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Palestine is a state in limbo—they lack full formal recognition as a sovereign land but possess a unique nation-state status that incorporates elements of a unified national consciousness and basic civil institutions albeit with limited autonomy. Palestine’s ambiguous political status is starkly illustrated by its convoluted territorial control, an...
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... Seely, 2007). It is not my intent to discuss those issues here; instead, I want to focus on how archaeological practice, the display of artifacts, and archaeological site protection are fractured as a result of law and policy. Under the current geopolitical and legal structure of occupation in Area C as designated by the Oslo Accords, Israeli archaeology in Palestine is accountable to no one. Greenberg and Keinan (2007) suggest that this can be construed as the mobilization of culture for colonialism; opportunities for Israeli academics to carry out ‘‘scientific’’ programs of excavation with very little oversight and no collaboration with Palestinian academics and archaeologists. The present geography of archaeological administration in Palestine, divided into areas A, B, and C, has been deployed as part of the colonial project of alienation, dismemberment, and displacement (De Cesari, 2010c: 7). In the following examination of archaeology under occupation, I use the case study of Herodium to consider the effects of law and policy on the archaeological sites and objects of the Palestinian landscape. From the 16th century onward, Palestinians were subject to Ottoman rule and to the numerous Ottoman laws of 1874, 1884, and 1906, which were aimed at controlling and protecting the archaeological sites and resources of the Empire (Kersel, 2008, 2010). With the dissolution of the Empire in 1917 and the subsequent division of territories under the League of Nations, Great Britain assumed control of the territory we now know as Israel, Palestine, and Jordan under the colonial British Mandate. In one of its first actions, the British Mandate government promulgated an antiquities proclamation noting the importance of cultural heritage in the region. A formal Department of Antiquities and the Antiquities Ordinance of 1929 followed shortly after—these efforts outlined procedures for excavation, interpretation, and museum acquisition, while at the same time regulating the trade in antiquities (for further discussion of the legal legacies in the Middle East, see Keane and Azarov, 2012–2013; Kersel, 2008, 2010). In the period immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the West Bank was annexed as part of Jordan and under the law and jurisdiction of the Hashemite Kingdom, resulting in the bifurcation of cultural heritage oversight. Chatterjee (1993) hypothesizes that post-colonial states do not usually transform the basic institutional arrangement of colonial law and administration, opting instead to keep a continuity of law with the hope of greater stability. In Israel and Jordan (then including the West Bank), the various provisions and regulations of the British Mandate Antiquities Ordinance of 1929 remained in force, ensuring a continuous legal framework for cultural heritage oversight and management. In 1966, Jordan repealed the Mandate Antiquities Ordinance, repla- cing it with Jordanian Temporary Law no. 51 on Antiquities, which maintained many of the earlier Mandate provisions but became the new cultural heritage legislation for the West Bank. From 1967 onward, legally and administratively, the West Bank was subject to an occupying Israeli military government, with military commanders in each area empowered with administrative, governmental, and legislative powers (Cavanaugh, 2002–2003: 942). These powers were executed through a series of Israeli military orders. ‘‘Orders codified Israel’s control of the Occupied Territories far beyond the concern of its military forces,’’ (Gordon, 2008: 31) which resulted in two of these orders directly affecting cultural heritage (nos. 1166 and 1167), well beyond the mandate of the Israeli military. Military order no. 1166 specifically addressed the issue of cultural heritage in the West Bank, augmenting the Jordanian Temporary Law no. 51 on Antiquities of 1966 and authorizing an Israeli appointed Staff Officer (SO) for the West Bank tasked with the management and the protection of cultural heritage sites according to the regulations contained in the original Jordanian Law. In the relative peace of the early 1990s, there were overtures toward a two- state solution, with a phased autonomy and self-rule for Palestine. Intended to be a road map for peace The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip , known more informally as the Oslo Accords, carved the Occupied Territories into a complex mosaic of areas—A, B, and C, allegedly presenting greater opportunities for Palestine to manage and administer some of the archaeological and cultural heritage sites in the West Bank and Gaza. 3 The effects of the partitioning into areas A, B, and C were/are significant (Bshara, 2013: 298). The West Bank was divided into three areas: Area A, under complete Palestinian civil and military control; Area B, under Palestinian civil control but Israeli military control; and Area C, under complete Israeli civil and military control (see Figure 1). 