Figure 1 - uploaded by Jarret T Crawford
Content may be subject to copyright.
(Bilewicz et al.). Political orientation of social psychologists in Western and Eastern-European countries (United States N = 52, United Kingdom N = 22, Hungary N = 32, and Poland N = 26).
Source publication
Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity—particularly diversity of viewpoints—for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. This article reviews the available evidence and finds sup...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... since the early 20th century, the Democratic Party has been the Left-leaning party and the Republican Party has been the Right-leaning party (Levendusky 2009). In Figure 1, we have plotted all available data points on the political identity of psychologists at American colleges and universities, including both party identification (diamonds) and liberal-conservative identification (circles). Both sets of measures show a strong leftward movement. ...
Context 2
... other piece of evidence we have comes from an anonymous Internet survey conducted by Inbar and Lammers (2012), who set out to test Haidt's claim that Figure 1. The political party and ideological sympathies of academic psychologists have shifted leftward over time. ...
Context 3
... the trend toward political homogeneity seems to be continuing: whereas 10% of faculty respondents self-identified as conservative, only 2% of graduate students and postdocs did so (Inbar 2013, per- sonal communication). This pattern is consistent with the broader trends throughout psychology illustrated in Figure 1: The field is shifting leftward, the ratio of liberals to conservatives is now greater than 10:1, and there are hardly any conservative students in the pipeline. ...
Context 4
... have sounded this alarm before (e.g., MacCoun 1998;Redding 2001;Tetlock 1994). We have added to this small literature in three ways: (1) We have drawn on a larger set of studies to show that the under-representation of non-liberals is increasing (see Fig. 1); (2) we have identified specific risk points in the research process, and specific psychological mechanisms by which political diversity can improve social-psychological science (e.g., via minority influence, and by helping researchers to overcome the confirmation bias); and (3) provide a more comprehensive analysis of the multiple ...
Context 5
... a recent online study of 132 social psychologists from the United Kingdom, United States, Hungary, and Poland (Bilewicz et al., in press), we asked participants to indicate their political views with respect to social issues (e.g., religion or gender roles) and economic issues (e.g., taxes or welfare state) (Fig. 1). Social psychologists working in the post-Communist East European countries expressed rather right-wing political orientation with respect to economic issues and left-wing political orientation with respect to social issues, whereas Western social psychologists expressed left-wing orientation on both dimensions. Although East European ...
Context 6
... et al. identify the 1980s as the critical point tilting the field towards affiliating with the Democrats and thus allegedly to the left. However, the U.S.-party positions on the LLR scale over time (see Fig. 1) clearly show that both have strongly shifted towards the right of the political spectrum since the 1980s. As a result, Democrats currently hold a moderate position, whereas Republicans are positioned farther out on the right wing than they used to be. Thus, the relative increase in self-identified Democrats in the community can be ...
Context 7
... even if we treat the claim as largely true, it does not alter our conclusion that social psychology leans left. Our conclusions do not hinge on a single source of data, as we present evidence from multiple sources that social psychologists are politically homogeneous (see Figure 1 of the target article). This includes party identification, ideological identification, and attitudes towards policy issues (see Inbar & Lammers 2012). ...
Context 8
... academic psychology always tilted so far left? The existing data are imperfect, as the only data we could find that date back beyond a few decades examined party iden- tification (Democrat vs. Republican;McClintock et al. 1965), not ideological self-placement. Before the 1980s, party identification did not correlate with the left-right di- mension as strongly as it does today ( Barber & McCarty 2013). There used to be substantial minorities of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. Nonetheless, since the early 20th century, the Democratic Party has been the Left-leaning party and the Republican Party has been the Right-leaning party (Levendusky 2009). In Figure 1, we have plotted all available data points on the political identity of psychologists at American colleges and universities, including both party identification (dia- monds) and liberal-conservative identification (circles). Both sets of measures show a strong leftward movement. Psychology professors were as likely to report voting Republican as Democrat in presidential contests in the 1920s. From the 1930s through1960, they were more likely to report voting for Democrats, but substantial mi- norities voted for Wilkie, Eisenhower, and Nixon (in 1960). , however, the ratio of Democrats to Repub- licans had climbed to more than 11:1 (Gross & Simmons 2007;Rothman & Lichter ...
