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The European Union's (EU) political and economic integration project has grown dramatically since its inception in 1952. While the ultimate goal of the EU is unclear, one of its aspirations has been to attempt to create European citizens. The idea is that over time, citizens would look towards Europe as their main national identity. While the polit...
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... It is expected that citizens who are better off economically, due to their position within the social stratification system, should be more likely to have a positive view of the EU and to develop a sense of identification as Europeans. The empirical evidence so far supports this idea of a spill -over effect, with higher educated more often seeing themselves (also) as Europeans than medium or lower educated (Bergbauer 2018;Borz et al. 2018;Fernández -Eigmüller 2018;Fligstein 2008;Kuhn 2015;Luhmann 2017;Polyakova -Fligstein 2016;van Mol et al. 2015). Similarly, unemployed are in tendency more seldomly identify (also) as Europeans than employed (Fernández -Eigmüller 2018). ...
... Similarly, unemployed are in tendency more seldomly identify (also) as Europeans than employed (Fernández -Eigmüller 2018). 4 There is also a clear divide between those working in white -collar leadership positions in service -oriented industries, and those employed in the industrial sector, whereas the latter are less likely to identify as Europeans (Bergbauer 2018;Fernández -Eigmüller 2018;Fligstein 2008;Kuhn 2015;Polyakova -Fligstein 2016;Verhaegen et al. 2014). In addition, those who consider the economic situation of their household to be favourable are also more likely to identify themselves as Europeans (Pötzschke -Braun 2019;Verhaegen et al. 2014), just as those who assume that they personally benefit economically from the EU (Borz et al. 2018;Verhaegen et al. 2014). ...
... This would imply lower levels of inclusive European identity in wealthier countries, rejecting the utilitarian approach expected above. In contrast, the analysis by Polyakova and Fligstein (2016), focussing on exclusive national formation in contrast to inclusive European identity for 2005 and 2010, reveals other findings. The negative effect of GDP on exclusive national identity formation is statistically significant, yet only for the data from 2010 and only if economic development is taken into account (Polyakova -Fligstein 2016). ...
This special section investigates citizens’ attitudes towards EU citizenship in
Eastern Central Europe (ECE) and Western Europe (WE) and their relation
to regional living conditions. It presumes that living in regional peripheries
leads to ‘peripheral’ conceptions of citizenship. In particular, we ask whether
citizens living in spatially, economically or socially peripheral regions, both in
ECE as such and within it, are more likely to share conceptions of citizenship
that deviate from those dominant in Western Europe – often equated with the
centre of the EU.
... Orbàn's Hungary appears to be a precursor for the region, with its rejection of international institutions and the implementation of economic nationalism. Citizens look to the nation rather than to Europe for solutions to their difficulties, hence diminishing the sense of European solidarity (Fligstein and Polyakova, 2016). The new government sees liberalism as the main threat in the country and sees itself as the last bastion against excessive globalisation. ...
This study examines the impact of populism on central bank communication, with a focus on theoretical developments and the specific case of Hungary. Populism, characterised by the opposition between 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', challenges traditional institutions, including central banks, which are seen as part of the elite due to their unelected technocratic leadership. The rise of populism has led to increased scrutiny and pressure on central banks, which have been forced to adapt their communication strategies in order to maintain credibility and public trust. The analysis explores how central banks are shifting their communication to defend their reputation in response to populist pressures, moving away from traditional roles and toward a focus on predictability and public engagement. JEL Codes: E52, E58, P16
... In all three graphs, non-populists on the left-side of the x-axis embody the conventional wisdom about the public's view of constitutional courts: citizens are most likely to oppose curbing the FCC's decision-making authority, followed by the Bundestag and, in last place, the EU. This relative ranking reflects the consensus that the FCC is "traditionally regarded as one of the most revered institutions in Germany" (Vanberg, 2005, 99), whereas the EU has been quite unpopular relative to other institutions (e.g., Dalton, 2021;Polyakova & Fligstein, 2015). Support for the national parliament falls between the FCC and the EU. ...
Given the rise of populism around the globe, do populist citizens support the exceptional authority of national constitutional courts to make decisions on controversial issues? Or do these individuals view constitutional courts just like any other political institution? To investigate this question, we embedded an experiment in a national survey in Germany in early 2020 that varied the institution (i.e., the federal constitutional court (FCC), the parliament and the EU) and its decision on a controversial civil liberties issue. The results clearly show that citizens with populist attitudes judge the FCC like any other political institution in terms of their willingness to restrict its authority. In contrast, individuals with non-populist attitudes endorse the exceptional status of the FCC compared to other institutions. The study suggests that the FCC may lose its venerate status as the ultimate guardian of democracy among the nontrivial portion of citizens who favor populism. Theoretically, the results support a “fusion” model that assumes populists’ support for power curbing includes the constitutional court in “the system” they disparage.
