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(Hilbig and Moshagen). Percentage of votes gained in most recent election conditional on party positions on the logit left-right (LLR) scale. The black lines indicate the unweighted (dashed) and weighted (dotted; weighting party positions by the proportion of actual votes received) mean across parties (mean and median differ by less than 2% of the scale). The red and blue lines indicate the LLR position of U.S. Republicans and U.S. Democrats (latest election only), respectively. 

(Hilbig and Moshagen). Percentage of votes gained in most recent election conditional on party positions on the logit left-right (LLR) scale. The black lines indicate the unweighted (dashed) and weighted (dotted; weighting party positions by the proportion of actual votes received) mean across parties (mean and median differ by less than 2% of the scale). The red and blue lines indicate the LLR position of U.S. Republicans and U.S. Democrats (latest election only), respectively. 

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Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity—particularly diversity of viewpoints—for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. This article reviews the available evidence and finds sup...

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... the position of U.S. Democrats and U.S. Republicans on the LLR scale to those of the 99 political parties of said 12 countries clearly reveals that U.S. Democrats are best characterized as holding a moderate (rather than left) position in a global context (results are virtually identical when considering all countries available in the manifesto database). Figure 2 plots the proportion of actual votes parties received in the most recent national elections against their position on the LLR scale. As can be seen, the "global midpoint" (both unweighted and weighted by actual votes that parties received) is close to the numerical neutral point of the left-right spectrum. ...
Context 2
... is self-evident that the political parties of these countries will not map onto the Democrat-versus-Republican categorization from the United States. Comparing the position of U.S. Demo- crats and U.S. Republicans on the LLR scale to those of the 99 political parties of said 12 countries clearly reveals that U.S. Dem- ocrats are best characterized as holding a moderate (rather than left) position in a global context (results are virtually identical when considering all countries available in the manifesto data- base). Figure 2 plots the proportion of actual votes parties re- ceived in the most recent national elections against their position on the LLR scale. As can be seen, the "global midpoint" (both unweighted and weighted by actual votes that parties re- ceived) is close to the numerical neutral point of the left-right spectrum. In turn, this is essentially the current position of U.S. Democrats. By contrast, U.S. Republicans score approximately 1 standard deviation right of this global midpoint. Thus, in compar- ison to the political spectrum of all parties across these countries (which contribute just as much to psychological science as the United States), it is clear that the U.S. spectrum (Democrats vs. ...

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... These trends continue even though evidence mount that this limits the development of critical thinking (Fenton and Smith, 2019). Lack of political diversity can also limit progress in specific subjects, like psychology and sociology (Duarte et al., 2015;Haaga, 2020;Baehr, 2020). Research suggests increasing viewpoint diversity will help Universities fulfill their core mission of advancing knowledge (Whittington, 2020). ...
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Introduction: A number of recent surveys have shown that college campuses are becoming intolerant of different viewpoints. Part of the mission of any college should be to create a space where different viewpoints can be debated in a healthy, intellectual way. To gauge the campus climate at their own University, the authors deployed a survey to business students asking how comfortable they were sharing and responding to different viewpoints. Methods: Business students were surveyed for their attitudes towards diverse viewpoints. The survey instrument has been used at other colleges to survey students for several years. Results: A portion of students are censoring their views on controversial topics. There is often a reluctance to present honest viewpoints in the classroom. Discussion: Faculty needs to be mindful of the classroom environment they create. Colleges should be a major place where different viewpoints are discussed and debated. Limitations: Only business students were surveyed. There may be different outcomes for students in other majors. Conclusions: These results suggest that many students are self-censoring their views in class. Faculty should be aware of this and create an environment where different viewpoints are welcome.
... A merican academia is often accused of liberal bias, and some observers have blamed the academy's left-wing slant for undermining trust in science (Duarte et al., 2015). The impression that scientists are overwhelmingly liberal has provided an impetus for conservative attacks on scientific findings and fueled the rise of conservative counter-institutions dedicated to challenging "liberally biased" academic science, chiefly for a lay audience (Mann and Schleifer, 2020). ...
