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Chinaâs energy insecurity largely originates from its constrained availability, questionable reliability, and uncertain affordability of its oil supplies. The countryâs fast industrialization and urbanization, together with demand for infrastructure and increasing popularity of automobiles, requires a lot of energy, but it consumes energy both inte...
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... of economic prowess. Recognition of China's multiplying energy demand has directed new attention to its developing problem of energy security. China's energy insecurity can be assessed in terms of actual cyclical, structural and institutional insecurities, and in terms of perceived insecurity of energy availability, reliability and affordability (Fig. 2). It is critical to consider both actual and perceived insecurity because the former speaks to the magnitude of China's energy insecurity and the latter points to the country's policy response to different sources of insecurity. Specifically, perceived insecurity indicates the motivations behind China's proposed solutions and China's ...
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... a security issue for the country because growing quantities of oil imports magnify the effects of price fluctuations on its economic growth. Since it became a net oil importer, the money China spends on oil imports has grown more than eight times from $2.3 billion in 1993 to $19.8 billion 2003, with an average growth of more than 38% annually (Fig. 12). Moreover, expanded oil imports accounted for only 2.23% of China's total expanded imports in 1993, but by 2003 they made up 4.8% of the country's budget for aggregate imports, more than doubling the share in ...
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... expenditure on crude oil imports as a percentage of China's total import expenditures total money spent on crude oil imports (billion US dollars) total expanses on crude oil imports as a % of total import expanses Figure 12. Chinese expenditures on oil imports and share of total imports 72 ...
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... granted its non-state oil companies import quotas to import oil and oil products for the first time in 2002, allowing them to import 8.28 million tons of oil and 4.6 million tons of oil products. As shown by Figure 20, ever since 2002 the import quotas allocated to non-state owned oil companies have been growing at 15% for both crude oil and oil products. Second, as part of its WTO commitments the central government opened the retail market of oil products, allowing foreign oil companies to open gas stations in China. ...
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... on the floor of the East China Sea. The particular gas field that has been fueling rivalry between the two countries since May 2005 is the Chunxiao Gas Field, which lies on the Chinese side of the line but Japan is concerned that by drilling in the area China may hit veins that extend east of the line and extract resources that belong to Japan (Fig. 21). The Chinese government never recognized the median line claimed by the Japanese government. Instead, Beijing holds the continental shelf extension theory, according to which China Exclusive Economic Zones stretch to a larger extent than that designated by Japan. After two rounds of failed bilateral consultations, the Japanese ...
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Abstrakt
Energy security is one of the targets of the energy policies adopted by modern states and more and more by supranational structures. At the same time, it is a precondition for a country’s economic growth and the society’s well-being. In the 21 century, we depend on both primary (like electricity) and secondary energy carriers. Among the l...
The needs of energy are increasing every year. The unavailability of energy will cause economic losses and weaken energy security. To overcome the availability of gas supply in the future, planning are cruacially needed. Therefore, it is necessary to approach the system, so that the process of gas distribution is running properly. In this research,...
The utilisation of renewable energy in the European Union seems, at the present stage of energy policy development, inevitable. It offers many benefits, including, above all: the possibility of increasing the energy security of a given state or region thanks to the diversification of the sources of energy supply, the limitation of imports from ener...
Citations
... On the other hand, while the incremental demand for coal-fired power grew at a slower rate, the coal-fired power equipment manufacturing sector showed increasing signs of excess capacity in China thanks to two waves of expansion. In response to the country's struggle to address power shortages plaguing the Chinese society in 2002-2005 (Kong, 2005), the coal-fired power equipment manufacturing sector saw the first round of investment and production boom in the 21st century; the fallout of the 2007-2008 GFC provided the sector with an opportunity to engage in a second wave of expansion as local governments turned to infrastructure buildout as a way stimulate the GFC-battered economy. This turbocharged expansion did not lose momentum until Beijing started to impose caps on CFPP buildout nationwide in the midst of its campaign to fight "the war on air pollution." ...
This study aims to explain why China has become a new coal champion of the world. From 2006 to 2019, our new data set shows that China has financed 14 percent of the newly installed coal fired power plants across 17 countries around the world. We deploy a ‘push and pull’ analytical model and combine both qualitative and quantitative analysis to examine the political economy of Chinese overseas finance for coal. Our analysis shows that the globalization of Chinese official development finance for coal-fired power is a function of both the pull by the demand from the 17 countries, which have turned to the Chinese policy banks for financial backing to build coal-fired power plants, and the push by the coal-fired power equipment manufacturing sector in China and the central government in Beijing, which have been confronted with a set of structural challenges following the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Our findings carry some worrisome policy implications for the global effort to reduce CO2 emissions resulting from coal burning in the electric sector. Without changes on the demand side, and a profound re-alignment of forces within China, Chinese development finance for coal-fired power may prove relatively resilient.
