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Data will flow across borders unless governments enact restrictions. While some countries allow data to flow easily around the world—recognizing that legal protections can accompany the data—many more have enacted new barriers to data transfers that make it more expensive and time-consuming, if not illegal, to transfer data overseas. The spread of...
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... that measurements within the OECD's PMR Indicators database are recorded on a scale of 0-6 (0 being most open for trade, and 6 being most restrictive to trade flows), DRI is also computed on the same scale, wherein a higher measurement of DRI indicates greater restrictions on data flows within a country. Figures 1 and 2 and three show the rankings of most datarestrictive countries based on DRI scores for years 2013 and 2018. ...
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... In 2018, following the realisation that domestic South African banks intended to move more of their transactions to global payment service networks, the South African Reserve Bank suspended the migration of all domestic transaction volumes from Bankserv (South Africa's bank-owned domestic payment switch) to international payment schemes (Cory & Dascoli, 2021). The suspension was to remain in place until a new policy was developed and enacted. ...
This chapter seeks to address the concerns associated with data regulation on the African continent. In particular, the paper zooms in on three major aspects of data regulation that hold the reigns to the potential development of the continent. These are the free flow of data, the adoption of open data regimes and cybersecurity. This will be in the general context of Africa, with a focus on regulatory instruments from the different bodies at continental and sub-regional level as well as some national legislation from countries that have developed any legislative instruments that address the same concerns. Emphasis will also be paid to the strides that have been taken by the European Union, the first continental body that has taken a geographically concerted approach to comprehensive data regulation. The aim is to draw lessons from such efforts with the intention of determining an appropriate African centred approach to data regulation, particularly in the context of increased inter-African trade as envisaged by the Agreement on the African Free Continental Trade Area and an enhanced digital economy as motivated for in the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030).
... In 2018, following the realisation that domestic South African banks intended to move more of their transactions to global payment service networks, the South African Reserve Bank suspended the migration of all domestic transaction volumes from Bankserv (South Africa's bank-owned domestic payment switch) to international payment schemes (Cory & Dascoli, 2021). The suspension was to remain in place until a new policy was developed and enacted. ...
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the value chain approach to data production in Africa and how it can be improved to enable sound policymaking in the continent. The research also explored ways of increasing uptake of official statistics for informing decision-making in policy formulation as well as other aspects like social environmental issues. The need for this research stems from the fact that Africa has in general lagged other continents in developmental matters and by extension improvement of living standards for its people. The research reviewed existing literature and identified and examined gaps and challenges regarding production and use of official statistics in Africa. Data governance gaps and weaknesses in Africa were also examined. The research also conducted three case studies covering Australian Bureau of Statistics, National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, and Statistics South Africa where their practices regarding data production, use, and governance were reviewed. Value chain analysis was conducted based on the gaps, challenges, and case studies, and recommendations were made regarding data production, use, and governance in Africa. The research has made recommendations that need to be implemented by African countries in pursuit of sound policymaking for better economies of their citizens.
... These measures are prevalent in data protection laws in the sense that the conditions on data transfers can potentially create barriers to cross border data transfers to such an extent that they are effectively data localisation requirements. The GDPR is a good example of a law with de facto data localisation measures (Cory and Dascoli 2021) and compliance with the conditions may be very costly to the extent that some entities are forced to store data locally by default (Kugler 2021). ...
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... The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) noted that the number of countries enacting data localization requirements has nearly doubled from 35 in 2017 to 62 in 2021. 38 New obligations to keep user data in local computing facilities have recently gone into force in China, India, Turkey and Vietnam. More data localization proposals are in the legislative pipeline in numerous countries, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and South Africa. ...
Digital transformation of the global economy is bringing markets and people closer. Few conveniences of modern life – from international travel to online shopping to cross-border payments – would exist without the free flow of data.
Yet, impediments to free-flowing data are growing. The “Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT)” concept is based on the idea that responsible data concerns, such as privacy and security, can be addressed without obstructing international data transfers. Policy-makers, trade negotiators and regulators are actively working on this, and while important progress has been made, an effective and trusted international cooperation mechanism would amplify their progress.
This white paper makes the case for establishing such a mechanism with a permanent secretariat, starting with the Group of Seven (G7) member-countries, and ensuring participation of high-level representatives of multiple stakeholder groups, including the private sector, academia and civil society.
