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Constructivist biosemiotics foundations. a, bPunch’s cartoon that show succinctly the cognitivist third-person hypothesis and the alternative one. a In the cognitivist third-person hypothesis, to catch his prey, for the observer, the kingfisher must represent in its brain the Snell’s refraction law by information processing. b The constructivist lecture show how the significance levels can be seen arising from the underlying structural network of the kingfisher and the model of the observer. c René Magritte’s painting (1928–29) pointing out the levels of realms in cognitive relations. A painted pipe is just an approximate map of a real pipe. d M.C. Escher’s Print Gallery lithograph showing how a young man is standing inside the same print as the one he is looking at. A constructivist interpretation in first-person indicates that what is observed is an active and enactive relation of the observer, depicting the complex closed loop of embodiment relations. e Rosen’s Modeling Relation shows that the observation of natural systems, governed by causal relations, is a cognitive act reflected in the relations of measurement and prediction subject to mathematical systems of inferential rules. If the mathematical system corresponds to the causal relations, then it can be assumed as a ‘Natural Law’. f Maturana draws how nervous system, though organizationally closed, use language to loop-through the other. g Minimization of free energy by active inference and prediction error indicates one possible formal representation of cognition and autopoiesis
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Constructivist biosemiotics foundations (CBF) imply the first-person basis of cognition. CBF are developed by the biology of cognition, relational biology, enactive approach, ecology of mind, second order cybernetics, genetic epistemology, gestalt, ecological perception and affordances, and active inference by minimization of free energy. CBF rejec...
Citations
... To understand life, science requires an intellectual "toolkit" that goes beyond the 1 It is important to highlight different interpretations of cognition in the context of life sciences. A critical assessment of biological theories of cognition has been presented by Rubin (2017), including terminological differences between them. For example, the term "biology of cognition" is usually associated with the pioneering work of Humberto Maturana and his collaboration with Francisco Varela Varela, 1980, 1987), from which other collaborations (Mpodozis, 2022) and interpretations (Capra, 2022) developed. ...
... The autopoiesis concept is explicit in understanding cognition: "… to live is to know" (Maturana and Varela 1987, 174). Cognition is understood not as a representation of the independently existing world, but as the process of continually "bringing forth a world" (Maturana and Varela, 1987, 26) through the structural coupling of organisms and their environments (Rubin, 2017;Capra, 2022;Mpodozis, 2022). This structural coupling is best understood as a process of organismal structural changes in response to environmental influences. ...
... The most recent development that unifies scientific principles behind CB is the elaboration of the free energy principle, Markov blankets and active inference. These features are unique to living systems, from cells to the biosphere (Friston et al., 2006;Rubin, 2017;Rubin et al., 2020). The free energy principle, in the context of the organism (system 1)environment (system 2) interactions, is a statistical measure (probability) of the environmental quantities that act on the organism and distribution of these quantities encoded by the organism's internal structure (Friston et al., 2006). ...
... Structural coupling refers to the preservation of the structural correspondence between the organism and niche (environment). Such correspondence, however, does not an objective independent reality to be represented (cognitivism) by information processing (computationalism) 11 in order to be the fittest (adaptationism) (Rubin, 2017). Rather, the existence of an environment depends on the organism's actions and perceptions, which form a closed loop of sensorimotor coordination (Maturana 1970): hence why self-producing organization embody cognition. ...
... Indeed, there are not many FSs that have been developed in this direction. This is because cognition, in the mainstream cognitive sciences and its FSs, is understood precisely as computationalism, cognitivism and adaptationism (Rubin, 2017). Moreover, most of the FS of cognition in autopoiesis are based on first-order cybernetics, which is a paradigm reactive behaivours. ...
... Secondly, the incorporation of anticipation in MA as modelled by the (M,R)-system is not only structurally determined, but is crucial for structural coupling, enaction and evolution by natural drift (Rubin, 2017(Rubin, , 2022. This means that anticipation does not violates structural determinism. ...
