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Categories of aggregate nodes occurring in the Twittersphere of @KagutaMuseveni (November 2020-January 2021).
Source publication
Despite populism being a fast-growing field of inquiry, populist discourse in an African setting is understudied. This paper expands our knowledge of populist communication and foreign policy in a competitive authoritarian context, proposing an analysis of two Ugandan politicians—Bobi Wine and Yoweri Museveni—and their communication on Twitter befo...
Context in source publication
Context 1
... the intent to signal a strong linkage with the West, Museveni considers Uganda to be a democratic state and actively promotes economic development ( figure 2 ) and the continuation of international aid for the development of Uganda's infrastructure and food and financial security, as well as a solution to large-scale unemployment. In his eyes, this is a tried-and-tested approach to meet "people's needs": On November 29, he tweets: "We have already made great strides in this direction, I therefore urge our people to elect the NRM flag bearers in the forthcoming elections so that we complete what we started" and on December 21, he writes: "Interacted with our leaders from Mubende, Kyankwanzi, Kiboga, Kasanda & Mityana districts. ...
Citations
... Scholarly works on PFP have proliferated in recent years and some have started developing a research agenda on how populism can shed light on IR debates (Wajner and Guirlando 2024;Chryssogelos et al. 2023). PFP research has focused on different regional realities from Africa, Asia, Latin America, Middle East, North America and Western and Easter Europe (Lacatus 2023;Plagemann and Destradi 2018;Löfflmann 2022;Wajner and Wehner 2023;Lopes et al. 2022;Wehner 2023;Giurlando 2021;Jenne 2021). Initial works on international populism engaged in conceptualizing PFP, with a focus on its manifestations and characteristics (Chryssogelos 2018;Destradi and Plagemann 2019;Verbeek and Zaslove 2017;Wehner and Thies 2021). ...
... According to Brownlee (2007), this is the most common form of autocracy, but that may be because it encompasses two others: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. The latter has also been referred to as the most common type of hybrid regime (Carothers, 2018), and has been applied to cases such as the Andes (Levitsky & Loxton, 2014), Turkey (Castaldo, 2018;Esen & Gumuscu, 2016), the western Balkans (Bieber, 2018), Ukraine (Way, 2004), Uganda (Lacatus, 2023), various African countries (Bogaards & Elischer, 2016), and Malaysia (Giersdorf & Croissant, 2011). Case studies using the broader concept of electoral authoritarianism include Turkey (Gunay, 2023;Turan, 2019), Iran (Mahdavi, 2023), and Cambodia (Hyde et al., 2023). ...
This article explores the dynamics of modern authoritarian regimes, using Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko as a case study. By examining Belarus’s transition from a “competitive authoritarian” regime to a “hegemonic authoritarian” one from 1994 to 1996 and its further shift from a spin dictatorship to a fear dictatorship in 2020, the study offers insights into the multifaceted nature of dictatorships. The main findings are that using elections as a means to classify regimes does not fully explain their effect on authoritarian vulnerability and that different classifications of dictatorship, such as spin versus fear, are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
... In East Africa, Kenya, a multi-party democratic state founded on the national values and principles of governance referred to in Article 10 of her constitution, has viewed Electoral democracy as highly related to the conduct of elections as a process (Oxford Analytica, 2020). Unfortunately, having democratic elections and voter choices during the conduct of the competitive elections as a pre-requisite for electoral democracy in those economies has been influenced by one's ethnic and partisan ideologies instead of whether the government in power has performed in the interest of the citizens or not (Lacatus, 2023). Ethnic differences, social ties and political disintegration among Kikuyus and Kalenjin, coupled with limited voter education, a state-dependent Electoral Commission, and unregulated campaign financing, have not only been manipulated by political elites in elections, reducing political deliberations to "bread and butter issues" but have also caused voter apathy that has limited citizen participation leading to low voter turnout (Lacatus, 2023). ...
... Unfortunately, having democratic elections and voter choices during the conduct of the competitive elections as a pre-requisite for electoral democracy in those economies has been influenced by one's ethnic and partisan ideologies instead of whether the government in power has performed in the interest of the citizens or not (Lacatus, 2023). Ethnic differences, social ties and political disintegration among Kikuyus and Kalenjin, coupled with limited voter education, a state-dependent Electoral Commission, and unregulated campaign financing, have not only been manipulated by political elites in elections, reducing political deliberations to "bread and butter issues" but have also caused voter apathy that has limited citizen participation leading to low voter turnout (Lacatus, 2023). ...
Limited citizen participation in elections, politics, and leadership remains a governance challenge globally especially in Low developed countries like Uganda. Citizens have over time through traditional methods, been encouraged to participate in elections; however, without internet use, no meaningful participation may be achieved. Electoral democracy has been one of the cornerstones of democracy all over the world. Without free, inclusive, fair, transparent, open, and credible elections being conducted, with meaningful representation of the people, the power of the people cannot be achieved. The objective/ purpose of this study, therefore, is to examine the effect of E-Engaging on Electoral democracy in Uganda. This study took both the quantitative paradigm and qualitative approach, thus the adoption of mixed methods research in order to capture the conflicting ideas of reality with more focus on the quantitative approach. A correlational research design was adopted and a sample size of 472 respondents was selected. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient tests were used for the hypotheses. The results show that there exists a statistically significant and positive association between E-engaging and electoral democracy, based on Pearson’s correlation coefficients. The study recommends that there is a need to design easily downloadable mobile applications that can be utilised for online campaigns, online voter education and online voting. These should however, be first sampled like in a university election before being used in a general election to rule out their effectiveness and efficiency. These should also have internal security systems designed for the security of the ballot papers if it is for online voting in order to reduce the levels of voter bribery, ballot stuffing, delayed delivery of electoral materials and vote rigging.
Under what conditions do populists embrace or reject “the international”? Some scholars of populism argue that populist leaders tend to neglect political (inter-)action in the international arena due to their stated preference for isolationist, nationalistic, and protectionist stances. Meanwhile, others claim that through their promotion of performative encounters and transnational solidarities between “People(s),” populists are actually more likely to engage with actors, ideas, styles, and agendas coming from abroad. This article explores this apparent contradiction, hypothesizing that three main elements influence the “populist mindset” to narrate the external world and thus adopt or rather resist new contingencies originating internationally: legitimacy, support, and opportunity. To examine the combination of these behavioral patterns, we compare two populist presidents who are paradigmatic of a fourth wave of populism in Latin America: Brazil's Jair Messias Bolsonaro and Mexico's Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). A comparative analysis of Bolsonaro's and AMLO's discursive responses to numerous foreign policy issues reveals how these three mechanisms condition their engagement or apathy toward external developments in bilateral frameworks of cooperation, regional integration schemes, multilateral organizations, and global governance institutions. The findings of this study can contribute to a greater understanding of populist foreign policies and their outcomes, with a special emphasis on Latin America and the Global South, and more generally to the emerging research on populism in international relations.