4 In 1995, this division assigned the eight major Palestinian cities (Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Jericho, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarem) to Area A, representing about 3% of the total area of the West Bank and approximately 26% of the population. Area B, which includes a buffer zone around Area A, covers about 24% of the West Bank but contains the majority of the Palestinian population (70%). Area C encompasses approximately 73% of the West Bank area and includes Palestinian villages (4% of the population) as well as Israeli settlements, outposts, and military installations. Israel retains full responsibility for security and public order as well as for civil issues relating to the area, which included archaeology (Gordon, 2008: 36). After the Wye Agreements of 2000, the distribution changed to Area A at 18%, Area B 22%, and Area C 64%, the current configuration in the West Bank. Originally, the Oslo Accords envisioned a gradual handover of civil and military responsibilities to the Palestinians over the course of 18 months after the inauguration of the Palestinian legislative council, first in Area B and later in Area C. However, to this day, the Israelis have retained full civil and military authority over Area C, the vast majority of Palestine. Archaeologically, the Oslo Accords were the intended replacements for the existing Israeli military orders in Area C, until such time that the Palestinian government passed relevant legislation regarding the protection and preservation of cultural heritage. In 2003, the government of Palestine introduced draft cultural heritage legislation aimed at protecting both the natural and cultural environment. It awaits approval and implementation (see Fahel, 2010; Kersel, 2008; Taha, 2010, 2014). As a result of a complex legal system comprising Ottoman, British Mandatory, Egyptian (the Gaza Strip), Jordanian (the West Bank), Israeli military orders, and international accords (Oslo), preservation and protection of cultural heritage in Palestine can only be considered fractured and inconsistent. Bshara (2013: 299) suggests that after over two decades since Oslo, there remains no real legal framework in place to protect cultural heritage and very few government initiatives to preserve and to protect Palestinian resources. Under Oslo, Israel and Palestine pledged to protect and safeguard the cultural heritage from looting, development, and the detrimental effects of tourism. As part of Appendix I, Article II the Israelis provided the Palestinians with a list of specific sites which were deemed by Israeli negotiators to have particular archaeological and historical importance—mostly synagogue remains and tombs, sites relating specifically to Judaism. Under the Oslo II provisions, a joint committee (comprising Palestinian and Israeli cultural heritage professionals) would be established to deal with archaeological issues of common interest. This committee would also keep each other abreast of archaeological discoveries and disseminate the results of excavations through publication, publications and online, ensuring access for all. Each agreed to respect sites holy to the various religions of the area. To date, few to none of these aims have been implemented. The now largely aborted peace process and the complex legislative legacies leave cultural heritage sites caught in the middle of this failed agreement (Cavanaugh, 2002–2003; Rynhold, 2008). Since the phased handover of Area C has not occurred, the archaeological sites in this area (some 60% of cultural heritage sites in the West Bank, numbering in the thousands) are governed by the Civil Administration of Israel, the Jordanian Temporary Law no. 51, 1966, and the Israeli military order no. 1166 of 1986. Area C remains in the control of the Israeli Archaeological Department of the Civil Administration (ADCA). The oversight and management of cultural heritage in Palestine is truncated by the attempted post-colonial condition created by the Oslo agreements and current Israeli occupation (see Bshara, 2013; Pratt, 2013). In an ideal world, Palestine should now be in control of the archaeological sites within its territorial boundaries. Since the Oslo Agreements, in Areas A and B the Palestinian Department of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage (DACH) has carried out over 600 salvage excavations and joint projects with North American and European partners at sites like Khirbet Bal’ama, Tell Balata, Tell el-Ajjul, Tell es-Sultan, and Khirbet el-Mafjar in Jericho. The DACH routinely issues permits to Palestinian archaeologists from Birzeit University and Al-Quds University to carry out archaeological investigations. At the national level, the government and its agents are focused on the acquisition of World Heritage status for the natural and cultural sites of Palestine, which may be to the detriment of smaller sites not deemed of ‘‘outstanding universal value’’ (Bshara, 2013; De Cesari, 2010c). At the same ...
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... However, there are certain constraints for the context. Since 1967, the West Bank was under the Israeli occupation till the Oslo Peace Accord in (1993) when the West Bank is divided into areas A, B, and C. Area A (18% of the WB) is under the full control of the Palestinian Authority; Area B (22% of the WB) is under the civil administration of the Palestinian Authority (health and education) while Israel retains exclusive security control over Area C (60% of the WB) [11] Hebron has been under the full control of Israel, and Israel established settlements in the heart of the city, in addition to the settlements around Hebron. This makes Hebron a special case in the Palestinian Israeli conflict. ...
