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Pledge fulfilment studies frequently anticipate that party control of a given ministry increases the chance campaign promises within that brief will be enacted. However, existing evidence is mixed, and few studies have looked beyond ministers’ partisan affiliation. It stands to reason that other personal and political characteristics may influence...
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Context 1
... cases are all small-to-medium sized industrialized democracies, but with substantial variation in social and political context which have a bearing on the way ministers are appointed, behave and implement policy (see Table 1). This allows us to examine the generalizability of the phenomenon across a range of political cultures and institutional designs, providing a strong test for our universal hypotheses concerning ministerial skills and effort. ...Context 2
... quo) pledges are included in all models. The results of the models are presented in Figure 1(a) and (b), showing odds ratios (the effects of the control variables length of legislative period and policy change are omitted from the figures for clarity, but are included in the full regression models shown in Table A1 in the Appendix). ...Context 3
... with prior research, pledges made by single-party governments and those promising to preserve the status quo are substantially more likely to be enacted. Additionally, as expected, the longer a government has in office, the more election pledges it fulfils (see Table A1 in the Appendix). For the institutional variables, we find a positive and statistically significant effect for parliamentarism (vs. ...Context 4
... effect of ministers' personal characteristics on pledge fulfilment (Odds Ratios). Note: Results from binary logistic regressions based on Table A1 in the Appendix (M1 for (a), and M2 for (b)). Standard errors are clustered by party and year. ...