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There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coope-tition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing rule, that we call inverse proportional. This rule emb...
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Context 1
... we do this analysis for the egalitarian treatment and then for the inverse proportional treatment. Similarly to the regression in Table 3 prosociality proxied by social value orientation does not correlate with effort in the egalitarian treatment. Risk attitudes have the same effect as in the regression in Table 3. ...Context 2
... to the regression in Table 3 prosociality proxied by social value orientation does not correlate with effort in the egalitarian treatment. Risk attitudes have the same effect as in the regression in Table 3. Interestingly, the effect of cooperativeness as captured by contribution in the public goods game is considerably lower in the egalitarian treatment than in Table 3. Competitiveness exhibits a consistent negative effect that is marginally significant in one specification, indicating that competitive individuals tend to make less effort in the egalitarian treatment. ...Context 3
... attitudes have the same effect as in the regression in Table 3. Interestingly, the effect of cooperativeness as captured by contribution in the public goods game is considerably lower in the egalitarian treatment than in Table 3. Competitiveness exhibits a consistent negative effect that is marginally significant in one specification, indicating that competitive individuals tend to make less effort in the egalitarian treatment. ...Context 4
... the effect of cooperativeness as captured by contribution in the public goods game is considerably lower in the egalitarian treatment than in Table 3. Competitiveness exhibits a consistent negative effect that is marginally significant in one specification, indicating that competitive individuals tend to make less effort in the egalitarian treatment. The effect of period, group's total effort, rival group's total effort is very similar to what we have seen in Table 3. ...Similar publications
We study experimentally cooperation in group contests under a new sharing rule that captures elements of coopetitive setups that are often characterized by the tension between cooperation and competition. It introduces an allocation of the obtained prize which is inversely proportional to individual efforts. We use it to study if the pervasive over...