Context 9
... other piece of evidence we have comes from an anonymous Internet survey conducted by Inbar and Lammers (2012), who set out to test Haidt's claim that Figure 1. The political party and ideological sympathies of academic psychologists have shifted leftward over time. Circles show ratios of self-reports of liberal vs. conservative. Diamonds show ratios of self-reports of party preference or voting (Democrat vs. Republican). Data for 1924-60 is reported in McClintock et al. (1965). Open diamonds are participants' recollections of whom they voted for; gray diamonds are self-reported party identification at time of the survey. Data for 1999 is reported in Rothman et al. (2005). Data from 2006 is reported in Gross and Simmons (2007). The right-most circle is from Inbar and Lammers (2012) and is the ratio of self- identified liberal/conservative social psychologists. there were hardly any conservatives in social psychology. They sent an e-mail invitation to the entire SPSP discussion list, from which 292 3 individuals participated. Inbar and Lammers found that 85% of these respondents declared themselves liberal, 9% moderate, and only 6% conserva- tive 4 (a ratio of 14:1). Furthermore, the trend toward polit- ical homogeneity seems to be continuing: whereas 10% of faculty respondents self-identified as conservative, only 2% of graduate students and postdocs did so (Inbar 2013, personal communication). This pattern is consistent with the broader trends throughout psychology illustrated in Figure 1: The field is shifting leftward, the ratio of liberals to conservatives is now greater than 10:1, and there are hardly any conservative students in the ...
Context 10
... other piece of evidence we have comes from an anonymous Internet survey conducted by Inbar and Lammers (2012), who set out to test Haidt's claim that Figure 1. The political party and ideological sympathies of academic psychologists have shifted leftward over time. Circles show ratios of self-reports of liberal vs. conservative. Diamonds show ratios of self-reports of party preference or voting (Democrat vs. Republican). Data for 1924-60 is reported in McClintock et al. (1965). Open diamonds are participants' recollections of whom they voted for; gray diamonds are self-reported party identification at time of the survey. Data for 1999 is reported in Rothman et al. (2005). Data from 2006 is reported in Gross and Simmons (2007). The right-most circle is from Inbar and Lammers (2012) and is the ratio of self- identified liberal/conservative social psychologists. there were hardly any conservatives in social psychology. They sent an e-mail invitation to the entire SPSP discussion list, from which 292 3 individuals participated. Inbar and Lammers found that 85% of these respondents declared themselves liberal, 9% moderate, and only 6% conserva- tive 4 (a ratio of 14:1). Furthermore, the trend toward polit- ical homogeneity seems to be continuing: whereas 10% of faculty respondents self-identified as conservative, only 2% of graduate students and postdocs did so (Inbar 2013, personal communication). This pattern is consistent with the broader trends throughout psychology illustrated in Figure 1: The field is shifting leftward, the ratio of liberals to conservatives is now greater than 10:1, and there are hardly any conservative students in the ...
Context 11
... comparisons of extremism are notoriously difficult. (What criteria should we use in judging whether left-wing Democrats are to the right of the Tony Blair/ Gordon Brown wing of the British Labor Party?) But even if we treat the claim as largely true, it does not alter our conclusion that social psychology leans left. Our conclu- sions do not hinge on a single source of data, as we present evidence from multiple sources that social psychologists are politically homogeneous (see Figure 1 of the target article). This includes party identification, ideological identification, and attitudes towards policy issues (see Inbar & Lammers 2012). Neither Hilbig & Moshagen nor Seibt et al. present evidence showing that social psychologists are more aptly characterized as moderates or centrists. We also note that it is ever convenient to characterize one's own ideology as centrist or "moderate," while casting the other side as the true ideologues. Moreover, our target article presented direct evidence and examples of biased research, which is ultimately the core issue. Hilbig & Moshagen did not address that ...
Context 12
... a recent online study of 132 social psychologists from the United Kingdom, United States, Hungary, and Poland (Bilewicz et al., in press), we asked participants to indicate their political views with respect to social issues (e.g., religion or gender roles) and economic issues (e.g., taxes or welfare state) (Fig. 1). Social psy- chologists working in the post-Communist East European coun- tries expressed rather right-wing political orientation with respect to economic issues and left-wing political orientation with respect to social issues, whereas Western social psychologists expressed left-wing orientation on both dimensions. Although East European social psychologists were overall more right-wing than Western social psychologists, this difference was more pronounced for eco- nomic than for social issues. Despite a relatively small sample size, this study serves as a preliminary illustration of the differences between Western and Eastern social ...
Context 13
... have sounded this alarm before (e.g., MacCoun 1998;Redding 2001;Tetlock 1994). We have added to this small literature in three ways: (1) We have drawn on a larger set of studies to show that the under-representation of non-liberals is increasing (see Fig. 1); (2) we have identi- fied specific risk points in the research process, and specific psychological mechanisms by which political diversity can improve social-psychological science (e.g., via minority in- fluence, and by helping researchers to overcome the confir- mation bias); and (3) we have drawn on a wealth of new data (e.g., Gross 2013;Inbar & Lammers 2012) to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the multiple causes of the underrepresentation of non-liberals in social ...