This new institution would go beyond short-term fixes and catalyse long-term thinking to operationalize DFFT.
... Regulation of cross-border data flows varies greatly from one country to another. Although cross-border transfers can allow for the use of cloud computing to develop apps by local start-ups as well as the viability of regional data infrastructure, there is a global trend to adopt cross-border data flow restrictions (Cory and Dascoli 2021), and Africa is no exception. Three main approaches to data transfers can be identified: a limited transfer model, a conditional transfer model, and an open transfer model (World Bank 2021e). ...
... Новые технологии, в частности блокчейн, имеют децентрализованную природу, и, соответственно, локализация противоречит их развитию. Локализация не обеспечивает суверенитет в силу трансграничного характера природы интернета [Cory, Dascoli, 2021]. ...
... В общем по итогам трех лет работы над инициативой стало понятно, что легитимировать приоритеты, правила и нормы «семерки» и ОЭСР в «Группе двадцати» не получается. Не сработало и продвигаемое через экспертные центры предложение США об использовании системы правил трансграничной конфиденциальности АТЭС как модели для глобального механизма трансфера данных, альтернативного ограничительному подходу ЕС и протекционистской модели Китая [Cory, Dascoli, 2021]. Но и каких-то новых подходов выработать не удалось. ...
... Правительства «семерки» и ЕК, Корпорация по присвоению доменных имен (ICANN), Общество Интернета, Microsoft, Google, Amazon и др. См., например,IGF [n.d.],[OECD, n.d.b].16 См., например, оценку в отношении Регламента ЕС в[Cory, Dascoli, 2021]. ...
Data is an infinite resource, a new form of capital in the knowledge economy. In absence of data regulation, global technological corporations seek to expand their influence at each link in data chains and use their market power to build monopolies. Data can generate not only profits for tech giants but also social value; however, market forces by themselves will not create data-based public goods. For this, government actions are needed at the county level, and interstate and multilateral institutional cooperation is required at the international level. To date, despite numerous initiatives to establish coordination mechanisms and data regulation, cooperation on data governance is highly fragmented and gridlocked due to contradictions and tough competition between players. One of the key disagreements is related to the regulation of cross-border data flows. The article explores contradictions between the regulatory practices of the central actors in the digital economy, the U.S., the European Union (EU) and China in the first place, and the approaches they promote in international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of G20 (G20), the Group of 7 (G7), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In particular, the authors look at the G20’s agenda on data governance and the initiative on free data flow with trust and consider its challenges and the risks of cooperation stagnation. The conclusion presents possible scenarios for future cooperation on data governance, their risks and perspectives, including the establishment of the Digital Economy and Data Governance Board by the G20, the G7’s initiative on shaping global digital order, deepening of cooperation on data governance within the G7 and the OECD, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) proposal on building a multilevel, distributed polycentric data-governance model with the UN playing a central role. The authors conclude with a proposal on cooperation within BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) aimed at shaping inclusive multilateral data governance.
... Moreover, there is also evidence that impediments to digital trade can be costly for the economy. Nigel Cory and Luke Dascoli (2021) highlight the rise in policy measures in force that impose data localization requirements and restrict data flows. Drawing on OECD product market regulation data and EU KLEMS 16 indicators of sectoral data intensity, they develop a composite indicator for data restrictiveness. ...