... Existing literature has highlighted a communitarian backlash against globalisation (see Walter, 2021b) due to sectoral economic and social decline (e.g., Broz et al., 2021) or repulsion for culturally progressive norms (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Moreover, most people have deep-seated national identities but at best superficial transnational identities (Hooghe & Marks, 2009;Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016). In this context, Dellmuth and Tallberg (2023) show that negative elite communication about IOs is generally more effective than positive communication in shaping citizens' legitimacy beliefs: 'When elites criticize IOs by invoking democratic deficits or poor performances, they therefore get through more easily to citizens than when they endorse the same organisations' (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2023, p. 13). ...
In the wake of international organisations' (IOs) politicisation, treaty-based transfers of authority to or from IOs have virtually come to a standstill. Instead, we increasingly see instances of informal internationalisation and unilateral renationalisation of IO authority. In this article, we introduce a Political Contest Theory (PCT) that explains both phenomena at the same time. PCT builds on the postfunctionalist assumption that, in the age of politicisation, IO authority transfers activate a transnational cleavage between communitarian and cosmopolitan factions fighting over the 'right' locus of political authority. Yet, beyond extant postfunctional theorising, PCT specifies the mechanisms through and the conditions under which either the one or the other faction may prevail. We argue that communitarians can rely on a structural mobilisation advantage which allows them to assert unilateral renationalisations, whereas cosmopolitans can rely on an institutional power advantage which allows them to push through informal internationalisations. Moreover, PCT highlights a pattern of mutual reinforcement between the systematic advantages enjoyed by the opposing factions that is likely to exacerbate the polarisation over IO authority transfers in the future.
... Thus, national attachment is progressively complemented by European feelings. Despite the pessimistic expectations (e.g., Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016), the crises faced by the EU did not lead to the upraise of nationalistic identities, nor a significant mutation of the European identitarian landscape (Börzel & Risse, 2018). ...
The Maastricht Treaty remains a crossroad in the history of European integration. Since its ratification, policy areas at the core of the national sovereignties have been included in the Brussels agenda, the power balance between the European institutions has started to mutate, and the European Union affairs have progressively become a controversial issue in the public debate. The goal of the book is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the politicization of European affairs. The final aim is to assess the institutional and socio-political impact of EU politicization, detecting how the European elites could exploit the saliency gained by European affairs to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European institutions.
... While the theories of recategorization of identities are built on the assumption that social categorization into different groups breeds ingroup favoritism and outgroup stereotypes, thereby fostering intergroup prejudice (Jackson and Smith 1999;Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001;Simon, Kulla, and Zobel 1995), it is uncertain how these may carry over to international relations. For example, studies conducted with individuals in member states of the European Union have found that relatively new, overarching European identity has not replaced extant national identities (Polyakova and Fligstein 2016). ...
Research has found that affirming national identity can encourage the public’s trust toward a foreign adversary. On the other hand, aggressor states have attempted to recategorize identity by promoting a superordinate identity that includes both aggressor and defender states. In comparison with national identity affirmation, we test how effective emphasis of a common identity might be in the context of Russia-Ukraine and evaluate the scope conditions under which such a strategy may backfire. We propose that the effectiveness of the two identity affirmation approaches should differ across people with varying levels of national chauvinism. We expect that high-in-chauvinism individuals will experience more worldview-conflict when exposed to promotion of superordinate identity. Experimental findings on Ukrainians’ trust toward Russia in 2020 suggest a policy that emphasizes a common identity can backfire among highly chauvinistic Ukrainians in the Western region. This indicates that recategorizing one’s nation as a member of a larger group may fuel resistance among individuals with a sense of nationalistic superiority. By contrast, highlighting Ukrainian national identity boosted trust toward Russia even among the more chauvinistic respondents in the Southeastern region. This study helps identify the scope conditions of identity affirmation as a way to increase trust in international relations.
... In some instances, they will have to re-think their EU stance and the policies they are proposing (especially when there is a reaction from their voters) to retain their popularity and safeguard national interests. This is especially evident in light of the recent financial crisis which challenged various mainstream parties across Europe and helped the emergence of new political parties which rejected the economic policies of the European Union which included the promotion of a series of austerity measures and its influence on member states (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016;Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). These new emerging parties would receive an additional boost with the Syrian migration crisis which allowed these parties to expand their influence within their electorate (Börzel & Risse, 2018). ...
... Overall, it is clear that whilst the level of impact of Europeanisation is debatable, most scholars recognise that some form of influence exists. The evidence presented below discusses this influence and highlights the potential ability of the European Union to alter the relationship between parties, voters, and the state (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016;Ladrech, 2012a;Raunio, 2002;Kritzinger & Michalowitz, 2005;Hooghe & Marks, 2006;Walecki, 2007). ...
This chapter deals with the literature on Europeanisation. It provides a detailed investigation on the influence of the European Union on political parties. This chapter engages with various scholars of Europeanisation including Radaelli, Bulmer and Ladrech to explain how the European Union can influence states and entities such as political parties. The chapter is divided into two providing a detailed an insight into the characteristics of Europeanisation as well as an analysis on how the European Union can influence party politics. The chapter concludes that Europeanisation is not simply the ability of the European Union to influence party politics, but also, the way the European Union is used by these parties in order to gain political advantage.
