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Evolution of the burning-embers diagram. Left IPCC TAR version (Smith et al. 2001). Right PNAS version (Smith et al. 2009)
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... 2009) summarizes two major conclusions from the bulk of more recent impacts studies, namely (1) that the risks tend to slip down the GMT scale quickly with the advancement of the pertinent science, and (2) that fairly disastrous effects are likely to kick in already below the 2 • C-line, especially in the marine biosphere (see the comparison in Fig. ...
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... In the following section, we look at the potential final outcomes of the development of the climate-related science-policy system, extending the ideas of Schellnhuber [68]. Bellman's "curse of dimensionality" can be avoided, if we concentrate, in a binary way, on the most essential factors only, ignoring all those aspects that are not absolutely crucial for the problem at hand. ...
... Let us have a closer look at the four considered outcomes, labeled as proposed by Schellnhuber [68], illustrated in Figure 3, and briefly outlined in the sequel. In particular, we examine whether the situation has changed during the last 12 years or whether the considerations by Schellnhuber [68] still hold today. ...
... Let us have a closer look at the four considered outcomes, labeled as proposed by Schellnhuber [68], illustrated in Figure 3, and briefly outlined in the sequel. In particular, we examine whether the situation has changed during the last 12 years or whether the considerations by Schellnhuber [68] still hold today. The main message of science is the projection of significant global warming in response to human interference with the atmosphere and the anticipation of large adverse impacts of that climatic change. ...
The ongoing debate on global climate change has polarized societies since ever. The attitude of an individual towards its anthropogenic nature as well as the need and extent to which human beings should mitigate climate warming can result from a number of factors. Also, since the consequences of such alteration in global climate have no borders and became much more severe in the last decades, it is worth it to shed some more light on a current state of an interplay between scientific findings and climate policies. In this paper, we examine a low-dimensional space of possible attitudes toward climate change, its impact, attribution, and mitigation. Insights into those attitudes and evidence-based interpretations are offered. We review a range of inconvenient truths and convenient untruths, respectively, related to fundamental climate-change issues and derive a systematic taxonomy of climate-change skepticism. In addition, the media track related to climate change is reconstructed by examining a range of cover stories of important magazines and the development of those stories with global warming. In a second major step, we span a low-dimensional space of outcomes of the combined climate science-policy system, where each of the subsystems may either succeed or fail. We conclude that the most probable outcome from today's perspective is still the same as it was 12 years ago: a tragic triumph, i.e., the success of climate science and the simultaneous failure of climate policy.
... For v max , we note that the current velocity of climate change (Loarie et al., 2009) already exceeds most historical migration speeds (Davis & Shaw, 2001). We assume that ecosystems can adapt to at most v max = 0.2°C/decade (Schellnhuber, 2010). ...
Individual organisms on land and in the ocean sequester massive amounts of the carbon emitted into the atmosphere by humans. Yet the role of ecosystems as a whole in modulating this uptake of carbon is less clear. Here, we study several different mechanisms by which climate change and ecosystems could interact. We show that climate change could cause changes in ecosystems that reduce their capacity to take up carbon, further accelerating climate change. More research on – and better governance of – interactions between climate change and ecosystems is urgently required.
... First, there was the publication of a report by the German Advisory Council (WBGU 2009) which provided a better scientific foundation for the target. This study proposed a new budget approach-based on the calculated budget of carbon dioxide emissions still available worldwide-for countries' commitments to global/national decarbonisation trajectories necessary to hold the 2°C line (Schellnhuber 2010). ...
Targets are widely employed in environmental governance. In this paper, we investigate the construction of the 2 °C climate target, one of the best known targets in global environmental governance. Our paper examines this target through a historical reconstruction that identifies four different phases: framing, consolidation and diffusion, adoption, and disembeddedness. Our analysis shows that, initially, the target was science-driven and predominantly EU-based; it then became progressively accepted at the international level, despite a lack of broader debate among governments on the policy implications and required measures for implementation. Once the 2 °C target was endorsed at the level of the United Nations, the nature of the target changed from being policy-prescriptive to being largely symbolic. In this phase, the target became a disembedded object in global governance not linked to a shared agenda nor to coordinated and mutually binding mitigation efforts. The 2015 Paris Agreement marks the last stage in this development and may have further solidified the target as a disembedded object. In the final part of the paper, we suggest ways to overcome the current situation and to develop the 2 °C target into a fully fledged global environmental governance target.
... The climate scientist, Hans Schellnhuber, has warned that the difference between two degrees and four degrees of warming may be civilisation itself. We are playing, he warns, 'Earth roulette' (Schellnhuber, 2010). Several chapters contemplate civilisation decline and how we might transform it so that humanity continues to prosper (Chapters 30 and 37, this volume). ...