The natural stone industry in many countries plays an essential role in its cultural heritage, history and economy. However, the stone industry consumes large amounts of energy in the production phase. The total energy in the natural stone production is a collective summation of energy levels consumed in each phase of production, starting from stone quarries or from mixture preparation to finally produce natural or artificial stone as an end product. The study aims at evaluating the total embodied energy of the stone industry in Palestine to further conduct a comparative Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) for both energy levels consumed in the manufacturing of natural and artificial stone. Personal interviews, observations, and stone quarry sites and workshops visits were used to collect data in Hebron-south of the West Bank. The results have shown a more sustainable production of artificial stone over natural stone in terms of energy consumption; and the (GHG) emissions accordingly as the amounts of energy for natural and artificial stone manufacturing were 120 MJ/m 2 and 70.71 MJ/m 2 respectively. As a conclusion, the study proves that natural stone (limestone) manufacturing produces more (GHG) emissions than the locally made artificial stone manufacturing in the study context under the studied circumstances. The environmental impact can be decreased through locating the workshops near the quarries and the sourcing points of raw materials. In addition, this can be obtained by depending on electrical vehicles and using green energy sources.
... The mean annual temperature of the region is around 17 °C, and the mean annual rainfall is around 650 mm. (Kersel 2015) level. The mean annual temperature is around 24 °C, and the mean annual rainfall ranges from 100 mm near the Dead Sea in the south to 300 mm in the north of the region. ...
In this paper, a new hybrid DRASTIC-based fuzzy C-means (FCM) clustering technique is utilized to find the real relation among the affecting parameters of each hydrogeological point resulting in vulnerability and the fuzzy membership degree of each point to the “most-vulnerable class”. This procedure can be done instead of holding a summation through all affecting parameters to form vulnerability index as implemented in the ordinary DRASTIC method. In DRASTIC, any changes in one point’s parameter value may cause that point to move to another vulnerability class or points which have obviously different parameter values may belong to the same vulnerability class. While in fuzzy logic, each point partly belongs to each vulnerability class and does not necessarily belong to a specific one. This is the main motivation to use FCM clustering technique. In this paper, the vulnerability map of Damaneh-Daran aquifer, located in Isfahan province in central Iran, is prepared using DRASTIC and hybridizing DRASTIC and FCM. The analytical-experimental investigations reveal the weighting power of 1.75 is the best value among 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 and 2. In this weighting power, there are approximately 51%, 21% and 1% decreases in the area percentages covered by low, medium and high vulnerability clusters, respectively, while the area percentages covered by very low and very high clusters increases 8 and 5 times than those of the ordinary DRASTIC, respectively, mainly due to partial membership of the hydrogeological points in the fuzzy clusters, making the areas covered much more evenly distributed among different vulnerability classes. To validate the proposed model, the final vulnerability indices were compared with the nitrate concentration of the aquifer assuming four fuzzy intensity levels. The results indicate the FCM-DRASTIC-based vulnerability zoning have more correlation with the nitrate concentration zoning of the aquifer than the ordinary DRASTIC model.KeywordsClusteringDRASTICFuzzy C-meansGroundwaterVulnerability
... The mean annual temperature of the region is around 17 °C, and the mean annual rainfall is around 650 mm. (Kersel 2015) level. The mean annual temperature is around 24 °C, and the mean annual rainfall ranges from 100 mm near the Dead Sea in the south to 300 mm in the north of the region. ...
The Middle East Region exceeds 7 million km2 surface area, which is equivalent to 5% of the total area of the Globe, with approximately 4.4% of the total population. Its geographic location between three continents makes it an international hub where several activities are located. The Middle East Region is characterized by arid to semi-arid climate; and therefore, it is the most water-poor region where the average annual precipitation is below 200 mm besides a potential evapotranspiration exceeding 2000 mm. Recently, the dramatic population growth in the region accompanied with agricultural development and the relevant activities created overstress on water resources and the per capita sometimes does not exceed 100 m3/year. This has been exacerbated by the changing climate towards increase in temperature and with torrential rain patterns and recurrence of climatic extremes. The socioeconomic status in the Middle East Region along with the geo-political conflicts contributed on the mismanagement of water resources, notably the shared resources. Beside this unfavorable situation in the water sector, the applied adaptation and mitigation measures are still insufficient to cope with the least water demand. This chapter will illustrate an overview on water resources in the Middle East Region where the striking challenges will be tackled.KeywordAridityTorrential rainFossil groundwaterFloodsTransboundary water
... The mean annual temperature of the region is around 17 °C, and the mean annual rainfall is around 650 mm. (Kersel 2015) level. The mean annual temperature is around 24 °C, and the mean annual rainfall ranges from 100 mm near the Dead Sea in the south to 300 mm in the north of the region. ...