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Scientists in the United States are more politically liberal than the general population. This fact has fed charges of political bias. To learn more about scientists’ political behavior, we analyze publicly available Federal Election Commission data. We find that scientists who donate to federal candidates and parties are far more likely to support Democrats than Republicans, with less than 10 percent of donations going to Republicans in recent years. The same pattern holds true for employees of the academic sector generally, and for scientists employed in the energy sector. This was not always the case: Before 2000, political contributions were more evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. We argue that these observed changes are more readily explained by changes in Republican Party attitudes toward science than by changes in American scientists. We reason that greater public involvement by centrist and conservative scientists could help increase trust in science among Republicans.
... Diversity actually makes us smarter and one should seek out people with different ideas (Phillips, 2014). Duarte et al. (2015) maintain: "Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversityparticularly diversity of viewpoints -for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving." ...
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Most Americans believe that higher education is heading in the wrong direction. In Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, the eponymous heroine’s tumble into a rabbit hole immerses her in a bizarre, surreal, disorienting universe. Has higher education fallen down the rabbit hole? This paper will examine the many ways that academe has become a peculiar, illogical, and topsy-turvy world where things are often the opposite of what we call them and of what we expect them to be. To restore the credibility of our education system and make it of value to most students, it must be completely reimagined and, in fact, totally rebuilt from the ground up.
... That said, a burgeoning chorus of scholars have asserted that the relation between conservatism and rigidity hinges crucially on a host of empirical (e.g., Ditto et al., 2019;Federico & Malka, 2018;Feldman & Johnston, 2014;Kahan, 2016;Malka & Soto, 2015;Zmigrod et al., 2019), methodological (e.g., Malka et al., 2017;Zmigrod, 2020), and metascientific (e.g., Duarte et al., 2015;Jussim et al., 2016) factors, such that the RRH's evidentiary foundation may be grounded in a noisy and contradictory literature. To provide a sense of these prior critiques, consider that many people identify as "socially liberal" and "economically conservative" (or vice versa), suggesting that "liberalism" and "conservatism" may not be psychologically coherent categories (Feldman, 2013;Kerr, 1952). ...
... An additional source of bias may be attributable to the fact that we live in an extremely polarized and politicized world, and psychologists, being humans, are not immune from the biases that tend to accompany partisanship. Namely, several authors (e.g., Duarte et al., 2015;Honeycutt & Jussim, 2020) have suggested that the RRH has benefited from the disproportionately left-leaning political preferences of social psychologists (Haidt, 2011;Langbert et al., 2016;von Hippel & Buss, 2017), which may have biased the literature in undetermined ways. All meta-analyses are liable to poor statistical accuracy due to biases introduced during the dissemination of results (e.g., publication bias) and/or those borne of correlated error variance across multiple studies. ...
... For instance, Gaffan and colleagues (1995) famously found that, in a meta-analytic review of the efficacy of various psychotherapeutic approaches, researchers' allegiance to a given therapeutic approach accounted for up to half of the difference between said approach and other treatments. The same may be true of political allegiance (Duarte et al., 2015). Still, evidence is for this possibility is mixed (e.g., a recent adversarial collaboration found that political allegiance is not related to replicability; Reinero et al., 2019) and warrants further examination. ...