Digital trade is transforming the international economy. Initially, expansion was facilitated by light regulation of the digital dimension. However, with its growth over the past two decades, it has come to the attention of regulators. Oversight has increased as regulators seek to respond in an appropriate manner to growing concerns about privacy, consumer protection, cybercrime, administrative transparency and facilitation, and national security matters, among other issues. But, in some cases the result is an international regulatory patchwork of unnecessary complexity, inconsistent approaches, uncertainty, or outright discrimination against foreign suppliers. //
This new paper with CIGI examines the rising level of impediments in some areas, as measured by several composite indicators. Drawing on recent literature, it considers current issues in governance of digital trade, highlighting strengths and weaknesses in regional arrangements, as well as the importance of addressing data and trust issues. Then, based on illustrative cases of five leading digital economies – Canada, the European Union (EU27, membership as of Feb 2020), Japan, Singapore and the United States – the analysis employs a case-study methodology and statistical assessment to review their efforts to promote development of a liberal, rules-based framework for governance of digital trade. These economies have employed a multipronged, collaborative approach at the regional and multilateral levels.//
The paper considers 6 regional trade agreements engaging one or more of the case study economies and addressing relevant aspects of digital trade. There are early signs of positive results, though gaps remain that reduce the effectiveness of the accords. Simultaneously, at the World Trade Organization, the case-study economies have pursued with other members a broad work program and supported negotiations for an international accord on e-commerce. In the face of growth in impediments to digital trade globally (e.g., Evenett and Fritz, GTA/DPA, 28 June 2022), such efforts as those of the case-study countries may be seen as pushing back. The paper concludes with recommendations to advance in the agenda for a liberal, rules-based international framework for improved digital trade governance.//
The paper is available via CIGI:
https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/no.270_EvKNvNN.pdf
... Alongside the growing data exchanges across national borders, increasing data availability, access, and sharing to maximize the economic and social value to companies, consumers, and national economies have been widely recognized (Nguyen and Paczos, 2020;Snelson and Cilauro, 2021). Despite positive data-driven value and trade growth, the regulations that govern cross-border data flows specific to each trading country's jurisdictions are increasing, which could slow down cross-border data flows (Cory and Dascoli, 2021). Regulations are vital to protect producers, consumers, and the data sovereignty of nation states Herian, 2020;Mann et al., 2020;Thumfart, 2022); the slower pace of regulatory reform work could consequently impair the value growth potential of data and act as a brake on future data-dependent trade growth (Cory, 2017). ...
... Data localization measures that restrict the flow of data from one country/jurisdiction to another are also increasingly on the rise in the past 4 years. According to Cory and Dascoli (2021), 144 data localization barriers have been implemented by 62 countries in 2022 compared with 67 such barriers by 35 countries in 2017. These policies and measures are generally designed for data integrity, cybersecurity, and online consumer protections. ...
The adoption of digital technologies has transformed the way of international trade and cross-border data flow has become an important enabler for trade growth across countries. Meanwhile, regulations that govern cross-border data flows for the sake of protecting producers, consumers and the data sovereignty of nation-states are increasing at both national and trans-national levels, which could put a brake on data flows across national borders. Insofar as data regulations are concerned in an increasingly regulatory landscape in the trans-national trade context, this chapter examines how regulatory and technical responses – blockchain-related technologies – can ensure compliance with cross-border rules and regulations for data flows. One of the most recent and profound initiatives – the blockchain-based service network (BSN) – that is seeking to address challenges given rise to by new regulatory systems of governance and establish a jurisdictionally compliant digital environment for streamlined cross-border trade were investigated. Built on the reflection on the limitations of the BSN approach associated with its architectural design for cross-border trade in accordance with national/trans-national regulatory requirements, this chapter proposes a BSN-based ‘hub-to-hub’ cross-border trade framework that incorporates Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) into multi-party governance mechanisms to enable international trade in the face of increasingly regulatory barriers to cross-border data flow.
... Moreover, although current privacypreserving policies that fail to consider harm when data is not shared may be well-intentioned, they ultimately result in hurting marginalized populations [69]. Indeed, increased regulations on publicly available datasets will likely raise the barrier to entry for developing countries, further excluding their populations from datasets, and increasing biases that favor high-income countries [69,76]. ...
Artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced explosive growth in oncology and related specialties in recent years. The improved expertise in data capture, the increased capacity for data aggregation and analytic power, along with decreasing costs of genome sequencing and related biologic "omics", set the foundation and need for novel tools that can meaningfully process these data from multiple sources and of varying types. These advances provide value across biomedical discovery, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, and prevention, in a multimodal fashion. However, while big data and AI tools have already revolutionized many fields, medicine has partially lagged due to its complexity and multi-dimensionality, leading to technical challenges in developing and validating solutions that generalize to diverse populations. Indeed, inner biases and miseducation of algorithms, in view of their implementation in daily clinical practice, are increasingly relevant concerns; critically, it is possible for AI to mirror the unconscious biases of the humans who generated these algorithms. Therefore, to avoid worsening existing health disparities, it is critical to employ a thoughtful, transparent, and inclusive approach that involves addressing bias in algorithm design and implementation along the cancer care continuum. In this review, a broad landscape of major applications of AI in cancer care is provided, with a focus on cancer research and precision medicine. Major challenges posed by the implementation of AI in the clinical setting will be discussed. Potentially feasible solutions for mitigating bias are provided, in the light of promoting cancer health equity.