... In the last 30 years, insecurity of liquid fuel supply has been the most alarming problem for Chinese leaders, although the rest of the challenges, for example, imbalance of energy distribution, low energy efficiency, and massive pollution, are still noticeable in energy sector. Lacking of availability, reliability and affordability of oil [10] seriously threats Chinese government's fulfillment to its commitment on improving living level, accelerating economy development, safeguarding sovereignty and territory, and realizing the national rejuvenation [11]. ...
... This growing foreign dependence has contributed to China's perceived energy security challenge; that is: can China secure access to adequate and affordable energy supplies from overseas and ship them back without compromising its economic interests and foreign policy interests? This concern is especially pronounced when it comes to the country's dependence on the volatile Middle East and the sea lines of communications, through which over 90 per cent of China's imported energy travel (Kong, 2005). ...
This article seeks to understand what role China can and will play in global energy governance by examining how its domestic energy context shapes the country's attitudes toward the multilateral, market and climate change aspects of global energy governance. It finds that China demonstrates a preference for bilateral/regional to multilateral energy institutions, exhibits an inclination to blend state and market when pursuing energy security, and shows a principally consistent but pragmatically flexible approach to global negotiations on climate change. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, China's engagement with the international energy order suggests that a rising and energy-hungry China has not and is unlikely to upset the very system that has benefited and will continue to benefit the country. Instead, this article argues that China has shown signs and promises of contributing to global energy governance by offering financial, technical solutions and stimulating the world to develop clean energy. However, energy governance in China has experienced considerable capacity decay in the era of reform and globalization. This decay not only bodes ill for the country's ability to lead in global energy governance but also complicates international attempts to engage China on complex energy and climate challenges. © 2011 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
... For example, the average engine displacement capacity of domestically produced cars in China jumped from 1.53 to 1.68 liters between 2006 and 2007, registering an annual growth rate of 9.8% and equivalent to a 5% increase in annual fuel consumption. 15 The growing fuel intensity of Chinese cars confirms empirical studies that demonstrate the positive correlation among fuel prices, fuel consumption, and macroeconomic fuel efficiency. 16 Thus, the fuel tax is increasingly perceived as an energy policy instrument required to curb oil consumption in the auto sector and to reduce the country's dependence on foreign oil. ...
This paper investigates why some energy decisions are made faster than others in a reformed and globalized China. This investigation uncovers five factors that determine whether a proposal becomes a decision in the Chinese political system: (1) associated benefits of the proposed decision for other policy problems; (2) presence of a consistent ‘issue champion’; (3) strength of mobilized and united ‘veto players’; (4) vertical and horizontal support; and (5) clear policy preferences of the central leadership. The paper argues that the Chinese decision-making process has become increasingly consultative, iterative, and participatory and that it is also increasingly prone to deadlock, inaction, and paralysis. Thus, the Chinese decision-making process is increasingly similar to that of the United States in the era of reform and globalization. While the capacity of the Chinese state to make and implement distributive policies has remained largely unchanged, reform and globalization has weakened its capacity to make and implement redistributive policies.
... Presently, China is facing severe energy resource shortage (Kong, 2005) and environmental deterioration, including water and air pollution, soil erosion, land degradation, deforestation, destruction of grasslands and salinization (Harris, 2006). ...
Assuming that energy consumption is the main source of GHG emissions in China, this paper analyses the effect of population, urbanisation level, GDP per capita, industrialisation level and energy intensity on the country's environmental impact using the STIRPAT model with data for 1978–2006. The analysis shows that population has the largest potential effect on environmental impact, followed by urbanisation level, industrialisation level, GDP per capita and energy intensity. Hence, China's One Child Policy, which restrains rapid population growth, has been an effective way of reducing the country's environmental impact. However, due to the difference in growth rates, GDP per capita had a higher effect on the environmental impact, contributing to 38% of its increase (while population's contribution was at 32%). The rapid decrease in energy intensity was the main factor restraining the increase in China's environmental impact but recently it has also been rising. Against this background, the future of the country looks bleak unless a change in human behaviour towards more ecologically sensitive economic choices occurs.
... Thus, quotas for energy consumption could be set for industries 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 1983198619891992199519982001. Energy intensity and carbon dioxide emissions in China, 1980-2005, normalised to 1980levels. Source: Energy Information Administration (2007. ...
... The proportional increases in energy intensity were greater for coal and for electricity, which are the fuels of industry, than for oil, the fuel of transport (Hang and Tu, 2007). Total investment in fixed assets jumped from 36% to 47% of GDP over the period 2002-2005. The output of key energy-intensive products rose sharply after the year 2000 (Fig. 5a), and China became firmly established as the world's largest producer of steel (35% of world output in 2006), cement (48% of world output), flat glass (49% of world output), and aluminium (28% of world output; Rosen and Houser, 2007). ...