Context 14
... et al. identify the 1980s as the critical point tilting the field towards affiliating with the Democrats and thus allegedly to the left. However, the U.S.-party positions on the LLR scale over time (see Fig. 1) clearly show that both have strongly shifted towards the right of the political spectrum since the 1980s. As a result, Democrats currently hold a moderate position, whereas Republicans are positioned farther out on the right wing than they used to be. Thus, the relative increase in self-identified Democrats in the community can be explained through the simple notion that scientists tend to favor a moderate, balanced position. In turn, the increase in self-identified Democrats cannot be taken as evidence in favor of a pro-left bias in the ...
Citations
... Specifically, our finding that minorities across ethnic and political backgrounds scored closer to right-wing Whites in their valence for strong leaders than to left-wing Whites highlights that it was left-wing Whites who were unique in their relatively strong aversion to strong leaders. Thus, it is the leadership preferences of left-wing Whites-who play a particularly important role in electoral politics (Brooks, 2018) and among psychologists and social scientists more broadly (Duarte et al., 2015;Inbar & Lammers, 2012)-that might need explaining. ...
The prevailing view among scholars has been that the preference for strong leaders is an idiosyncratic feature of right-wing individuals. However, it is unclear whether this inference is accurate given that prior research has largely overlooked the role of ethnicity. We analyzed data from the United States and Western Europe ( N = 34,443) and found that ethnic minorities (and right-wing individuals) preferred strong leaders to a greater extent than Whites (and left-wing individuals). Notably, ethnic minorities across diverse ethnic and political backgrounds were closer to right-wing Whites on strong-leader preference than to left-wing Whites. Our work also provides some evidence, using both measurement-of-mediation (Studies 1–4) and experimental mediation (preregistered Studies 5 and 6), that generalized trust helps explain group differences in strong-leader preference. In sum, our research illustrates the unique nature of left-wing Whites’ leadership preferences, and highlights the importance of testing social science theories using diverse participant samples.
... Moreover, empirical studies show that the average political attitudes of university academics are significantly more left-leaning compared to those of non-academic populations (Duarte et al. 2015). Therefore, scientists are even more urged to frame recommendations based on their own values hypothetically rather than categorically, to avoid the risk of losing the trust of the non-academic public. ...
... Second, it ignores the argument that political censorship and self-censorship represent structural and internal biases which threaten the integrity of science (Clark et al., 2023;Duarte et al., 2015). For example, in the German state of Bavaria, a recent prohibition was placed on the use of gender-equitable language by state employees, including scientists (Deutsche Welle, 2024). 1 In the United States, meanwhile, several state governments have enacted laws banning the teaching of critical race theory (Lukianoff et al., 2021). ...
... A common phenomenon in this context is objections to information that portrays historically 1 On a linguistic level, German uses gendered nouns (masculine, feminine, neuter), but Gendern-gender-equitable language practices-has recently aimed to neutralize certain gender distinctions in German language (Diewald & Nübling, 2022). disadvantaged groups unfavorably (Clark et al., 2023;Duarte et al., 2015). This is especially crucial in the field of historiography, where the representation of historical events and figures can be highly contentious (Rummel, 2002). ...
... For example, in the quantitative sciences, the preference for positive and significant results leads to biased literature (Fanelli, 2010(Fanelli, , 2011. Comparably, if publishability in historiography depends on political preferences, certain perspectives will be overrepresented while others are underrepresented, irrespective of the quality of the respective study, potentially skewing the historiographical record in favor of certain political perspectives while marginalizing others (Duarte et al., 2015). This could potentially lead to a file drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979), similar to the non-publication of non-significant results, but specifically involving the suppression of politically unfavored articles or books from being published in prestigious journals or book series. ...
Background This study examines the influence of political preferences on historians’ assessments of the publishability of contemporary history abstracts by investigating whether historians favor abstracts that align with their political orientation. Methods In an online experiment, 75 historians evaluated 17 fictitious contemporary history abstracts from 17 pairs, each presented with either a progressive or conservative stance. The participants made initial intuitive assessments regarding the publishability of each abstract and later provided more considered responses, also rating their Feeling of Rightness (FOR) regarding their initial judgments. Results The results revealed a significant interaction effect between an abstract’s political stance and historians’ political orientation, consistent with the observation that right-wing historians prefer conservative abstracts, left-wing historians prefer progressive abstracts, and moderate historians show no preference for either. Overall, participants preferred progressive abstracts, largely reflecting a majority of left-leaning historians in our sample. Moreover, after reconsidering their responses and providing FOR ratings, participants’ initial decisions did not significantly change. Conclusions Our study suggests that political preferences influence research evaluations and are not diminished by more deliberate processing, as demonstrated through the case study of historians.