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The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (RRH), which posits that cognitive, motivational, and ideological rigidity resonate with political conservatism, is an influential but controversial psychological account of political ideology. Here, we leverage several methodological and theoretical sources of this controversy to conduct an extensive quantitative review—with the dual aims of probing the RRH’s basic assumptions and parsing the RRH literature’s heterogeneity. Using multi-level meta-analyses of relations between varieties of rigidity and ideology measures alongside a bevy of potential moderators (s = 329, k = 708, N = 187,612), we find that associations between conservatism and rigidity are tremendously heterogeneous, suggesting a complex—yet conceptually fertile—network of relations between these constructs. Most notably, whereas social conservatism was robustly associated with rigidity, associations between economic conservatism and rigidity indicators were inconsistent, small, and not statistically significant outside of the United States. Moderator analyses revealed that non-representative sampling, criterion contamination, and disproportionate use of American samples have yielded over-estimates of associations between rigidity-related constructs and conservatism in past research. We resolve that drilling into this complexity, thereby moving beyond the question of if conservatives are essentially rigid to when and why they might or might not be, will help provide a more realistic account of the psychological underpinnings of political ideology.
... Consistent with research on political orientations in academia and, particularly, the field of psychology (e.g., Duarte et al., 2015;Honeycutt & Freberg, 2017;Inbar & Lammers, 2012), most I-O psychology academics and also practitioners who participated in our study reported holding a liberal personal political orientation. In light of recent position papers and commentaries proposing a (increasing) neoliberal bias in I-O psychology research (Bal & Dóci, 2018;Mumby, 2019), our finding suggests an intriguing paradox: most I-O psychologists hold a liberal (or left-wing) personal political orientation, but research in the field issupposedly -"captured by neoliberalism" (Guest & Grote, 2018). ...
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Researchers and practitioners have become increasingly interested in the role of political orientation in the workplace. Importantly, people do not always agree with other members of their profession when it comes to politics. However, the effects of such person-occupation political orientation misfit on people’s work-related attitudes remain unclear. According to the social identity perspective, person-occupation political orientation misfit is likely to lead to the experience of identity threat which, in turn, should negatively impact people’s occupational identification. To address this idea empirically, the goal of this study was to examine the influence of different political depictions of the field of industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology (i.e., as generally neoliberal, left-wing, pluralistic, or neutral) on I-O psychologists’ occupational identification, depending on their personal political orientation (i.e., more or less liberal vs. conservative). Specifically, we hypothesized that experiencing person-occupation political orientation misfit would reduce occupational identification. Results of an experiment (n = 800 I-O psychology academics and practitioners) provided some support for this hypothesis, suggesting specifically that person-occupation political orientation misfit might alienate people with a more conservative political orientation from their occupation.
... 34 Therefore, one plausible explanation for the increasing mentions of prejudice themes and social justice terminology in media content could be due to the increasingly liberal ideological composition of newsrooms that might shape journalists' choices of topics to cover since people who identify more strongly on the left are far more focused on the topic of prejudice. 35 A third potential explanation for the rising incidence of prejudice and social justice rhetoric in news media content could be the recent emergence of financial incentives for media organizations to maximize diffusion of news articles through social media channels by triggering negative sentiment/emotions, 36 and/ or political out-group animosity, both of which have been shown to drive engagement of social media-based news consumption. 37 By focusing on more moralistic and polarising language, designed to generate clicks on social media platforms, the new social-media driven incentives may be encouraging discursive shifts in news media, though we would welcome insights in this regard from media organizations themselves. ...