Human is highly concerned with Earth resources and the processes occur on the Earth's surface and he is always developing new tools and methods for investigating the Earth. Many of these resources and processes are still undiscovered while there is a rapid race in technologies to innovate more effective tools notably that the economic status worldwide requires to mobilize studies and researches for more sophisticated technologies. Perhaps, satellites are one significant aspect of these tools which have been widely used everywhere. Therefore, it is not exaggeration to say that all countries are now using satellites whether in communication or for resources exploration technologies where the latter, as the scope of this book, occupies numerous of applications. Therefore, Remote Sensing has been found since six decades, and there are tens thousands of these space shuttles accompanied with different types of satellites orbiting around the Earth. A large number of these satellites are assigned as Land Observatory satellites that capture images from space for different purposes. The use of satellites have been progressed along with the geo-information system as a supporting tool for geo-spatial data manipulation. This chapter illustrates a comprehensive discussion satellite images and their technical specifications.KeywordSpace techniquesAster imagesSpatial resolutionDigital numberThematic maps
... Inoltre, la situazione amministrativa nella West Bank è molto diversificata tra le diverse aree. Infatti, gli accordi interinali tra Israele ed OLP, hanno diviso la Cisgiordania in tre zone ben delineate ( fig. 3) : Fig 3. -Aree A, B e C nella West Bank Fonte: Kersel, 2014. 1. Area A, attualmente composta da circa il 18% del territorio della Cisgiordania, che comprende tutte le città palestinesi e la maggior parte della popolazione palestinese della West Bank, nella quale l'autorità palestinese è dotata di un più ampio potere di governo. 2. Area B, che comprende circa il 22% della West Bank e comprende vaste aree rurali, all'interno delle quali Israele ha mantenuto il controllo della sicurezza della zona ed ha trasferito il controllo delle questioni civili all'Autorità Palestinese. ...
... To date, in spite of the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), the Israeli military still maintains complete custodianship over the archaeological materials from Area C of the West Bank. The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, which carved the occupied territories of Palestine into a complex mosaic of areas A, B, and C, have resulted in fractured oversight of heritage sites and objects (Kersel, 2014). In the West Bank, Area A, under direct Palestinian control, includes the major populated cities but constitutes no more than 3 per cent of those areas; Area B encompasses 450 Palestinian towns and villages representing 27 per cent of the West Bank, jointly controlled territory in which the Palestinians would exercise civil authority but Israel would retain security control; and Area C, in which Israel has exclusive control, constitutes the rest of the West Bank (70 per cent), including agricultural land, the Jordan Valley, natural reserves, areas with lower population density, Israeli settlements, and military areas (Hanafi, 2009). ...
... Archaeologically, the Oslo Accords were intended as replacements for the existing Israeli military orders in Area C, until such time as the Palestinian government passed relevant legislation regarding the protection and preservation of cultural heritage (Kersel, 2014). In 2003, the PNA introduced draft cultural heritage legislation aimed at protecting both the natural and cultural environment. ...
... In the West Bank, a kind of "war of position" has been ongoing since the 1990s between the Palestinian "state" and "civil society" that together with the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict has profoundly shaped the local heritage field. This conflict over functions and responsibilities has elicited a number of court cases, mostly occasioned by the frequent occurrence of NGOs working without a license issued by the Department of Antiquities, but the main battlefield has been the drafting of new heritage legislation to replace the colonial law that still regulates heritage work in the Palestinian territories (Kersel 2015). Based on their review of heritage legislation worldwide (including the Italian heritage legislation), Palestinian NGOs in the early 2000s drafted a new law widening the scope of public protection from antiquities older than AD 1700 to the recent vernacular past and involving more actors beyond the state. ...