A rich literature has grown up over the years that bears with autopoiesis, which tends to assume that it is a model, a theory, a principle, a definition of life, a property, refers to self-organization or even to hastily conclude that it is hylomorphic, hylozoist, in need of reformulation or to be overcome, making its status even more unclear. Maturana insists that autopoiesis is none of these and rather it is the causal organization of living systems as natural systems (NS) such that when it stops, they die. He calls this molecular autopoiesis (MA), which comprises two domains of existence: that of the self-producing organization (self-fabrication) and that of the structural coupling/enaction (cognition). Like all-NS in the universe, MA is amenable to be defined in theoretical terms, i.e. encoded in mathematical models and/or formal systems (FS). Framing the multiple formal systems of autopoiesis (FSA) into the Rosen's modeling relation (a process of bringing into equivalence the causality of NS and the inferential rules of FS), allows a classification of FSA into analytical categories, most importantly Turing machine (algorithmic) vs non-Turing machine (non-algorithmic) based, and FSA with a purely reactive mathematical image as cybernetic systems, i.e. feedbacks based, or conversely, as anticipatory systems making active inferences. It is thus the intent of the present work to advance the precision with which different FS may be observed to comply (preserve correspondence) with MA in its worldly state as a NS. The modeling relation between MA and the range of FS proposed as potentially illuminating their processes forecloses the applicability of Turing-based algorithmic computational models. This outcome indicates that MA, as modelled through Varela's calculus of self-reference or more especially through Rosen's (M,R)-system, is essentially anticipatory without violating structural determinism nor causality whatsoever, hence enaction may involve it. This quality may capture a fundamentally different mode of being in living systems as opposed to mechanical-computational systems. Implications in different fields of biology from the origin of life to planetary biology as well as in cognitive science and artificial intelligence are of interest.
... 6 | A discussion of the sequence hypothesis (information and program in the genomic sequence) within a constructivist context can be found in Rubin (2017). ...
In its current formulation, natural drift, despite being non-adaptationist, apparently follows the machine metaphor. I scrutinize the notion of machines on the basis of the four Aristotelian causes and argue that, following Rosen’s work, living systems are causal systems but not mechanisms and, therefore, not “machines.” This leads to the question as to whether natural drift is a blind and reactive mechanism or whether it entails anticipation in the sense that organisms are able to distinguish the potential effects of their actions on their environment. This aspect has a bearing on the question of whether natural drift can account for the origin of Earth’s habitability.
... Lo que implica que la información no preexiste a la vida. Por lo tanto, la afirmación que el genoma contiene información no es sostenible bajo la perspectiva de Bateson (Cárdenas-García, 2020;Cárdenas-García & Ireland, 2019;dC Rubin, 2017). ...
Resumen Este artículo es una introducción al tema de la información, al cual se lo puede abordar desde varios puntos de vista. El enfoque presentado se basa en la definición fundamental de Gregory Bateson que define a la información como 'una diferencia que marca una diferencia'. Hay que indicar que esta definición parte de un esquema cibernético; es decir, de un esquema cuyo objetivo es 'el control y comunicación en el animal y en la máquina'. La intención es argumentar que el tema de la información, desde un punto de vista fundamental, tiene aplicabilidad en el ámbito de las ciencias sociales. Esta introducción incluye breves aplicaciones para ilustrar los conceptos fundamentales.
... Some authors have further established formal connections between autopoietic systems, (M,R)-systems (Letelier et al., 2003;Nomura, 2007;Zaretzky and Letelier, 2002;Rubin, 2017;Rubin and Crucifix, 2019), the minimization of variational free energy (active inference) (Friston, 2013;Rubin, 2017;Ramstead et al., 2018, Rubin et al., 2020 and chemical reaction networks (Contreras et al., 2011;Kreyssig et al., 2012;Veloz et al., 2011). Here we focus on the latter. ...
... Some authors have further established formal connections between autopoietic systems, (M,R)-systems (Letelier et al., 2003;Nomura, 2007;Zaretzky and Letelier, 2002;Rubin, 2017;Rubin and Crucifix, 2019), the minimization of variational free energy (active inference) (Friston, 2013;Rubin, 2017;Ramstead et al., 2018, Rubin et al., 2020 and chemical reaction networks (Contreras et al., 2011;Kreyssig et al., 2012;Veloz et al., 2011). Here we focus on the latter. ...
