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While students of political tolerance often view tolerance decisions as a trade-off between opposing values (civil liberties versus other values), there have been few explicit attempts to formulate and test such a multiple-values model. With rare exception, researchers typically examine linkages between tolerance judgments and a single value conste...
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... This same value-equality-can also inform attitudes towards, for example, taxes, where valuing equality will likely lead to supporting a progressive tax. Political values are thus viewed as broader than political attitudes and have been found to guide political attitudes and behavior (Feldman and Zaller 1992; see also Ciuk, Lupton, and Thornton 2018;Lupton and McKee 2020;Lupton, Smallpage, and Enders 2020), predicting positions on social welfare (Feldman & Steenbergen 2001), government spending, candidate evaluations (Feldman 1988), beliefs about racial equality (Kinder & Sanders 1996), judgments on tolerance (Peffley et al. 2001), and affective polarization . 1 Referencing political values in rhetoric is reasonable given that-as Goren et al. (2009) explain-"political values are quite popular, [so] the perceptual background surrounding them is positive." Elites aiming to persuade should highlight the facets of an issue that give their side "the rhetorical edge" (Jerit 2008; see also Riker 1996), and political value rhetoric could in fact be that edge (see Nelson and Garst 2005). ...
Politicians use political value rhetoric to win elections or persuade constituents towards policy positions, but the effectiveness of this rhetoric is unclear. I argue that partisan forces constrain the effectiveness of this rhetoric and that this constraint is conditional based on the value evoked and the match between the politician’s and message recipient’s partisanship. To examine this, I conduct a survey experiment with a diverse U.S. national population and show that politicians’ value rhetoric is disproportionately evaluated based on the value evoked as well as whether the politician is in-party or out-party: in-party politicians are punished—and out-party politicians rewarded—for trespassing on the other party’s values. I then use individual-level variables to examine what drives this result, finding that both party-congruent value endorsements and affective polarization levels moderate the asymmetric responses to political value trespassing. Lastly, I replicate this experiment and reproduce the same findings. The results speak to political values, the effectiveness of political rhetoric, party betrayal signaling, and the true object of out-party distaste, which seems to be more about the party than the party member.
... Tolerance has been described as involving a psychological process of balancing competing values (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). Values tend to be inherently comparative and competitive (e.g., Tetlock, 1986) and the trade-off among multiple values that are simultaneously relevant tends to affect cognition and behaviour including tolerance judgements (Peffley et al., 2001;Schwartz, 1996). Further, the accommodation of Muslim minorities in western societies has been analysed in terms of finding the right balance between civil liberties and a cohesive society (Miller, 2014;Reeskens & Wright, 2013). ...
... While a moral emphasis on the value of social cohesion might encourage intolerance of dissenting behaviours, moral values of individual freedom might encourage tolerance of these behaviours. Therefore, in Study 2, we drew on previous research which emphasizes the importance of moving beyond the single-value model of tolerance (e.g., Peffley et al., 2001), to instead investigate the trade-offs between competing moral values with their potential different implications for tolerance. Specifically, we predicted that stronger normative dissent of the behaviours makes moral concerns about social cohesion and unity relatively more important than the value of individual freedom, and this, in turn, predicts increased intolerance. ...
How do people decide whether specific minority behaviours should or should not be tolerated in society? The current research investigates the role of moralization in tolerance of Muslim minority behaviours that differ in their level of perceived normative dissent with four national samples of majority group members in the Netherlands and Germany (N = 3628). Study 1 revealed that behaviours perceived as more normatively dissenting were increasingly moralized and tolerated less. In Studies 2 and 3, we found that more normatively dissenting behaviours prompted people to prioritize the moral value of social cohesion over freedom and become less tolerant. Finally, Study 4 shows that priming the moral value of religious freedom decreases intolerance of a highly dissenting Muslim minority practice. Taken together, these studies reveal that moralization and value prioritizing can be associated with either intolerance or tolerance of minority behaviours depending on the perceived normative dissenting nature of these behaviours.
