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2. Frequency of frames (unweighted)

2. Frequency of frames (unweighted)

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We trace the contours of extractive populism as it is increasingly expressed in Canadian social media. First, we explore the genesis of Canadian extractive populism in industry's efforts to target and 'activate' key constituencies of supporters to emulate the successes of their opponents' communication and engagement strategies. Following a descrip...

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... Often described as a "thin-centered ideology", populism can and does align itself with many other, "thick" ideological structures (Mudde 2017). Keen to understand the resulting array of ideological projects to which populism has been dedicated, scholars have developed a series of qualified concepts-such as "market populism," "extractive populism," and "neo-liberal populism" (Gunster et al. 2021;Sawer and Laycock 2009). Moreover, given the powerful and culturally informed ways that it defines, binds, and mobilizes the "people" (Norris and Inglehart 2019), much attention has been paid to understanding populism's relationship to other large-scale forces informing group identities, including nationalism, nativism, and religion (Brubaker 2017(Brubaker , 2020. ...
... Unlike other studies of extractive populism (e.g., Gunster et al. 2021), our aim is not to quantitatively determine which frames are most prominent. Nor are we seeking to claim that TBA should be primarily understood as either an extractive populist or faith-based organization, or even necessarily as a freedom group focused on opposing public health measures. ...
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Alberta, Canada is both a major extractive zone—home to the world’s third largest proven oil reserves, mostly in the form of oil sands located in the north of the province—and a place whose political culture has been profoundly influenced by evangelical Christianity. It is both “petro province” and “God’s province”. Despite these distinct political economic and socio-cultural features, relatively little scholarly attention has been given to the contemporary relationships among them. To explore this, we profile the populist far-right social movement organization Take Back Alberta (TBA), which, by channeling the interlocking “freedom” and separatist movements into the governing United Conservative Party (UCP), played a pivotal role in Alberta Premier Danielle Smith’s rise to power. We ask the following question: what role do religion and a populist defense of the fossil fuel industry (or “extractive populism”) play, both ideologically and organizationally, within TBA? Drawing from TBA-related documents, including websites, podcasts, social media, and speeches, our analysis produces two key findings: first, that TBA deploys a radical, far-right version of extractive populism, which “anchors” the Danielle Smith government, and, second, that evangelical Christianity contributes to this extractive populism organizationally—by impacting TBA’s membership and resource infrastructure—and discursively, by influencing the collective action frames utilized by TBA leaders in advocating for the interests of the fossil fuel industry.
... Extractive populism appeals to the common-sense wisdom of "the people," pictured as being derived from authentic lived experience as opposed to the rarified, abstract knowledge of liberal elites. 39 Stephen Harper also used petro-nationalist discourse after the Chinese governmentowned oil giant, CNOOC, bought bitumen operator Nexen Inc. in 2012. Ottawa allowed the takeover but said it would henceforth limit foreign state ownership of Canadian resource companies. ...
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Alberta’s 2021 public inquiry into “anti-Alberta energy campaigns” targeted a molehill. Tasked with investigating the vast sums that allegedly flowed from U.S. foundations to Canadian environmental groups, inquiry commissioner Steve Allan followed the trail of money and found a pittance. If, as Alberta Energy Minister Sonya Savage stated, the aim of the inquiry was to expose the influence of foreign actors over domestic policy, it missed a far larger source of outside money influencing Albertan and Canadian politics: Big Foreign Oil. Oil corporations in Alberta and Canada are overwhelmingly foreign-owned. This report examines how Big Foreign Oil (BFO) hinders climate action in Canada by capturing and controlling the lion’s share of the industry, policy-making, and profits.
... Beyond simply linking to such material more consistently, the creative and provocative translation of this material into more shareable forms, such as memes that foreground key quotes, facts or images, could significantly increase levels of active engagement. Where right-wing Canadian actors make extensive use of such techniques to drive the sharing of particular claims and ideas (Gunster et al., 2021), they are much less common on the left. The higher active engagement metrics of pages such as North99, Keep Canada Beautiful and LabX Mediaamong the only pro-climate action actors in the sample to use memes on a regular basis, for examplesuggest that more creative forms of connective leadership could have significant impacts in terms of triggering connective action on the part of progressive audiences. ...