... The one below is an intermediate scenario of the whole network, which represents today's Earth system. et al., 2018;Letelier et al., 2011;Louie, 2012Louie, , 2017Maturana, 2011;Maturana and Varela, 1980;Nadin, 2010;Rosen, 1985a,b;Rubin, 2017;Varela, 1979Varela, , 2000. Applying COT and ZDT as two promising operational formalizations of autopoiesis-self-production by metabolic closure (Contreras et al., 2011;Kreyssig et al., 2012;Veloz et al., 2011), we presented a proof-of-concept by which Earth's molecular reaction network satisfies the conditions of an autopoietic organization. ...
The Gaia hypothesis states that the Earth is an instance of life. However, appraisals of it tend to focus on the claim that life is a feedback self-regulator that controls Earth's chemistry and climate dynamics, yet, self-regulation by feedbacks is not a definitive characteristic of living systems. Here, we consider the characterization of biological systems as autopoietic systems (causally organized to self-produce through metabolic efficient closure) and then ask whether the Gaia hypothesis is a tractable question from this standpoint. A proof-of-concept based on Chemical Organization Theory (COT) and the Zero Deficiency Theorem (ZDT) applied on a simple but representative Earth's molecular reaction network supports the thesis of Gaia as an autopoietic system. We identify the formation of self-producing organizations within the reaction network, corresponding to recognizable scenarios of Earth's history. These results provide further opportunities to discuss how the instantiation of autopoiesis at the planetary scale could manifests central features of biological phenomenon, such as autonomy and anticipation, and what this implies for the further development of the Gaia theory, Earth's climate modelling and geoengineering.
... Some authors have further established formal connections between autopoietic systems, (M,R)-systems (Letelier et al., 2003;Nomura, 2007;Zaretzky and Letelier, 2002;Rubin, 2017;Rubin and Crucifix, 2019), the minimization of variational free energy (active inference) (Friston, 2013;Rubin, 2017;Ramstead et al., 2018, Rubin et al., 2020 and chemical reaction networks (Contreras et al., 2011;Kreyssig et al., 2012;Veloz et al., 2011). Here we focus on the latter. ...
... Some authors have further established formal connections between autopoietic systems, (M,R)-systems (Letelier et al., 2003;Nomura, 2007;Zaretzky and Letelier, 2002;Rubin, 2017;Rubin and Crucifix, 2019), the minimization of variational free energy (active inference) (Friston, 2013;Rubin, 2017;Ramstead et al., 2018, Rubin et al., 2020 and chemical reaction networks (Contreras et al., 2011;Kreyssig et al., 2012;Veloz et al., 2011). Here we focus on the latter. ...
... The one below is an intermediate scenario of the whole network, which represents today's Earth system. et al., 2018;Letelier et al., 2011;Louie, 2012Louie, , 2017Maturana, 2011;Maturana and Varela, 1980;Nadin, 2010;Rosen, 1985a,b;Rubin, 2017;Varela, 1979Varela, , 2000. Applying COT and ZDT as two promising operational formalizations of autopoiesis-self-production by metabolic closure (Contreras et al., 2011;Kreyssig et al., 2012;Veloz et al., 2011), we presented a proof-of-concept by which Earth's molecular reaction network satisfies the conditions of an autopoietic organization. ...
Recent appraisals of the Gaia theory tend to focus on the claim that planetary life is a cybernetic regulator that would self-regulate Earth’s chemistry composition and climate dynamics, following either a weak (biotic and physical processes create feedback loops), or a strong (biological activity control and regulates the physical processes) interpretation of the Gaia hypothesis. Here, we contrast with the regulator interpretation and return to the initial motivation of the Gaia hypothesis: extending Schrödinger’s question about the nature of life at the planetary scale. To this end, we propose a relational and systemic biological approach using autopoiesis as the realization of the living and the (M,R)-system as the formal theory of biological systems. By applying a minimum of key categories to a set of interacting causal processes operating on a wide range of spatial time scales through the atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere of the Earth system, we suggest a one-to-one realization map between the Gaia phenomenon and (M,R)-Autopoiesis. We show that metabolic molecular self-production by closure to efficient causation on a planetary scale is plausible. This suggests that the Gaia phenomenon may be the embodiment of Life itself in the planetary domain, a sui-generis biological unity and thus more fundamental than self-regulation by feedback mechanisms. Formulating the Gaia theory in biological terms provides a formal basis for the claim that planetary biology elsewhere in the universe must involve and have a formal equivalence to a self-referential physical process which cannot be implemented by a Turing machine and, therefore, has a non-computable character.