... Political sophisticates tend to make more effective use of heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk 2001) and bring to bear more considerations when making political judgments (e.g., Gomez and Matthew Wilson 2001;Sniderman et al. 1991), leading to a more thoughtful and informed decision. Knowledgeable citizens also tend to be more politically tolerant (Brewer 2003;Mutz and Mondak 2006;Peffley et al. 2001) and hold meaningful opinions on the important political issues of the day (Zaller 1992). Some argue that information deficiencies can be overcome as people can rely on cues from the media and political elites (e.g., Lupia 1994Lupia , 2016Popkin 1991). ...
Labor unions have long been important political actors, mobilizing voters, shaping their members’ attitudes, and influencing representation and economic inequality. However, little is known regarding unions’ influence on political knowledge. In this paper, I argue that unions increase their members’ political knowledge through two mechanisms: direct information provision and workplace discussion of politics. I use data from recent national election surveys and a matching technique, showing that union members, particularly those with less formal education, who face higher costs in seeking out political information, are significantly more politically knowledgeable than their non-union counterparts and better informed about where political parties and candidates stand on the issues. I conclude by discussing unions’ capacity to reduce knowledge gaps and foster a more politically informed electorate.
... A different replication chain uses slightly more positive wording. An original article on citizens' political tolerance (Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001a) was replicated with the statement, "We regret to say that we found some significant differences when attempting to replicate" the study (Miller et al. 2001, 407). The replicators discussed reasons for the differences in the results and showed how they doublechecked their own procedures: "[w]e wanted to give the original analyses the benefit of the doubt" (Miller et al.,408). ...
... This raises the question for future research of how different principles and values are used in accepting or rejecting Muslim practices (e.g. Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001). ...
Rejection of Muslim religious practices in West European societies is typically explained by prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group. However, although people can oppose Muslim religious practices because they feel negatively towards Muslims as a group, they might also have more general reasons for doing so. By simultaneously considering multiple religious acts (wearing religious symbols and following religious education in public schools) and multiple religious actors (Muslims and Christians), we theoretically differentiate between individuals who apply a double-standard by rejecting Muslim but not Christian religious practices (discriminatory rejection) and those who reject practices independently of the religious group engaged in them (equal rejection). Among majority members in five West European countries, the findings support the existence of equal rejection next to discriminatory rejection with both patterns of responses having different associations with people's prejudices towards Muslim, their endorsement of civil liberties and secular values, and their religious affiliation.
... Scholars generally endorse this conceptual definition of political values, where political values are core to the self and guide political behavior. Values have been found to predict positions and attitudes on social welfare (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), government spending (Jacoby 2006), candidate evaluations (Feldman 1988), beliefs about racial equality (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and judgments on tolerance (Peffley et al. 2001), among others-leading to partisanship-aligned value polarization (Jacoby 2014). In fact, Schwartz et al. (2010) argue that values account for 54% of the variance in vote choice, concluding that values are foundational in explaining variation in political attitudes and behavior. ...
Worries about the instability of political attitudes and lack of ideological constraint among the public are often pacified by the assumption that individuals have stable political values. These political values are assumed to help individuals filter political information and thus both minimize outside influence and guide people through complex political environments. This perspective, though, assumes that political values are stable and consistent across contexts. This piece questions that assumption and argues that political values are socially reinforced—that is, that political values are not internal predispositions, but the result of social influence. I consider this idea with two empirical tests: an experimental test that recreates the transmission of political values and an observational analysis of the effect of politically homogeneous social contexts on political value endorsements. Results suggest that political values are socially reinforced. The broader implication of my findings is that the concepts scholars term “political values” may be reflections of individuals’ social contexts rather than values governing political behavior.
... Efforts to enhance tolerance (or reduce intolerance) feature in P/CVE efforts across a range of contexts [60][61][62]. Political tolerance was measured using three items (α = 0.79), based on measures used previously by Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz [63], that capture tolerance of a political/religious group disliked by the participant to make a speech in their city (M = 3.94, SD = 1.09), hold a meeting in their neighborhood (M = 3.43, SD = 1.14), and to use Facebook to recruit to their group (M = 3.51, SD = 1.23). ...