... Research has shown that in the U.S., the U.K., and many other Western nations, there are more left-leaning than right-leaning journalists [19], [20], [21]. Similarly, academics also tend to lean, on average, left-of-center [22], [23], [24]. If the political preferences of individuals within the news media and academia influence the content they produce-especially content with political implications-and this content is subsequently used to train LLMs, then prevailing perspectives within these institutions could percolate into the models trained on that content. ...
Political biases in Large Language Model (LLM)-based artificial intelligence (AI) systems, such as OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's Gemini, have been previously reported. While several prior studies have attempted to quantify these biases using political orientation tests, such approaches are limited by potential tests' calibration biases and constrained response formats that do not reflect real-world human-AI interactions. This study employs a multi-method approach to assess political bias in leading AI systems, integrating four complementary methodologies: (1) linguistic comparison of AI-generated text with the language used by Republican and Democratic U.S. Congress members, (2) analysis of political viewpoints embedded in AI-generated policy recommendations, (3) sentiment analysis of AI-generated text toward politically affiliated public figures, and (4) standardized political orientation testing. Results indicate a consistent left-leaning bias across most contemporary AI systems, with arguably varying degrees of intensity. However, this bias is not an inherent feature of LLMs; prior research demonstrates that fine-tuning with politically skewed data can realign these models across the ideological spectrum. The presence of systematic political bias in AI systems poses risks, including reduced viewpoint diversity, increased societal polarization, and the potential for public mistrust in AI technologies. To mitigate these risks, AI systems should be designed to prioritize factual accuracy while maintaining neutrality on most lawful normative issues. Furthermore, independent monitoring platforms are necessary to ensure transparency, accountability, and responsible AI development.
... First, we found that by far most of the authors of the publications we reviewed are affiliated with universities in the Global North. While overrepresentation of knowledge production institutions located in the global north might not be unique for fundamentalism studies, we still think this finding is worth reporting as empirical (e.g., Duarte et al., 2015) and theoretical studies (e.g., Anderson, 1995;Elgin, 2017) have shown that diversity along many dimensions benefits nuanced scholarship and has a bigger chance of counteracting bias. Therefore, while biasing effects of the accumulation of epistemic power in the global north most likely is not a problem unique for fundamentalism studies, these effects nevertheless merit attention. ...
This scoping review of conceptualizations of fundamentalism scrutinizes the concept's domain of application, defining characteristics, and liability to bias. We find fundamentalism in four domains of application: Christianity, other Abrahamic religions, non-Abrahamic religions, and non-religious phenomena. The defining characteristics which we identify are organized into five categories: belief, behavior, emotion, goal, and structure. We find that different kinds of fundamentalisms are defined by different characteristics, with violent and oppressive behaviors, and political beliefs and goals being emphasized for non-Christian fundamentalisms. Additionally, we find that the locus of fundamentalism studies is the Global North. Based on these findings, we conclude that the concept is prone to bias. When conceptualizing fundamentalism, three considerations deserve attention: the mutual dependency between the domain of application and the specification of defining characteristics; the question of usefulness of scientific concepts; and the connection between conceptual ambiguity and the risk of bias in the study of fundamentalism.
... Furthermore, politics can shape individuals´ perception of the expertise, trustworthiness, or objectivity of scientists, resulting in the dismissal of their messages due to a perceived lack of credibility (Philipp-Muller et al., 2022). Scientists may be perceived as imbuing their research and methods with liberal values, thereby producing conclusions that mischaracterize conservatives (Duarte et al., 2015) or exhibit bias against Christians (Barnes et al., 2020). ...
... This approach reflects Slovak challenges with left-right self-identification, common in post-communist contexts (Otjes & Rekker, 2021). Political conservatism's association with unfavorable attitudes toward science in Western studies (Mann & Schleifer, 2020) may extend to Slovakia, where some conservatives may perceive scientists as aligned with liberal values (Duarte et al., 2015). However, the varied influence of religiosity and conservatism as predictors underscores the need for context-sensitive methodologies when studying populist attitudes. ...
