the Taliban and foreign militants to the safe havens located across the adjacent tribal areas. This was followed by Pakistan's military operations in the region to fight Taliban in 2004-2005(International Crisis Group 2006, Johnson and Mason 2008, Jones and Fair 2010, Burki 2010, Rashid 2012, Butool 2013, Siddique 2014. The favourable terrain, obsolete and ineffective administrative system, absence of political system, Jihadi culture, and local traditions of hospitality to outsider and socio-economic deprivation provided a breeding ground for hosting Mujahedeen, development of TTP and outbreak of violent conflict (Burki 2010, Siddique 2014. ...
... Later, during the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan became a close ally of the US in pushing the Soviet Red Army out of Afghanistan. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US and Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) of Pakistan together revived the Jihadi culture among the tribal people and thousands of locals and foreign mujahidin were recruited and trained to fight the Soviet Union (Jones and Fair 2010, Rashid 2012, Williams 2015. After the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, a vacuum was created which was filled by the Taliban (the former mujahidin) and many Taliban from the Pakistani tribal areas joined them (Samples 2008). ...
Article
Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan and the merged Tribal Districts, particularly the North Waziristan Tribal District (NWTD), experienced increasing violent conflict. This paper examines the causes of conflict in North Waziristan from the perspective of local communities. The study is based on qualitative primary data collected in NWTD. The study identifies deep-rooted internal factors such as poor socioeconomic conditions, political exclusion, degradation of local institutions and culture, introduction and promotion of Jihadi culture and militancy as the main drivers of conflict in NWTD. External factors, like the USSR and US invasions in Afghanistan, a porous border and unseen international actors, have contributed to the start and even escalation of the more recent conflict, but mainly through exacerbating internal factors. The study recommends that policies aiming to reduce violent conflict in this region pay due attention to the significance of addressing the underlying internal drivers of conflict.
... The case of Pakistan 45 While Pakistan failed to dismantle its well-known policy of employing key militant groups to exert influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir, it conducted limited operations against select groups in FATA and KPK in exchange for U.S. aid. Pakistan's strategy of alternating between military operations and negotiations with select militants however generated a survival threat for targeted groups. ...
Article
U.S. military aid provides recipient governments the fighting capability they require to undermine domestic militant groups, which can undermine groups’ leadership structures and trigger group splintering. In this environment, brutal attacks against non-combatants become an effective mechanism for targeted groups to signal their resolve and outbid competitors. A large-n analysis of U.S. military aid between 1989 -2011 links higher levels of military aid with higher levels of rebel-perpetrated civilian killings, and deaths due to explosive attacks on non-combatant targets. A closer examination of the case of Pakistan sheds further light on the underlying causal mechanisms.
... The so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas began in North and South Waziristan, but quickly spread to parts of the other tribal agencies. Beginning in 2007 local Taliban also emerged in parts of KPK (previously known as Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP).The Pakistan army has engaged in various operations to contend with these militant groups (Jones and Fair 2010 (Jones and Fair, 2010). 5 ...
... The so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas began in North and South Waziristan, but quickly spread to parts of the other tribal agencies. Beginning in 2007 local Taliban also emerged in parts of KPK (previously known as Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP).The Pakistan army has engaged in various operations to contend with these militant groups (Jones and Fair 2010 (Jones and Fair, 2010). 5 ...
... Jaish-e-Mohammad) have been targeting Pakistani security forces, civilian government figures and civilian targets in FATA and adjacent territories under the umbrella of the Pakistan Taliban. They have conducted attacks throughout KPK (especially Peshawar and its environs), and hit Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi (Gul 2009;Jones and Fair 2010). ...
Article
A long tradition of research into political culture argues that greater support for core liberal democratic values leads to a rejection of destructive political activities and reduced support for violent politics. Policymakers have long drawn on this line of enquiry, arguing that "exporting" democracy can reduce violent political activity such as terrorism. Unfortunately, there have been few direct tests of the hypothesis that mass-level support for democratic values correlates with the rejection of violence. We conduct such a test in Pakistan, a country that is both a significant source of militancy and one whose citizens suffer massively from terrorism. We designed, conducted, and analyzed an original 6,000-person provincially-representative survey and find that strong supporters of democratic values are actually more supportive of militant groups focused outside of Pakistan than Pakistanis less favorable towards liberal democracy. Consistent with the principle of azadi, this result is driven by those who believe that Muslim rights and sovereignty are being violated in Kashmir. Our results both challenge the conventional wisdom that has formed the basis of public policy as well as contribute to theoretical debates on the influence of civic culture on political stability and violence.