Technical Report
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• Recent years have seen considerable debate about the rise of political polarisation in British society. Specifically, over the last decade, various studies have suggested that the UK is now rapidly following the United States into a more polarised politics in which intensifying ‘culture wars’ over issues such as racism, identity, diversity, history, the legacy of history, and ‘social justice’ or so-called ‘woke’ politics are becoming far more prominent. • While this debate typically focuses on the role of party politics, much less attention has focused on the relationship between news media and rising polarisation. Building on recent pioneering research which has tracked a sharp increase in the overall prominence of prejudice and social justice rhetoric in US and Spanish media, our purpose in this report is to explore whether similar trends are now also visible in the UK. • We use computational content analysis to explore the chronological prevalence in UK news media of words which denote prejudice (i.e., sexism, racism, homophobia, etc.) and ‘social justice’ or ‘woke’ rhetoric (i.e., white privilege, whiteness, cultural appropriation, diversity, etc.). Our main interest in doing so is to explore how the media debate has changed over time. • Thus, we present analyses of UK media usage of these terms between the years 2000 and 2020 in 16 million news and opinion articles, published in a nationally representative sample of ten popular British media outlets: The Guardian, The Independent, The Daily Mirror, BBC, The Times, Financial Times, Metro, The Telegraph, Daily Mail and The Sun. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive analysis of UK media coverage of these issues to date. • Consistent with recent studies in the U.S. and Spain, we find that references to prejudice and social justice rhetoric have increased sharply in UK media in recent years. Between 2010 and 2020, terms such as racism and white supremacy in popular UK media outlets increased on average by 769% and 2,827% respectively, while terms such as sexism, patriarchy and misogyny increased by 169%, 336% and 237% each. Additional terms such as transphobia, islamophobia and anti-semitism increased by 2,578%, 289% and 469% respectively. Similarly, terms associated with social justice discourse have also markedly increased over the same temporal period: diversity (199%), activism (146%), hate speech (880%), inequality (218%), gender-neutral (1,019%) or slavery (413%). • These sharp increases are pervasive across media, regardless of their ideological leanings. But overall prevalence tends to be larger in left-leaning outlets. Mentions of prejudice have also become far more prominent in the BBC, the UK’s leading public service outlet. From 2010 to 2020, mentions in BBC content of terms suggestive of racism have increased by over 802% while mentions of terms suggestive of sexism have increased by 610%. Mentions of homophobia and transphobia increased by 134% and 3,341% respectively. Terms signifying islamophobia and anti-Semitism increased by 585% and 2,431%. • By tracking the temporal prevalence of terms denoting prejudice and social justice in UK news media, we throw light on how the UK media debate is evolving and raise important questions about whether media institutions have got the balance right in how we talk about these issues. In the final section, we consider possible explanations for the sharp increase in the prominence of prejudice and social justice rhetoric in UK news media, including the shifting profile of the UK media class which has increasingly become far more elite.
... Scientists' objectivity has also been called into question. Scientists in certain fields are portrayed and perceived as exhibiting biased perspectives against Christian (22) and conservative (23) values. Indeed, many religious individuals reject science, in part, due to the perception that scientists are atheistic (24). ...
Article
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From vaccination refusal to climate change denial, antiscience views are threatening humanity. When different individuals are provided with the same piece of scientific evidence, why do some accept whereas others dismiss it? Building on various emerging data and models that have explored the psychology of being antiscience, we specify four core bases of key principles driving antiscience attitudes. These principles are grounded in decades of research on attitudes, persuasion, social influence, social identity, and information processing. They apply across diverse domains of antiscience phenomena. Specifically, antiscience attitudes are more likely to emerge when a scientific message comes from sources perceived as lacking credibility; when the recipients embrace the social membership or identity of groups with antiscience attitudes; when the scientific message itself contradicts what recipients consider true, favorable, valuable, or moral; or when there is a mismatch between the delivery of the scientific message and the epistemic style of the recipient. Politics triggers or amplifies many principles across all four bases, making it a particularly potent force in antiscience attitudes. Guided by the key principles, we describe evidence-based counteractive strategies for increasing public acceptance of science.
... This paradox also exists in academic settings for researchers studying ideological communication. Academic institutions are becoming increasingly homogenous in ideology [14,15], and recruiting a wide range of opinions is notoriously difficult, let alone bringing opponents into the lab to have a heated discussion. To combat this difficulty, many researchers have opted to use imagined scenarios or forecasted experiences to study ideological communication [6]. ...
