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Frequency of cooperators ρ C as a function of damping factor δ for different reputation threshold R 0. Each data is obtained by averaging the proportion of cooperators in the last 500 iterations after the system reaches evolutionary stability. Note that more an individual’s fitness depends on reputation, the more it promotes the emergence of cooperation.
Source publication
Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment for behaviors that harm the interests of groups with different reputations. However, conventional pairwise int...
Citations
... As a further step, the punishment is used as an incentive mechanism, and a new classification form of punishment is introduced into the spatial public goods game, 53 where the probability of punishment changes dynamically according to the number of consecutive defections in the game. Furthermore, Zhang et al. 46 studied the impact of the reputation threshold based tolerant punishment mechanism on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games. Specifically, if an individual's reputation fell below the threshold, he would be punished after he chose to defect; whereas he was not punished even though he adopted defective strategy, if his reputation exceeded the threshold. ...
Trust holds a pivotal position in contemporary society. Yet, the question of how to elevate and sustain trust among selfish individuals poses a formidable challenge. To delve into this issue, we incorporate a graded punishment strategy into a networked N-player trust game, aiming to observe the progression of trust-related behavior. Within this game framework, punishers uphold a certain degree of trust among the participants by incurring an extra expense to exclude those who betray trust. By conducting numerous Monte Carlo simulation experiments, we uncover that the graded punishment strategy can effectively curtail untrustworthy conduct to a significant degree, potentially even eliminating such behavior, thereby fostering an improvement in the overall trust level within the population. However, to effectively deploy this strategy, it is imperative to strike a balance between the penalty cost and the penalty amount, ensuring that the natural evolution of the system is not unduly disrupted. This balance is crucial for preserving the stability and sustainability of the system while safeguarding trust. Broadly speaking, our study offers fresh insights and approaches for enhancing and maintaining trust in the networked society, while also highlighting the avenues and challenges for future research, particularly in the realm of applying graded punishment strategies.