... The Taliban Pakistan, for example, as have numerous foiled plots since 2004 (Jones and Fair 2010). Importantly, few Pakistanis link al-Qa'ida to its most important actions: the 9/11 attacks on the United States. ...
Article
Combating militant violence - particularly within South Asia and the Middle East - stands at the top of the international security agenda. Much of the policy literature focuses on poverty as a root cause of support for violent political groups and on economic development as a key to addressing the challenges of militancy and terrorism. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to support this contention, particularly in the case of Islamist militant organizations. To address this gap we conducted a 6000-person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis that measures affect towards four important militant organizations. We apply a novel measurement strategy to mitigate item nonresponse, which plagued previous surveys due to the sensitive nature of militancy. Our study reveals three key patterns. First, Pakistanis exhibit negative affect toward all four militant organizations, with those from areas where groups have conducted the most attacks disliking them the most. Second, contrary to conventional expectations poor Pakistanis dislike militant groups more than middle-class citizens. Third, this dislike is strongest among poor urban residents, suggesting that the negative relationship stems from exposure to the externalities of terrorist attacks. Longstanding arguments tying support for violent political organizations to individuals’ economic prospects - and the subsequent policy recommendations - may require substantial revision.
Article
Contemporary research mainly relates police ineffectiveness in sectarian crimes prevention-investigation and enforcement of anti-terror laws to disorganized police infrastructure, a shortage of manpower, a lack of professionalism and limited access to modern equipment. This article, by applying capacity (i.e. manpower, resources, professional and technical training, etc.) and autonomy (effective and neutral exercise of powers within mandates delegated to them) concepts, aims to examine police effectiveness in the enforcement of anti-sectarian laws in the context of interference in their functions by the political executive and the State’s Army. It addresses the question: How do police capacity and autonomy issues affect police effectiveness in prevention-investigation of sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws? This article applies a mixed method research approach by using data from books, journal articles, newspapers, TV talk shows, online sources and interviews. It relates the police’s effectiveness in prevention-investigation of sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws to their capacity and autonomy issues in the Punjab Province of Pakistan. It argues that the police due to capacity and autonomy issues cannot exercise delegated powers impartially, which affects their effectiveness in prevention-investigation of sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws.
Article
Full-text available
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan joined the global war against terrorism. This decision instigated the homegrown terrorist outfits and resulted in a wave of violence across the country. This article examines the military offensives launched by the Pakistani security forces, in the tribal belt, and across the country, to dismantle extremist and terrorist groups, as a part of Pakistan's counterterrorism policy. By utilizing the official and unofficial sources, it seeks to link the military offensives and their efficacy in uprooting terrorism in Pakistan. This article offers an overview and assessment of the military operations and underlines the significant factors that have severely impeded an effective formulation and implementation of Pakistan's counterterrorism policy. Empirically, it finds that despite significant gains made with these offensives in recent years, Pakistan's war against extremism and terrorism is far from over. It argues that Pakistan direly needs an all-out and holistic counterterrorism strategy to win its fight against terrorism and extremism.
Article
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan joined the global war against terrorism. This decision instigated the homegrown terrorist outfits and resulted in a wave of violence across the country. This article examines the military offensives launched by the Pakistani security forces, in the tribal belt, and across the country, to dismantle extremist and terrorist groups, as a part of Pakistan's counterterrorism policy. By utilizing the official and unofficial sources, it seeks to link the military offensives and their efficacy in uprooting terrorism in Pakistan. This article offers an overview and assessment of the military operations and underlines the significant factors that have severely impeded an effective formulation and implementation of Pakistan's counterterrorism policy. Empirically, it finds that despite significant gains made with these offensives in recent years, Pakistan's war against extremism and terrorism is far from over. It argues that Pakistan direly needs an all-out and holistic counterterrorism strategy to win its fight against terrorism and extremism.