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Distribution of Type of Sponsors by Alliance
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Purpose
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Methods
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Citations
... Group strength may have both first-order and second-order effects, e.g., stronger groups form more conflict ties, and they are especially attractive opponents for equally matched or weaker groups. Existing studies find support for the proposition that geographical location, territorial control and foreign sponsorship affect absolute and relative power of groups during war (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 2009;de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2015;Popovic, 2018). ...
p>Existing scholarship ignores relational interdependencies when attempting to understand the behaviour of non-state armed groups during civil war. This paper investigates the in- terconnected web of alliances and rivalries in the Yemen Civil War to answer the following question: why do armed groups fight each other? We employ a network approach to investigate determinants of intergroup violence. This emphasises the role of identity, arguing that operating in salient cleavages necessitates that groups align or distinguish themselves from each other. We further argue that informal cooperation incentivises violence the longer the war continues. These arguments are tested using pooled Exponential Random Graph Models to account for endogenous structures over time. Results indicate that shared identity is a significant driver of hostilities, moderating cooperation and amplifying the effects of group attributes. Robustness checks and simulations demonstrate that network models more accurately capture the underlying mechanisms to predict fighting in this case.</p
... Group strength may have both first-order and second-order effects, e.g., stronger groups form more conflict ties, and they are especially attractive opponents for equally matched or weaker groups. Existing studies find support for the proposition that geographical location, territorial control and foreign sponsorship affect absolute and relative power of groups during war (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 2009;de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2015;Popovic, 2018). ...
p>Existing scholarship ignores relational interdependencies when attempting to understand the behaviour of non-state armed groups during civil war. This paper investigates the in- terconnected web of alliances and rivalries in the Yemen Civil War to answer the following question: why do armed groups fight each other? We employ a network approach to investigate determinants of intergroup violence. This emphasises the role of identity, arguing that operating in salient cleavages necessitates that groups align or distinguish themselves from each other. We further argue that informal cooperation incentivises violence the longer the war continues. These arguments are tested using pooled Exponential Random Graph Models to account for endogenous structures over time. Results indicate that shared identity is a significant driver of hostilities, moderating cooperation and amplifying the effects of group attributes. Robustness checks and simulations demonstrate that network models more accurately capture the underlying mechanisms to predict fighting in this case.</p
The literature on delegated rebellion has treated principals (external states) and their agents (rebel groups) as the main factors in the inception of rebellion. Intriguingly, no attention has been paid to subnational elites as a separate, third actor. This article takes a novel perspective on delegated rebellion by ascribing agency to subnational elites. It introduces the theoretical concept of strategic entrapment, which shows that even subnational elites unwilling to follow the path of rebel violence may be trapped between the incipient rebel groups and a principal. As a result, subnational elites are sidelined and replaced by the principal’s rebel proxies.
Cooperation among militant organizations contributes to capability but also presents security risks. This is particularly the case when organizations face substantial repression from the state. As a consequence, for cooperation to emerge and persist when it is most valuable, militant groups must have means of committing to cooperation even when the incentives to defect are high. We posit that shared ideology plays this role by providing community monitoring, authority structures, trust, and transnational networks. We test this theory using new, expansive, time-series data on relationships between militant organizations from 1950 to 2016, which we introduce here. We find that when groups share an ideology, and especially a religion, they are more likely to sustain material cooperation in the face of state repression. These findings contextualize and expand upon research demonstrating that connections between violent nonstate actors strongly shape their tactical and strategic behavior.