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Gender-based attitudes towards EU membership and perceived personal benefits. Source: Author's own data. N = 815, N women = 574, N men = 241.
Source publication
This paper investigates the role of gender in shaping attitudes towards the European Union (EU) among young people living in Polish cities – the so-called ‘winners of European integration’. Previously, little attention has been given to gender as an influence on views on the EU. Most studies apply the gender-based perspective on Western Europe, whi...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... evaluate if attitudes towards EU integration and the perception of personal benefits resulting from EU membership differ (or not), I first analyse the data descriptively by presenting an overview of the answers to the questions. Figure 1 shows the results in percentage (%), broken down by gender. ...
Context 2
... evaluate if attitudes towards EU integration and the perception of personal benefits resulting from EU membership differ (or not), I first analyse the data descriptively by presenting an overview of the answers to the questions. Figure 1 shows the results in percentage (%), broken down by gender. ...
Citations
... The generational differences between both samples could bias the research results, showing not only the differences resulting from the stage of life (studying vs. work) but also from changing social norms regarding the relationship between children and parents over the years. Since accession of Poland to the European Union in 2004, Polish society has experienced many changes that have an impact on the system of values and attitudes (e.g., Favero, 2020), which most likely have an impact on filial beliefs. Furthermore, given the importance of close relationships and whether people move away from home in explanation of studentemployee differences in filial piety beliefs, a certain limitation of the current study is that these variables (e.g., relationship status, living with parents or not) were not collected. ...
Filial beliefs are defined as a cognitive script or even a contextualized personality construct for social exchanges, which shapes the attitudes of individuals. In the given study, we investigate the factorial structure of the Polish version of the Dual Filial Piety Scale (DFPS-PL) and verify whether measurement of filial piety is invariant among students and employees, and among men and women. Two studies were conducted on different age samples: 489 students aged 18–24 and 849 employees aged 25–64. In order to verify the hypotheses, the DFPS-PL was administered. As a result of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), it has been demonstrated that the structure of filial piety measured by the DFPS-PL among students and employees, and men and women, could be interpreted as two-factorial, and that there is partial scalar measurement invariance for the tested model across these groups (MGCFA). The comparison of the average latent mean scores suggests that employees declare a lower level of AFP (Authoritarian Filial Piety; need of social belonging and collective identity) than students. There were no significant differences between students and employees when RFP (Reciprocal Filial Piety; need of interpersonal relatedness) was compared. In addition, the results showed that women score higher in RFP than men. The given findings are discussed in the context of values transition in non-Asian countries. The main contribution is to confirm the factorial structure of the DFPS-PL and introduce the novel Eastern concept of Filial Piety to Western culture.
... Polls consistently show that young women tend to choose left-wing parties (Spring [Wiosna] or Left Together), while young men often opt for the radical right (Confederation). Well-educated women are also more likely to support EU integration than men (Favero 2020). ...
In the recent years, one of the most popular subjects of research in political science has been the rise of populism. In Poland, an anti-establishment government has won a second electoral cycle in a row. However, unlike in Hungary, the opposition received a comparable share of the vote. In this article, I try to show how a country with a seemingly homogeneous population could have become so divided. I argue that the current polarization is based on the lack of social recognition of the less well-off citizens and areas, and on the lack of social cohesion: deeply rooted cultural and moral divisions in society overlapping with differences in economic situation. Those underlying causes explain why civil society in Poland is still able to mobilize, but they also let us predict that the divisions will not disappear soon. Although the political preferences of the youth suggest a strong demand for more pluralism, the new gender cleavage may deepen with time, based on a similar logic: diverging life courses and a lack of social cohesion and recognition exploited by polarizing parties. The explanations offered here contribute to the understanding of not only the success of antiestablishment parties in Poland but also of the differences between the Western and Central and Eastern European political mainstream.
This paper explores the economic and non-economic factors that could potentially lead to a Polish decision to remain within or leave the EU, following a future potential Polexit referendum. The study aims to determine the relative impact of Polish citizens’ values and attitudes on their support for their country’s continued EU membership and integration, at such a crucial time. The research is based on a survey conducted in December 2021, with a stratified sample of 1,517 respondents, and a statistical analysis of the findings. The results suggest that the relative importance of these factors could vary considerably, with economic factors potentially playing a less significant role than sociocultural and political elements. We argue that this projected outcome is likely to be influenced by citizens’ socio-demographic backgrounds, their perceived levels of economic security or insecurity, and differences in their economic and non-economic values, thereby creating potential opportunities for future populist Eurosceptic politicians in Poland to exploit, underlining the potential implications of these findings.