Article
This article explores how competing discursive and political formations about climate change structure and circulate in social media by mapping a year of climate-related Facebook posts and links by Canadian civil society actors. Drawing upon the concept of connective action, it traces the efficacy and impact of the social media strategies of actors favouring stronger climate action against those aiming to delay or block such action. Distinguishing between self-referential vs network-building connective action and active vs passive types of user engagement, it finds the most significant use of Facebook by Canadian civil society actors was the sharing of mainstream and alternative news sources. Such activity plays a key role in building networked publics around shared perspectives on climate change as well as generating audience subsidies through which users are mobilized to amplify particular news stories, columnists and media outlets. In Canada, conservative actors tend to be more focused upon network building and more effective in producing these subsidies, especially for right-leaning commercial news organizations and alt-right digital outlets.
... Extractive populism appeals to the common-sense wisdom of "the people," pictured as being derived from authentic lived experience as opposed to the rarified, abstract knowledge of liberal elites. 39 Stephen Harper also used petro-nationalist discourse after the Chinese governmentowned oil giant, CNOOC, bought bitumen operator Nexen Inc. in 2012. Ottawa allowed the takeover but said it would henceforth limit foreign state ownership of Canadian resource companies. ...
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https://edmontonjournal.com/opinion/columnists/opinion-its-big-oil-not-environmentalists-who-are-foreign-funded
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Using a case study of Alberta, Canada, this paper demonstrates how a geographic critique of fossil capitalism helps elucidate the tensions shaping tar sands development. Conflicts over pipelines and Indigenous territorial claims are challenging development trajectories, as tar sands companies need to expand access to markets in order to expand production. While these conflicts are now well recognised, there are also broader dynamics shaping development. States face a rentier’s dilemma, relying on capital investments to realise resource value. Political responses to the emerging climate crisis undercut the profitability of hydrocarbon extraction. The automation of production undermines the industrial compromise between hydrocarbon labour and capital. Ultimately, the crises of fossil capitalism require a radical transformation within or beyond capital relations. To mobilise against the tar sands, organisers must recognise the tensions underpinning it, developing strategies that address ecological concerns and the economic plight of those dispossessed and abandoned by carbon extraction.
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This paper interrogates how the notion of hypocrisy is invoked in relation to climate change and offers two key findings. First, it demonstrates that invocations of hypocrisy are not only deployed by conservative opponents of climate action, but also by progressive proponents of such action. Second, this article shows that while hypocrisy discourse is used to support both anti- and pro-climate change perspectives, its nature and function fundamentally differs depending on who is using it. The article identifies four discrete types of climate hypocrisy discourse. Conservatives who reject climate change action tend to use two “modes” of hypocrisy discourse. The first is an “individual lifestyle outrage” mode that cultivates outrage about the hypocritical behavior and lifestyle choices of climate activists to undermine the urgency and moral need for climate change action. The second, an “institutional cynicism” mode, encourages a cynical fatalism about any proposed governmental action regarding climate change by suggesting that governments are necessarily climate hypocrites because of the economic and political impossibility of serious emissions reductions. In contrast, progressives use hypocrisy discourse in two different modes. The first involve an “institutional call to action” mode that uses charges of hypocrisy to attack government inaction on climate change and demand that effective action be taken in line with their public commitment to climate action. Secondly, they also employ a “reflexive” mode in which explorations of the ubiquity of climate change hypocrisy illuminate the dilemmas that virtually all responses to climate change necessarily grapple with in our current context. Overall, the article seeks to contribute to our understanding of climate change communications by (i) showing that hypocrisy discourse is not simply a sensationalist PR strategy of conservatives but is rather a broad, significant and multi-faceted form of climate change discourse; and (ii) suggesting that certain modes of hypocrisy discourse might not only represent genuine attempts to make sense of some of the fundamental tensions of climate change politics but also help us understand the challenge that the “entanglement” of personal agency/choice within broader political structures presents, and thus heighten positive affective commitments to climate change action.