Governments across the West have invested significant resources in preventing radicalization, and strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) are increasingly prominent within wider counter-terrorism policies. However, we know little about their effects, especially about projects that utilize former extremists to counter extremist narratives and increase critical thinking. Despite the prominence of interventions utilizing “formers”, there are almost no systematic, scientific evaluations of these programs. The lack of evaluation is problematic given the recognized risks and negative effects of using formers to address other social issues, such as crime prevention. This paper presents findings from the largest study to date of the effects of using former extremists to prevent violent extremism. Based on a randomized controlled effect evaluation with 1931 Danish youths, it highlights significant successes, including reducing the perceived legitimacy of political violence, as well as negative effects, including a small decrease in political tolerance. Overall, the findings suggest a need for cost–benefit analyses of P/CVE initiatives, weighing the benefits against the risks.
... In writing this paper, we have studiously attempted to avoid value judgments in assessing how our respondents addressed the limitations, or lack of same, that they would put on free speech. We have viewed them, as Gross and Kinder (1989), Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz (2001), Cowan et al. (2002), and others do, as a clash between important values, such as between free speech and racial equality, or equal protection. ...
Higher education is increasingly under fire as a bastion of liberal intolerance, where freedom of expression is routinely curtailed to protect and coddle vulnerable individuals and foster inclusion. While much of this picture is exaggerated, recent evidence suggests there is some truth at the core of this claim. We explore student attitudes toward freedom of speech on campus using a think-aloud method, in which students are exposed to source material on a subject and “think aloud” as they work through it. We gain an in-depth picture of how students understand and make judgments about who should and should not be allowed to speak on campus. Students tend to be more restrictive than a civil libertarian might like, albeit in (usually) internally consistent and sympathetic ways. We conclude by suggesting interventions that could help students better understand the way First Amendment rights are typically adjudicated and balanced against other lofty goals.
... The Satisfaction with Life Scale served as a measure of well-being (SWL; example item: "In The magnitude of participant's value conflict was calculated with Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin's (1995) formula. Although this formula was initially developed to measure attitude ambivalences, it has been used to calculate value conflict as well (e.g., Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001). Applied to the present context, the formula reads as follows: ...
This paper explores the potential negative side-effects of the sustainability movement in societies with large segments of materialistic consumers. Across three studies, there is evidence that a conflict between materialistic and green value profiles can arise in consumers. When it arises, it seems to be related to diminished well-being. Study 1 shows that consumers with a higher value conflict (VC) experienced higher levels of stress. Consumers with higher degrees of stress then reported lower satisfaction with life. Study 2 reveals the underlying process by which this value conflict affects well-being. The results suggest that the value conflict is related to a reduced clarity of consumers' self-concept (SCC), which in turn is related to increased levels of stress and a lower satisfaction with life. Results of Study 3 show that preference for consistency (PfC) serves as a boundary condition to this effect. The negative effect of VC on SCC is most pronounced among consumers high in PfC, while low PfC consumers seem to suffer less from the negative consequences of a conflict between green and materialistic values. Conceptual and public-policy implications of these results are discussed.
K E Y W O R D S green values, materialism, preference for consistency, satisfaction with life, self-concept clarity, stress, value conflict
... Context is extremely important for understanding citizens' beliefs and perceptions regarding civil norms. While citizens are thought to generally hold positive views towards civil liberties, their general level of support can wane when these rights come in conflict with other important values (Gibson 1987;Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001;Sniderman et al. 1996). This may best be observed during extreme, context-specific events such as violent wars. ...
... This includes one's preference for safety, security, and order. How people order their competing values determines their views towards the importance of civil liberties (Gibson and Bingham, 1985;Peffley, Hurwitz, and Knigge, 2001). McClosky and Brill describe and suggest a balance between liberty and control (McCloskey and Brill, 1983). ...