... By 2001, the time of energy surpluses in China had come to an end. Fuel shortages and blackouts had become widespread by the end of 2002, and were a serious threat to the economy (Kong, 2005). These domestic vulnerabilities were compounded by the international factors. ...
In 2004 China's government launched a vigorous programme to reverse the trend of rising national energy intensity and to reduce intensity by 20% over the period 2006–2010. The aim of this paper is to examine this programme in the context of nearly 30 years of measures to enhance energy efficiency in China, and thus to evaluate the likelihood that today's policies will yield improvements over a longer period. The country achieved a sustained decline of energy intensity in the period 1980–2001 but this trend was reversed in 2002. This reversal arose from a shift in the structure of the economy to more energy-intensive industries and from a decline in the rate of technical innovation. The measures taken since 2003 have been directed principally at energy-intensive industries, but have also addressed other sectors of the economy. Though the energy intensity target for the year 2010 may be achieved, greater efforts will be needed to address a number of constraints which include: the reluctance to use economic and financial instruments; the dependency of energy policy on industrial and social policies; the nature of political decision-making and of public administration; a shortage of skills; and social attitudes to energy.
... L'« insécurité institutionnelle » [Bo Kong, 2005] est peut-être le problème le plus pressant du secteur énergétique chinois. Sur le plan national, l'industrie énergétique est régie par plusieurs ministères, hérités de l'administration maoïste, sans direction claire et peu adaptés à la réalité d'une industrie qui se veut concurrentielle sur les marchés internationaux et qui s'y est intégrée. ...
... L'élaboration de politiques claires et cohérentes est sapée par les négociations interministérielles et ne permet pas de réagir de façon efficace aux besoins qui se manifestent. La création en mai 2005 d'un groupe dirigeant pour l'énergie, sous l'égide du Premier ministre Wen Jiabao et réunissant 13 ministres, pourrait permettre, pour la première fois depuis la dissolution du ministère de l'Énergie en 1998, une coordination horizontale entre les différents ministères chargés de la formulation et de la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie énergétique du pays [Bo Kong, 2005 ;Downs, 2006]. ...
... LA CHINE À LA CONQUÊTE DES MARCHÉS ÉNERGÉTIQUES MONDIAUX Hérodote, n°125, La Découverte, 2 e trimestre 2007.20. Pour l'insécurité énergétique cyclique et institutionnelle, voir[Kong, 2005]. 21. ...
China, the conquest of world energy markets
China’s worldwide quest for energy has raised growing interest due to its strategic approach to its energy insecurity. The ambiguous nature of the relationship between the Chinese government and the National Oil Companies (NOCs) has exacerbated international fears about a policy directed by the highest political instances in China in order to divide up global energy resources between the NOCs. This article aims to shed some light on this relationship and, against this backdrop, present China’s international energy policy as a balance of commercial and diplomatic interests and pressures. China’s energy diplomacy can therefore be seen as a flexible and evolving policy, destined to support the pursuit of the NOCs commercial objectives, while moderating their potentially harmful effects
... Similarly, the National Statistical Bureau, charged with handling energy data of the world's second largest consumer of energy, has a three-person staff. 22 By contrast, the United States, the world's top energy guzzler, has a 14,000-strong Department of Energy, of which approximately 2,000 staff map out policy and 600 collect and analyze data. The 30 people within China's Energy Bureau are overwhelmed by the deluge of daily project reviews and approvals, and have little time for drafting the country's energy policy or strategy. ...
This article argues China’s energy security challenges begin at home and many of them essentially boil down to its institutional problems. Specifically, it illuminates how the fragmentation and compartmentalization of the country’s energy decision-making system, the weak capacity of its energy regulatory capacity, and the insufficient liberalization of its energy market at home have together constituted the source of much of its energy insecurity.
... The former concern stems from the fact that China imports oil from about 30 countries, the majority being less than stable countries in the Middle East and Africa (See Figure 5). As a result of this concentration, China perceives its oil imports can easily be affected by the unstable geopolitical situation in these two regions (Kong, 2005;Ning, 2009). However, a key feature of Chinese strategic thinking on energy security is that there has been increasing discourse about the "collateral damage" on oil imports reliability from adversary powers" actions in the regions, mainly U.S. and its allies. ...
... Given China"s increasing dependence upon foreign oil, high oil prices are particularly perceived as inimical to its economy since they will increase outflow of its foreign exchange reserves and affect its balance of payment (Zhang, et al., 2002). More importantly, the government is extremely concerned that high oil prices will slow down China"s GDP growth, which underpins its stability and the survival of the political regime (Downs, 2004;Kong, 2005). ...