Article
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The rise of ideological polarization in the U.S. over the past few decades has come with an increase in hostility on both sides of the political aisle. Although communication and compromise are hallmarks of a functioning society, research has shown that people overestimate the negative affect they will experience when viewing oppositional media, and it is likely that negative forecasts lead many to avoid cross-ideological communication (CIC) altogether. Additionally, a growing ideological geographic divide and online extremism fueled by social media audiences make engaging in CIC more difficult than ever. Here, we demonstrate that online video-chat platforms (i.e., Zoom) can be used to promote effective CIC among ideologically polarized individuals, as well as to better study CIC in a controlled setting. Participants ( n = 122) had a face-to-face CIC over Zoom, either privately or publicly with a silent ingroup audience present. Participant forecasts about the interaction were largely inaccurate, with the actual conversation experience found to be more positive than anticipated. Additionally, the presence of an ingroup audience was associated with increased conflict. In both conditions, participants showed preliminary signs of attitude moderation, felt more favorable toward the outgroup, and felt more informed about the issue after the CIC. These results suggest that face-to-face CIC’s are generally positive and beneficial for polarized individuals, and that greater effects may be achieved through private conversations, as opposed to more public social media-like interactions. Future researchers studying ideological conflict may find success using similar Zoom paradigms to bring together ideologically diverse individuals in controlled lab settings.
... Studies investigating male-favouring differences may less readily gain IRB approval, attract grant money, or navigate the peer-review process (Ceci & Williams, 2020) -not necessarily because reviewers deliberately discriminate against such studies (although see Honeycutt & Freberg, 2017;Inbar & Lammers, 2012), but because they genuinely view them as lower in quality. Such effects seem particularly plausible given that most academics fall on the political left, where the male-favouring aversion is stronger (Ceci & Williams, 2020;Duarte et al., 2015). And not only might male-favouring studies have a harder time getting published, some might never be conducted in the first place because of researcher concerns about their effects or reception. ...
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Two studies (total N = 778) looked at (1) how people react to research finding a sex difference depending on whether the research puts men or women in a better light and (2) how well people can predict the average man and average woman's reactions. Participants read a fictional popular‐science article about fictional research finding either a male‐ or a female‐favouring sex difference. The research was credited to either a male or a female lead researcher. In both studies, both sexes reacted less positively to differences favouring males; in contrast to our earlier research, however, the effect was larger among female participants. Contrary to a widespread expectation, participants did not react less positively to research led by a female. Participants did react less positively, though, to research led by a male when the research reported a male‐favouring difference in a highly valued trait. Participants judged male‐favouring research to be lower in quality than female‐favouring research, apparently in large part because they saw the former as more harmful. In both studies, participants predicted that the average man and woman would exhibit substantial own‐sex favouritism, with both sexes predicting more own‐sex favouritism from the other sex than the other sex predicted from itself. In making these predictions, participants overestimated women's own‐sex favouritism, and got the direction of the effect wrong for men. A greater understanding of the tendency to overestimate gender‐ingroup bias could help quell antagonisms between the sexes.
... In other words, MFT scholars may argue that they are not suggesting that any one person or culture should or should not endorse justice, care, loyalty, and so on, as moral foundations. And yet, this (hypothetical) rebuttal would be at odds with (clearly) prescriptive statements made by MFT scholars who advocate for a "six-factor" moral channel in which all "best candidate" foundations are relied on and utilized (Haidt, 2012;Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim, & Tetlock, 2014). Indeed, MFT scholars have labeled "morally color-blind" those who adopt only a subset of the "best candidate" foundations : 389)-suggesting, then, that there is inherent goodness within the foundations that merit humans' endorsement and allegiance. ...
Article
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This article draws from Charles Taylor’s work of retrieval to advance moral foundations theory (MFT). Taylor’s contribution to MFT lies in his insistence that we retrieve the moral sources that have helped constitute, substantiate, and give meaning to individuals’ moral sensibilities. Applying Taylor’s insights to MFT, this article seeks to advance a view of moral foundations that connects them more explicitly to their underlying moral sources. Using this retrieved account of moral foundations, this article then addresses current issues within moral foundations research and theory. Finally, this article suggests ways in which Taylor’s philosophy can contribute to three areas within business ethics: ethical leadership, behavioral ethics, and ethics pedagogy.