... Since 1999, in the face of ongoing occupation and fractured oversight (Kersel 2015), under the direction of the late Adel Yahya, the NGO Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange (PACE) mobilized local populations to repair damaged historic buildings, clean up the areas, build paths to the sites, and assist in creating interpretive signs for visitors (Yahya 2002). Through town hall meetings, community clean-up days, and educational outreach in schools, PACE has encouraged interest in the objects and places of Palestine. ...
In this article, I examine the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations and the changing role of the state in cultural heritage policy. These processes rely on an accelerated transnational circulation of policy ideas grounded in a notion of culture as development and participation. In the occupied West Bank, several local but internationally funded organizations work to preserve the historic built environment, supplanting the heritage agency of a beleaguered, nonsovereign Palestinian Authority. In Italy, the government itself has disempowered its own heritage agency. Neoliberal cultural policy discourse has inspired legislative reform that has left the Italian heritage management severely underfunded. In both Italy and Palestine, the lack of state involvement has given nonstate actors increasing responsibility for heritage and blurred the boundary between the state and these nonstate entities. Contrasting colonial and noncolonial contexts, I show how quasi-colonial conditions of fragmentation and forms of state failure are spreading under neoliberal globalization. I argue that the current rearticulation of the discourse of heritage and cultural policy is intertwined with a general transformation whereby the contours of the state are increasingly frayed and its functions disassembled across a broad terrain.
... How are archaeological sites and excavations used as tools in the struggle for public opinion, and as a means of taking control of lands belonging to Palestinian residents? (Emek Shaveh, 2014a; see also Greenberg, 2009;Kersel, 2015) The project of rendering East Jerusalem's national parks, nature reserves, and archeological sites into accessible and even popular tourist sites is arguably a central aspect of the normalization of Jewish settlements, and of the Judaization of the landscape more broadly. Under the rubric of recreation and entertainment, the national park status of parts of Silwan allows the public to feel comfortable by obscuring the particular geopolitics of this occupied and conflicted site and making it into a park just like any other. ...
This article explores two national parks in East Jerusalem and their legal administration as the focus of contradictory and complementary attempts at preservation, colonization, and normalization. Drawing on in-depth interviews with, and observations of, officials from the Israel Nature and Parks Authority and others, I expose the Judaizing of the landscape in Jerusalem. Nature never stands for itself; it is always an echo of a human presence and, in this case, of a Jewish past and its modern reunion. The project of imagining the natural landscape as one that embodies an ancient past—what Israeli officials have referred to in our interviews as nof kdumim—and the contemporary Jewish people as those who hold the key to its revival as such, is a central aspect of Israel’s colonial dispossession agenda in East Jerusalem and a prerequisite to the land becoming Jewish in practice. Focusing on the perspectives of Israel’s nature officials, this article highlights not only the imaginary but also the legal technologies of erasing and remaking the national park landscape and the tensions between personal and collective, inclusion and exile, and memory and erasure that it inhabits. Arguably, while the identity of the Jewish settler as a nature lover who has returned to her lost Indigenous land is strengthened by the ancient biblical landscape of nof kdumim, the Palestinian is only granted authenticity and Indigeneity when she does not engage in what Israel perceives as “refugee camp” landscaping, and when she is willing to practice traditional forms of farming (or adam ba’har) so as to normalize this place as a universal tourist recreation site. Even then, however, the Palestinian’s labor goes to support orientalist environmental imaginaries. The natural landscape of East Jerusalem is thus recruited, only to discover that it has always been Jewish.
... The OPT's population, as for October 2018, is around 5,100,000 [1], distributed as approximately 3.05 million in the West Bank and approximately 2.05 million in the Gaza Strip. [19]; Right: Map of the Gaza Strip, showing the groundwater level in m (middle) and water quality, in terms of chlorite and nitrate concentrations (left and right) of the Coastal Aquifer System (CAS) (after [10].) 5. The presence of almost one million Israeli settlers living in more than 200 Israeli settlements in the Occupied West Bank, in violation of International Law and the Fourth Geneva Convention. ...