... Though it has to be acknowledged that there are many voices that are discordant with this view, as biosemiotics is a new interdisciplinary scientific project (Emmeche 1999;Pattee 2013;Barbieri 2012Barbieri & 2013. Some even reject the notion of biological (or intrinsic) information (Rubin 2017). Further, biosemiotics acknowledges information to be an implicitly semiotic term, which puts it at odds with the more recognized concept of Shannon Information. ...
... The implication is that organisms do not engage in agential actions; given the human dependence on satisfaction of physiological and social needs as ubiquitous to and in our actions. Also, given the nature of the Bateson information generation paradigm it is not discernible that there is biological (intrinsic) information in the genome (Rubin 2017). A noteworthy finding is also that there should be a way to reconcile Bateson information and Peircean semiotics, since in the first instance there does not seem to be any impediment to do so, as several biosemioticians have already noted (Emmeche 1999;Battail 2009 Springer Nature journal content, brought to you courtesy of Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH ("Springer Nature"). ...
The concept of information has been extensively studied and written about, yet no consensus on a unified definition of information has to date been reached. This paper seeks to establish the basis for a unified definition of information. We claim a biosemiotics perspective, based on Gregory Bateson’s definition of information, provides a footing on which to build because the frame this provides has applicability to both the sciences and humanities.
A key issue in reaching a unified definition of information is the fundamental problem of identifying how a human organism, in a self-referential process, develops from a state in which its knowledge of the human-organism-in-its-environment is almost non-existent to a state in which the human organism not only recognizes the existence of the environment but also sees itself as part of the human-organism-in-its-environment system. This allows a human organism not only to self-referentially engage with the environment and navigate through it, but also to transform it in its own image and likeness. In other words, the Fundamental Problem of the Science of Information concerns the phylogenetic development process, as well as the ontogenetic development process of Homo sapiens sapiens from a single cell to our current multicellular selves, all in a changing long-term and short-term environment, respectively.
This contribution presents a semiotic theory of translation based on protyposis that bridges the gap between quantum physics, semiotics, and translation studies. Protyposis, an elementary quantum structure, underlies all possibilities for generating meaningful information. The theory critiques traditional notions of information and examines its development from the communication theory of Shannon and Weaver to more complex biosemiotic perspectives. It addresses the interplay between protyposis and semiotic processes and shows how meaning emerges from relationships and functions that go beyond the quantum level. It integrates Marais’ work on semiotic translation theory, which proposes translation as a negentropic semiotic process that works within constraints to create relations. The study culminates in the advocacy of a transdisciplinary approach underpinned by protyposis to comprehensively understand the complexity of translation and information processes, opening a new perspective for understanding communication, perception and knowledge construction in different scientific fields.
The article deals with the notion of the genetic code and its metaphorical understanding as a “language”. In the traditional view of the language metaphor of the genetic code, combinations of nucleotides are signs of amino acids (see the table of the genetic code). Similarly, words combined from letters (speech sounds) represent certain meanings. The language metaphor of the genetic code (Markoš and Faltýnek, Biosemiotics 4(2), 171–200, 2011) assumes that the nucleotides stay in the analogy to letters, triples to words and genes to sentences (Jakobson 1971). We propose an application of mathematical linguistic methods on the notion of the genetic code. We provide quantitative analysis (n-gram structure, Zipf’s law) of mRNA strings and natural language texts. This analysis is sensitive to the detection of the code (language) units hierarchy. We also take into consideration a representative quantitative analysis of DNA, RNA and proteins. Our analysis of mRNA confirms an assumption that the design of the genetic code cannot analogize DNA bases and letters. The notion of the letter is much more appropriate if analogized with triplets or amino acids (see Lacková et al, Theory in Biosciences 136(3–4), 187–191, 2017).