... In some instances, they will have to re-think their EU stance and the policies they are proposing (especially when there is a reaction from their voters) to retain their popularity and safeguard national interests. This is especially evident in light of the recent financial crisis which challenged various mainstream parties across Europe and helped the emergence of new political parties which rejected the economic policies of the European Union which included the promotion of a series of austerity measures and its influence on member states (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016;Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). These new emerging parties would receive an additional boost with the Syrian migration crisis which allowed these parties to expand their influence within their electorate (Börzel & Risse, 2018). ...
... Overall, it is clear that whilst the level of impact of Europeanisation is debatable, most scholars recognise that some form of influence exists. The evidence presented below discusses this influence and highlights the potential ability of the European Union to alter the relationship between parties, voters, and the state (Polyakova, & Fligstein, 2016;Ladrech, 2012a;Raunio, 2002;Kritzinger & Michalowitz, 2005;Hooghe & Marks, 2006;Walecki, 2007). ...
This chapter provides an insight into the political system in Malta which is based on a near-perfect two-party system with the Nationalist Party and Labour Party competing for power. It delves into Malta’s electoral system which is based on the Single Transferable Vote. This is necessary in order to understand the Maltese political system, as well as the influence of the European Union on party politics, their approach towards the European Union and the way the European Union is used in political campaigns. The chapter argues that the Maltese political system is heavily dependent on clientelism, political patronage, and personal charisma. The chapter explores these characteristics and provides a detailed account of the establishment of the various civil society groups and the way they are now able to challenge the status quo of the main political parties.
... It became clear to people living in these countries that the EU was not a form of solidarity that embraced everyone. The effects of this intergovernmental agreement were to increase dislike of the EU and increase national identity (Polyakova and Fligstein 2016). The refugee crisis also showed clearly the intergovernmental nature of that policy domain in line with the papers by Lavenex and Diez. ...
The purpose of this volume is to examine how various actors within EU policy institutions have worked to try and create a European political identity. Each of the papers included in this volume deserves attention. They are thoughtful and full of interesting case studies.
... Posiblemente, debido a estas diferencias en sus consecuencias, la crisis económica acabó provocando una crisis política con un fuerte enfrentamiento entre países que afectó a la credibilidad de la UE en su conjunto, de tal modo que países que tradicionalmente habían sido considerados euroentusiastas, como es el caso de los países del sur de Europa (Llamazares y Gramacho, 2007), vieron aumentar sus niveles de euroescepticismo tras los rescates financieros y las medidas de austeridad impuestas por la UE (Verney, 2017). Los argumentos sobre la responsabilidad y la gestión de la crisis se encuadraron en términos morales, con frecuencia vinculados a lo que se presentaba como el interés nacional (Hall, 2012), y con un diagnóstico compartido de que la UE había sido incapaz de ofrecer soluciones colectivas a la crisis, llevando a los ciudadanos a buscarlas en la nación y no en Europa (Polyakova y Fligstein, 2015). Las dificultades de la crisis de la deuda constituyeron un desafío para la legitimidad de la UE, que se vio agravada posteriormente por la crisis de los refugiados en 2015, así como por la salida de Reino Unido tras el referéndum del Brexit de 2016. ...
... 127-146 déficit democrático de la UE (Bruter, 2003), de modo que funcione como una reserva de legitimidad frente al deterioro de otras actitudes. Además, como acabamos de señalar, durante la Gran Recesión se puso de manifiesto la incapacidad de la UE para dar una respuesta colectiva provocando una vuelta a las identidades nacionales (Polyakova y Fligstein, 2015), lo que lleva a preguntarnos: ¿cuál fue el impacto de la Gran Recesión en la relación entre las identificaciones nacionales y europea? Para ello, analizamos distintos factores que contribuyen a conformar la IE, entre ellos la identificación nacional, y si estos tuvieron un efecto diferenciado como consecuencia de la Gran Recesión y de la crisis de la deuda y de la eurozona a la que estuvo asociada. ...
En este trabajo estudiamos la identificación europea durante la Gran Recesión en los Estados miembro de la Eurozona, examinando la evolución de dos indicadores clásicos del Eurobarómetro: la percepción de ser europeo y el apego a Europa. Estos dos indicadores recogen respectivamente la dimensión cognitiva y afectiva de la identificación europea. El artículo se centra en el efecto de la crisis en la identificación europea examinando la interacción de la deuda pública, como factor contextual clave, con factores explicativos clásicos de estos dos indicadores. Específicamente analizamos el efecto de la crisis de la deuda en la relación entre la identificaciones europea y nacional -enfoque identitario-, aunque en nuestros análisis controlamos también por factores del enfoque racional instrumental, y de movilización cognitiva. Nuestros resultados indican que, cuanto mayor era la deuda pública del país, mayor fue el efecto positivo de la identificación nacional en la percepción de ser europeo, mientras que entre los niveles más bajos de deuda pública este efecto fue negativo. Por el contrario, la relación positiva de la identificación nacional sobre el apego a Europa fue menor cuanto mayor era la deuda pública del país. Por contraste, los efectos vinculados al enfoque cognitivo y al racional instrumental se han visto afectados en menor medida como consecuencia de la crisis.
