Fig 1 - uploaded by Eric J. Connolly
Content may be subject to copyright.
Source publication
Political ideology represents an imperfect yet important indicator of a host of personality traits and cognitive preferences. These preferences, in turn, seemingly propel liberals and conservatives towards divergent life-course experiences. Criminal behavior represents one particular domain of conduct where differences rooted in political ideology...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... mean differences in criminal behavior across the political ideology spectrum were detected within and across waves. At Wave 3, F = 14.78 (p b 0.001) and at Wave 4, F = 8.60 (p b 0.001). Results of the ANOVA are presented graphically in Fig. 1. To aid in interpretation, we converted the measures of criminal behavior to Z-scores. As is read- ily visible, individuals who classified themselves as very conservative had the lowest level of self-reported offending across both waves. Aver- age offending scores increased across consecutive ideological classifica- tions. In each ...
Citations
... Despite this, there is strong reason to expect politically conservative regions of the United States to be less open to the use of crowdfunding than are less conservative areas. Conservatism is associated with higher levels of orderliness and politeness (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010), lower levels of corporate fraud (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015) and criminality (Wright, Beaver, Morgan, & Connolly, 2017), and greater performance in business schools (Kemmelmeier, Danielson, & Basten, 2005). ...
Institutional change is typically studied at the organizational field level; we leverage political culture to examine how the context in which these fields are embedded influence processes of institutional change within such fields. Specifically, we look at the effect of conservative political culture on legitimation and adoption of crowdfunding in the United States. We find that crowdfunding is less popular and more slowly legitimated in conservative regions. However, we also find that crowdfunding’s legitimacy is more important in these regions and that once a legitimacy threshold is reached, the adoption of crowdfunding in conservative regions surpasses that in liberal regions.
... Nowadays, with the rapid development of mobile devices, a huge amount of effort has been devoted to dealing with various tasks in computer vision and machine learning tasks, such as activity recognition [34,41], motion tracking [6,61,64], behavior prediction [35,36,47], and political ideology prediction [2,44,45,62]. Among them, classification based on image sets, as a promising technique, has received significant attention and has been increasingly applied for many practical applications, such as video surveillance [58], action recognition [50], and face recognition [12,19]. ...
Classification based on image sets has recently attracted great interest in computer vision community. In this paper, we proposed a transductive Tensor-driven Low-rank Discriminant Analysis (TLRDA) model for image set classification, in which the tensor-driven low-rank approximation and the discriminant graph embedding are integrated to improve the representativeness of image sets. In addition, we develop an iterative shrinkage thresholding algorithm to better optimize the objective function of the proposed TLRDA. Experiments on seven publicly available datasets demonstrate that our proposed method is guaranteed to converge within a small number of iterations during the training procedure and obtains promising results compared with state-of-the-art methods.
... Although this was not representative of the federal election results on the whole, it is nonetheless consistent with how younger people tend to be more liberal. Given that political ideology would certainly be correlated with other factors, we controlled for age, gender, household income level, religion, and race (Wright, Beaver, Morgan, & Connolly, 2017). ...
... In this research, we obtain evidence firstly, that, a conservative ideology lowers intentions to donate one's organs, and second, that perceived threats to bodily integrity, ick factors, and jinx factors explain this relationship. The evidence is converging from two ways of looking at the data-by comparing individuals who voted for a liberal or conservative party in a recent election, and using their self-reported ideology, consistent with prior research (Wright et al., 2017). Thus, the data strongly support our hypotheses. ...
The low supply of organs is a global concern. It is crucial to recognize the barriers, whether cognitive or emotional, that influence individuals' willingness to sign up onto organ donation registries. In the current investigation, we hypothesize that a politically-conservative ideology reduces people's organ donation intentions. This is likely since individuals with a conservative ideology care more about the integrity of the human body, are more disgusted by the very act of organ donations, and believe that signing onto such registries would be tempting fate. We test and confirm this possibility in a study with 148 Australians. The findings indicate that political ideology can be a predictor of individuals' likelihood of becoming organ donors.
We critique Steven Pinker’s acclaimed book Enlightenment Now (2018) at length. In his defense of an optimistic view of modernity, Pinker fails to mention a variety of negative trends, such as those indicating declines in important dimensions of human intelligence.
We continue the historical theme of Chap. 3. We note that despite the profound enhancement of (components of) human well-being that modernization has produced, there are serious problems associated with the modern condition, which may be quantitatively (but likely not qualitatively) unique in the broader context of human history. Salient among these problems are nihilism and psychopathology, which seem to share phenomenology at the individual level and to be statistically associated at the group level.
We build on the finding of accumulating deleterious mutations with the SEAM (the social epistasis amplification model), which posits that the fitness costs of deleterious mutations are not limited to the organisms that carry them. This is possible in light of the existence of interorganismal genomic interactions, that is, social epistasis, whereby the genome of an organism (or the genomes of organisms) can influence another organism’s (or other organisms’) gene expression and therefore phenotypic traits.
This study examines the correlation between economic freedom and sexual freedom in the twenty-two OECD nations included in the 2020 Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady and Stephens, 2020). Our research builds on prior work by Unwin (1934, 1935, 1940) and Bose (2013), who suggest that economic freedom and sexual freedom are negatively related. We develop an economic and sexual freedom score from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2020) and take the difference between the two and track the difference since primarily the end of World War II. Our hypothesis is that right parties will emphasize more economic freedom in their party platforms than sexual freedom, whereas left parties will have more to say about sexual freedom in their party platforms than economic freedom. The difference is because the parties are attracting different types of voters based on their time preferences.