FOR CITATION:
Salem, H.S. (2019). Agriculture status and women’s role in agriculture production and rural transformation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Journal of Agriculture and Crops, 5(8-August): 132–150. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32861/jac.5(8)132.150 and
https://arpgweb.com/journal/journal/14 and
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334770801_Agriculture_Status_and_Women's_Role_in_Agriculture_Production_and_Rural_Transformation_in_the_Occupied_Palestinian_Territories_Journal_of_Agriculture_and_Crops_2019_58_132-150
ABSTRACT:
This paper focuses on the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), comprised of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, with respect to the status of agriculture and the role of Palestinian women in the agriculture sector, water management, and agricultural sustainability in rural areas in the OPT. Recent estimates indicate that 15.4% and 7.8% of the total employed are employed in the agriculture sector in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively. Despite the fact that the contribution of the agriculture sector to the GDP has decreased to 3% only, this sector is still hosting until recently 7.5%–10.5%, on average, of the employed in the OPT. Palestinian women only compose 18% of the labor force, and a little bit more than one fifth of them (22%, which is equivalent to around 4% of the women’s labor force) contribute to the agricultural sector in the OPT. However, most of women’s labor in the informal sector remains hidden and, thus, their contribution to the agriculture sector in the form of home-based activities is much higher than what is officially reported. Over 30% of informal agricultural work is performed by women as part of their domestic responsibilities. In addition, Palestinian women work at home as well as in the field, contributing effectively to the agriculture sector (plant and animal production) and, thus, to sustainable development in the OPT. With respect to water resources, women in rural areas play a considerable role in making water available for domestic and agricultural use, either by bringing water from far distances or getting water from springs and domestic harvesting wells (cisterns). Despite the fact that the status of agriculture in the OPT is really bad and getting even worse, and despite the presence of economic, financial, and political hardships and challenges, Palestinian women have obviously contributed to the agricultural sector towards achieving sustainable development in their communities in the OPT’s rural areas.
KEYWORDS: Palestinian women; Agriculture and status of agriculture; Water resources management; Challenges; Resilience; Sustainable development; Rural areas; Occupied Palestinian territories (West Bank; including Jerusalem; And Gaza strip).
... The OPT's population, as for October 2018, is around 5,100,000 [1], distributed as approximately 3.05 million in the West Bank and approximately 2.05 million in the Gaza Strip. [19]; Right: Map of the Gaza Strip, showing the groundwater level in m (middle) and water quality, in terms of chlorite and nitrate concentrations (left and right) of the Coastal Aquifer System (CAS) (after [10].) 5. The presence of almost one million Israeli settlers living in more than 200 Israeli settlements in the Occupied West Bank, in violation of International Law and the Fourth Geneva Convention. ...
FOR CITATION: Salem, H.S. 2019. Agriculture status and women’s role in agriculture production and rural transformation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Journal of Agriculture and Crops. 5(8-August): 132–150. (Published by Academic Research Publishing Group, Germany, Denmark, and Pakistan). ISSN(e): 2412-6381, ISSN(p): 2413-886X DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32861/jac.5(8)132.150 and https://arpgweb.com/journal/journal/14 and
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334770801_Agriculture_Status_and_Women's_Role_in_Agriculture_Production_and_Rural_Transformation_in_the_Occupied_Palestinian_Territories_Journal_of_Agriculture_and_Crops_2019_58_132-150
ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), comprised of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, with respect to the status of agriculture and the role of Palestinian women in the agriculture sector, water management, and agricultural sustainability in rural areas in the OPT. Recent estimates indicate that 15.4% and 7.8% of the total employed are employed in the agriculture sector in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively. Despite the fact that the contribution of the agriculture sector to the GDP has decreased to 3% only, this sector is still hosting until recently 7.5%–10.5%, on average, of the employed in the OPT. Palestinian women only compose 18% of the labor force, and a little bit more than one fifth of them (22%, which is equivalent to around 4% of the women’s labor force) contribute to the agricultural sector in the OPT. However, most of women’s labor in the informal sector remains hidden and, thus, their contribution to the agriculture sector in the form of home-based activities is much higher than what is officially reported. Over 30% of informal agricultural work is performed by women as part of their domestic responsibilities. In addition, Palestinian women work at home as well as in the field, contributing effectively to the agriculture sector (plant and animal production) and, thus, to sustainable development in the OPT. With respect to water resources, women in rural areas play a considerable role in making water available for domestic and agricultural use, either by bringing water from far distances or getting water from springs and domestic harvesting wells (cisterns). Despite the fact that the status of agriculture in the OPT is really bad and getting even worse, and despite the presence of economic, financial, and political hardships and challenges, Palestinian women have obviously contributed to the agricultural sector towards achieving sustainable development in their communities in the OPT’s rural areas.