... Warming in these regions threaten to push vital ecosystems beyond estimated climate thresholds or tipping points even earlier than the essential international 2°C guardrail is reached [25]. The maximum threat of short term local warming may be the hazard that it can prompt high quality feedbacks triggering big scale warming effects [26]. Discovered proof suggests that cutting edge melting of Arctic snow and sea ice is accelerating warming, as darker sea water and floor discovered by using receding sea ice and snow take in extra heat than the reflective ice and snow that once included it [27]. ...
The historic information indicates us that abrupt climate alternate isn't always simplest feasible it's miles the regular scenario. The prevailing heat, unwavering climate is a rare anomaly. It behooves us to learn as greatly as we are able to about the weather system so that we may be able to be expecting whilst the next abrupt shift in climate will come. Till we understand better when this might occur, it might be wise to stop pouring a lot carbon dioxide into the air. A nasty wonder might be lurking simply across the nook. On the other hand "the weather structure is an indignant beast, and we are poking it."
Annual greenhouse gases emissions in 2010 had been at their highest recorded degree regardless of an international recession. The danger is growing that the weather gadget could skip tipping points that cause abrupt and irreversible affects on a continental scale, possibly inside a long time. Successfully dealing with climate change requires speedy and competitive movement to lessen CO2 emissions, which are answerable for as much as 55% of radiative forcing due to the fact that 1750. It additionally requires fast and aggressive action to lessen emissions of the pollutants inflicting the alternative 45% of warming the non-CO2 climate forces, which includes hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), black carbon, methane, and tropospheric ozone. Alongside decreasing CO2, decreasing emissions of those non-CO2 weather forcers, which in maximum cases can be carried out the usage of existing technologies and existing legal guidelines and establishments, can reduce the rate of world warming in 1/2 for several many years and by using -thirds within the Arctic within the subsequent 30 years. Further, given the profoundly continual nature of CO2, it is important to discover and implement negative carbon methods to bring down present CO2 on a timescale of many years rather than millennia, and ultimately produce a net drawdown of CO2 whilst sinks exceed assets.
... In fact the so-called "2 • target" (which should rather be called "2 • limit" [7]) implies that the rise of GMT should be limited to 2 • C as against pre-industrial values. It was supported by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), then by the EU and finally on the global level by the Conference of the Parties [8]. ...
Climate economics has developed two main tools to derive an economically adequate response to the climate problem. Cost benefit analysis weighs in any available information on mitigation costs and benefits and thereby derives an “optimal” global mean temperature. Quite the contrary, cost effectiveness analysis allows deriving costs of potential policy targets and the corresponding cost- minimizing investment paths. The article highlights pros and cons of both approaches and then focusses on the implications of a policy that strives at limiting global warming to 2 °C compared to pre-industrial values. The related mitigation costs and changes in the energy sector are summarized according to the IPCC report of 2014. The article then points to conceptual difficulties when internalizing uncertainty in these types of analyses and suggests pragmatic solutions. Key statements on mitigation economics remain valid under uncertainty when being given the adequate interpretation. Furthermore, the expected economic value of perfect climate information is found to be on the order of hundreds of billions of Euro per year if a 2°-policy were requested. Finally, the prospects of climate policy are sketched.
... While CRA could be calibrated against any such target, here we would like to demonstrate CRA for a specific normative setting of particular relevance in the context of international climate negotiations. The target of constraining global mean temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial conditions has been discussed prominently in the climate policy debate (Schellnhuber 2010). However, a compliance level has been specified less clearly. ...
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) determines climate policies that reach a given climate target at minimum welfare losses. However, when applied to temperature targets under climate sensitivity uncertainty, decision-makers might be confronted with normatively unappealing negative expected values of future climate information or even infeasible solutions. To tackle these issues, Cost-Risk Analysis (CRA), that trades-off the costs for mitigating climate change against the risk of exceeding climate targets, has been proposed as an extension of CEA under uncertainty. Here we build on this proposition and develop an axiomatically sound CRA for the context of uncertainty and future learning. The main contributions of this paper are: (i) we show, that a risk-penalty function has to be non-concave to avoid counter-intuitive preferences, (ii) we introduce a universally applicable calibration of the cost-risk trade-off, and (iii) we implement the first application of CRA to a numerical integrated assessment model. We find that for a 2A degrees-target in combination with a 66 % compliance level, the expected value of information in 2015 vs. 2075 is between 0.15 % and 0.66 % of consumption every year, and can reduce expected mitigation costs by about one third. (iv) Finally, we find that the relative importance of the economic over the risk-related contribution increases with the target probability of compliance.
... The project also had a strong stakeholder collaborative component, which enabled stakeholders to provide feedback on the research throughout its duration. By being stakeholder focused, the human settlements component of SEQCARI aimed to bridge the science-policy interface, which has been identified as being critical to directly informing decision-making processes for climate change adaptation (Mastrandrea et al. 2010;Rosenzweig and Willbanks 2010;Schellnhuber 2010). ...
