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Context 1
... 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the effects (Intention-to-Treat or ITT effects) of the OTUP support package on the values of productive and non-productive assets, and the physical units of key asset items. Considering both the impact estimates using DiD with and without fixed effects, we find that the OTUP support package increases productive assets. ...Context 2
... ITT point estimate of the effect on the value of productive assets is BDT 2,646 (column 1 of Table 5). ...Context 3
... we do not observe statistically significant effect of the OTUP support package on outstanding loans although the point estimate is positive. Hence, the increased asset value of the participants of the OTUP support package as documented in Table 5 can be attributed to programme effect. We also document positive effect of the credit plus intervention on savings; however, it is not statistically significant. ...Context 4
... presented in columns 1 and 4 have been estimated using equation 2 presented in Section 5; and results presented in columns 2 and 5 have been estimated using equation 1 presented in Section 5. Table 5 report the estimated effects of the STUP support package on the values of productive and non-productive assets, and physical units of key asset items. Column 4 presents the results using DiD with fixed effects while column 5 presents that using DiD without fixed effects. ...Context 5
... the grant-based support package also increases savings of its participants. The ITT point estimate of the effect on the value of productive assets is BDT 4,447 (column 4 of Table 5). ...Context 6
... productive asset items shown in Table 5 do not include land holding. Hence, a separate analysis is conducted for land holding (Table 7). ...Context 7
... is thus likely that the ultra poor in Bangladesh would devote less time to self-employment due to their capital constraints. The single shot asset transfer to the participants of the STUP support package significantly affected their productive asset-base, as we have documented in Table 5. The participants of the OTUP support package received loans towards buying productive assets, and results show that the programme increased their productive asset-base. ...Similar publications
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Citations
Social protection through the social safety net programs is one of the key policies through which Bangladesh is battling against long-lasting and intergenerational poverty. However, though the pro-poor social protection programs (i.e., education and health) have been largely successful in improving the economic well-being of poor households, extremely poor households still remain excluded. This study exploits a multistage random sampling data of 1440 extremely poor households from four districts of Bangladesh and a qualitative survey of public service providers, mediating stakeholders, and beneficiaries. Built on a mixed method approach, this study diagnoses the ultra-poor's level of access to public health services and education and identifies a number of important mechanisms through which the poorest are excluded from their entitlements. The study finds that poor people are being excluded from accessing education and public health services due to some institutional and self-exclusionary mechanisms. Self-exclusionary mechanisms for not accessing public health services are misperception about the diseases that influence the health-seeking behavior (visiting a kabiraj rather than a doctor), misconception or fear of taking a vaccine, preferring home-delivery over hospital care, etc. Institutional exclusionary mechanisms are financial constraints, infrastructural constraints, not having a companion, missing income during hospital visits, etc. In accessing education, self-exclusionary mechanisms are myopic attitudes of parents, lack of awareness among parents and students, etc. However, institutional exclusionary mechanisms are financial constraints, corporal punishment, child labor, fear of mathematics and English class, early marriage, spatial constraints, etc. To make public services accessible to everyone, the issues that exclude poor households need to be addressed.
Existing evidence shows that programs that provide grants to productive assets along with training to very poor women increase labor supply, earnings, and consumption. In contrast, evidence on the effect of microcredit on these outcomes is mixed. In this paper, we examine the effect of a hybrid of the two approaches—credit and grant—on the livelihoods of the ultra‐poor in Bangladesh. A randomized evaluation of the hybrid intervention shows that it increases labor supply of working‐age women, household income, productive assets, savings, and consumption expenditures. The benefit–cost ratio of the intervention is estimated to be 8.47.