... Whereas thirty-five countries had sixty-seven localization requirements in 2017, the authors found that there were sixty-two countries with 144 data localization restrictions in 2021. 180 The report found that India has the second-highest number of such restrictions (behind China), including in areas like financial services, the provision of cloud services to government agencies, telecom subscriber data, company accounts, and public data. 181 In addition to the measures already in force, a number of localization proposals are in the pipeline, most notably under India's proposed data protection law, though this draft has been withdrawn for now. ...
Data localization initiatives are known to interfere with the free flow of information. They can be motivated anywhere by security, sovereignty, privacy, taxation, or competition concerns. But in Korea, the most pronounced data localization initiatives have arisen, first, from a desire to promote fair competition between domestic Korean firms and foreign companies and, second, from the need to investigate cross- border cyber crimes.
But the Budapest Convention and a new approach to fair competition would provide a better way forward. In assessing the likelihood that Korea will accede to the Budapest Convention to assuage the need for cross-border investigations, it seems clear that the country’s domestic investigatory regime could easily be updated and harmonized as required for accession to the convention. Of course, the public’s concerns about privacy may generate some friction if Korea were to do so. But in the final analysis, given the Korean public’s desire to migrate to foreign communication platforms whenever the privacy-infringing nature of domestic surveillance has been highlighted in the media, data localization of foreign services will likely be resisted more strongly by the Korean public than accession to the convention.
Meanwhile, even as Korea’s decision on the Budapest Convention remains in limbo, Korean politicians desire for data localization is growing in another respect. They argue that foreign companies can compete and beat domestic companies because only the latter are subject to Korea’s intricate internet regulations.
WTO trade rules allow exceptions for public interest purposes and therefore may be neutral to data localization initiatives. However, the WTO rules do not seem to allow data localization initiatives, including ones in Korea, that are motivated not by the public interest but by a desire to enhance the application of local laws to foreign companies. Because local laws can always be applied to foreign services
(as in the case of blocking the noncomplying websites), the public interest can be preserved, so the requirement that foreign firms establish and maintain a local presence is an unnecessary restriction on the cross-border provision of services.
Unfortunately, as long as perceptions of regulatory “reverse-discrimination” against domestic Korean companies remain, the calls in Korea for data localization will not subside. Ultimately, there is no readily available, instrument-based argument against Korea’s widespread and deepening aspiration for data localization. Neither WTO trade rules nor the Budapest Convention will answer either local law enforcement’s needs or local internet companies’ calls for fair competition over the long term.
To push back on the fair competition argument, a solution cannot simply rely on legal principles but would need to dismantle Korea’s parochial internet regulations, which provide a never-ending stream of arguments used by supporters of data localization in the name of fair competition. To do so, skeptics of data localization need to leverage concerns about human rights.
In addition, the resistance in Seoul to the Budapest Convention will weaken if Koreans realize that domestic surveillance is not any more intrusive than what is allowed in most other democracies. At that point, the convention would provide a more sustainable, instrument-based counterweight to calls in Korea for data localization. Enhanced cross-border data access under the convention would not necessarily abolish a safe haven for secret communications, while data localization would definitely do so. In this case, too, arguments and practices based on human rights could play an important role in shifting public attitudes and exerting pressure on the country’s political and regulatory class.
Many data localization rules are motivated by a desire for sovereign control. They originate from an idea that data is safer, more secure, or more useful, either from a control-hungry sovereign’s perspective or from that of privacy-hungry subjects, when it is located in a certain jurisdiction rather than another.
However, data reflects a sentient being’s perceptions of the world. The transferring of data is arguably akin to speech, and data collection is a form of knowledge. Most norms on free expression distinguish speech from physical activities and also distinguish data from physical objects. Cross-border transfers or collection of data is essentially cross-border speech or knowledge. These principles on free speech (and access to knowledge) should create exceptions to the sovereign’s Westphalian control within its territory and provide ample reasons for why data localization is not a sustainable governance tool and why human rights should figure prominently in the discourse on data localization.
Even data localization for economic purposes at least in the case of Korea originates from parochial internet regulations that put domestic companies at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign firms, and many of these regulations depart from international standards of human rights. Instead of restricting remote modes of supply and thereby causing friction with international economic law and treaties, Korea would be better off finding a much more efficient way to balance these competing interests while upholding its commitments to international norms and human rights standards.