Climate change impacts affecting coastal areas, such as sea-level rise and storm surge events, are expected to have significant social, economic and environmental consequences worldwide. Ongoing population growth and development in highly urbanised coastal areas will exacerbate the predicted impacts on coastal settlements. Improving the adaptation potential of highly vulnerable coastal communities will require greater levels of planning and policy integration across sectors and scales. However, to date, there is little evidence in the literature which demonstrates how climate policy integration is being achieved. This paper contributes to this gap in knowledge by drawing on the example provided by the process of developing cross-sectoral climate change adaptation policies and programmes generated for three coastal settlement types as part of the South East Queensland Climate Adaptation Research Initiative (SEQCARI), a 3-year multi-sectoral study of climate change adaptation options for human settlements in South East Queensland, Australia. In doing so, we first investigate the benefits and challenges to cross-sectoral adaptation to address climate change broadly and in coastal areas. We then describe how cross-sectoral adaptation policies and programmes were generated and appraised involving the sectors of urban planning and management, coastal management, emergency management, human health and physical infrastructure as part of SEQCARI. The paper concludes by discussing key considerations that can inform the development and assessment of cross-sectoral climate change adaptation policies and programmes in highly urbanised coastal areas.
... The second rise, after 2010, has probably resulted more from extreme weather events than from high energy prices, or from biofuels (raw data, FAO). be as high as 1-2 metres compared to 2000, if the twodegree global warming guardrail is crossed [22,23]. ...
Concern intensifying that emerging infectious diseases and global environmental changes that could generate major future human pandemics.
A focused literature review was undertaken, partly informed by a forthcoming report on environment, agriculture and infectious diseases of poverty, facilitated by the Special Programme for Tropical Diseases.
More than ten categories of infectious disease emergence exist, but none formally analyse past, current or future burden of disease. Other evidence suggests that the dominant public health concern focuses on two informal groupings. Most important is the perceived threat of newly recognised infections, especially viruses that arise or are newly discovered in developing countries that originate in species exotic to developed countries, such as non-human primates, bats and rodents. These pathogens may be transmitted by insects or bats, or via direct human contact with bushmeat. The second group is new strains of influenza arising from intensively farmed chickens or pigs, or emerging from Asian "wet markets" where several bird species have close contact. Both forms appear justified because of two great pandemics: HIV/AIDS (which appears to have originated from bushmeat hunting in Africa before emerging globally) and Spanish influenza, which killed up to 2.5% of the human population around the end of World War I. Insufficiently appreciated is the contribution of the milieu which appeared to facilitate the high disease burden in these pandemics. Additionally, excess anxiety over emerging infectious diseases diverts attention from issues of greater public health importance, especially: (i) existing (including neglected) infectious diseases and (ii) the changing milieu that is eroding the determinants of immunity and public health, caused by adverse global environmental changes, including climate change and other components of stressed life and civilisation-supporting systems.
The focus on novel pathogens and minor forms of anti-microbial resistance in emerging disease literature is unjustified by their burden of disease, actual and potential, and diverts attention from far more important health problems and determinants. There is insufficient understanding of systemic factors that promote pandemics. Adverse global change could generate circumstances conducive to future pandemics with a high burden of disease, arising via anti-microbial and insecticidal resistance, under-nutrition, conflict, and public health breakdown.
... The Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009), reached at the UN climate conference in December 2009, has been widely portrayed as a disappointment because of the lack of progress toward a binding global climate treaty-in the words of Schellnhuber (2010), a 'reality shock' not just a reality check. However, the large majority of countries have formally acceded to the Accord, and many, including all of the world's largest greenhouse gas emitting nations, have submitted quantified economy-wide emissions targets for the year 2020 (UNFCCC 2010). ...
Following the Copenhagen climate Accord, developed and developing countries have pledged to cut their greenhouse gas emissions, emissions intensity or emissions relative to baseline. This analysis puts the targets for the major countries on a common footing, and compares them across different metrics. Targeted changes in absolute emissions differ markedly between countries, with continued strong increases in some developing countries but significant decreases in others including Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa, provided reasonable baseline projections are used. Differences are smaller when emissions are expressed in per capita terms. Reductions in emissions intensity of economies implicit in the targets are remarkably similar across developed and developing countries, with China's emissions intensity target spanning almost the same range as the implicit intensity reductions in the United States, EU, Japan, Australia and Canada. Targeted deviations from business-as-usual are also remarkably similar across countries, and the majority of total global reductions relative to baselines may originate from China and other developing countries. The findings suggest that targets for most major countries are broadly compatible in important metrics, and that while the overall global ambition falls short of a two degree trajectory, the targets by key developing countries including China can be considered commensurate in the context of what developed countries have pledged.
