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2 Chinese versus US A.I. import preference in sample countries according to the median size of existing AI investment.
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The US and China grew locked into a competition over global A.I. dominance, both trying to maximize their respective capacities and exporting their own products to the world. Both countries prioritize capitalizing on the rapid growth in computing capacity, producing and processing increasingly bigger datasets, develop newer and more sophisticated a...
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Citations
... Some existing literature identifies a broad compass for more research on national or global governance of AI, the domestic and global politics that shapes that governance (Zeng 2022, Tallberg et al. 2023, and on business strategies of innovation for multinational enterprises and high-tech startups amidst rising "techno-nationalism" (Tung et al. 2024). The agenda can also be drawn more narrowly to track and analyse the terminology and imagery within the narratives around Sino-US AI relations, including their sources, and their implications for not just relations between the two powers but also the strategies of third countries (Unver & Ertan 2022, Zeng 2022. ...
Discussions about artificial Intelligence (AI) are gaining prominence in the recent revival of “cold war” narratives comparing US-China relations today to the historical rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Drawing on a review of existing academic and other relevant literature, this paper examines how the “AI cold war” narrative is justified, and numerous ways that it can be challenged. It argues that the framing is largely driven by the securitisation of AI: the discursive process in which state actors and policy pundits view AI innovations’ dual-use capabilities as key to national security and ideological competition in the rivalry between a hegemon and a rising power.
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