Science-related populism has recently emerged alongside political populism. However, its occurrence, connections with political populist attitudes, and underlying factors have not been explored in the Central-European context. This study seeks to achieve three key objectives: (1) examine the relationships among science-related populist attitudes, their subdimensions, and political populist attitudes; (2) assess the prevalence of populist attitudes; and (3) analyze a set of explanatory and exploratory factors contributing to political and science-related populist attitudes. Drawing from a national sample of 643 Slovaks, our study highlights the importance of addressing science-related populism in parallel with political populism. It elucidates the intricate interplay between these attitudes, with political populism being more prevalent in the Slovak population, albeit intertwined with science-related populism. Several contributing factors, such as education, political orientation, religiosity, trust in science, relative deprivation, faith in intuition, and susceptibility to pseudoscientific beliefs, were identified. These factors offer valuable insights into the emergence of populist attitudes in Slovakia. The findings from this study hold significance for further research aimed at comprehending and addressing the phenomenon of science-related populism within the Central-European context.
... The possibility that these "cries" may be well-founded does not occur to them. That psychology (in particular) already has very serious problems with ideological (and, in particular, left-wing and Marxist) bias is virtually inarguable Clark et al., 2024;Duarte et al., 2015;Honeycutt & Jussim, 2023). Consistent with this is the belief held by many psychologists (both in private and in public) that the APA has become little more than a (leftist) partisan advocacy organization (Fergusson, 2023;Silander & Tarescavage, 2023). ...
... However, acknowledging the "moral ordinariness" of scientists offers a more grounded and realistic perspective. Research in social psychology shows that academics, like individuals in any other sector, are susceptible to the same coercive social pressures and groupthink prevalent throughout wider society (Duarte et al. 2015). This vulnerability often manifests as confirmation bias, where researchers are inclined to interpret data in ways that reinforce their existing beliefs, rather than seeking evidence that might contradict them. ...
This article offers an appreciative but critical response to Donovan Schaefer’s book Wild Experiment, focusing on the connection between emotion and reason, particularly in the context of conspiracy theories and scientific inquiry. While acknowledging the valuable insights provided by Schaefer’s cogency theory and its emphasis on the role of emotions in shaping beliefs and reasoning, I argue for a more nuanced understanding of the factors that contribute to the popularity of conspiracy theories and the success of science. In particular, I challenge Schaefer’s characterization of scientists as primarily driven by cold emotions and a fear of making mistakes. Instead, I emphasize the social structure of science and institutional practices that enable collective intellectual vigilance and the advancement of reliable knowledge.
... "[representants of woke culture] in their attempt to separate Black discursive accountability praxes--calling out, reading, and cancelling--from their origins in the creative spaces occupied by the oppressed, and reposition them as a threat to their real and aspirational peers, elite public figures fall victim to their own worst fears: a realisation that the social capital they've worked so hard for is hyperinflated currency in the attention economy" (Clark, 2020, p. 4 From the academic perspective, it is useful to explore whether "cancel culture" is a necessary tool for social justice or rather a harmful trend that undermines free expression in academia. Critics argue that the fear of being cancelled stifles open debate and discussion, leading to self-censorship (e.g., Williams, 2016) and a lack of diverse perspectives in academic and public discourse (e.g., Duarte et al., 2015;Clark, 2020;Norris, 2021;Traversa et al., 2023;etc.).13 ...
... Furthermore, the examination will explore the intersectionality of power dynamics and the voices that often bear the brunt of deplatforming efforts, shedding light on the potential consequences of suppressing these perspectives. By engaging in this analysis, we hope to uncover insights that can inform strategies for promoting open discourse while advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion in academic settings (Duarte et al., 2014;Norris, 2021;Sousa & Clark, 2018). In conclusion, a comprehensive analysis of deplatforming and its implications for free speech and DEI initiatives is necessary in order to understand the complexities and potential consequences of silencing certain voices and to find a balanced approach that promotes both open discourse and inclusivity in higher education (Norris, 2020). ...
Introduction: In recent years, the number of deplatforming attempts has increased at universities. Deplatforming is an attempt to block a person from speaking when certain groups find their content to be objectionable. An institution’s culture of free speech may affect the number of deplatforming incidents.
Methods: This study utilized data from a new database of deplatforming incidents on campus. The data were tested for correlations in relation to an institution’s free speech ranking and its level of DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) staffing.
Results: These initial results show a negative relationship between free speech ranking and deplatforming incidents, and a positive relationship between DEI staffing and deplatforming incidents.
Discussion: Institutions face the challenge of balancing an inclusive and equitable environment with the preservation of robust intellectual diversity and academic freedom. Finding this balance requires a thoughtful and deliberate approach that considers the nuances of promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion while safeguarding the principles of free expression and open dialogue.
Limitations: These results were only for Power 5 universities in the United States. A more diverse sample may show different results.
Conclusions: The culture of an institution is related to the number of deplatforming incidents that take place. This culture can be examined via its commitment to free speech and to its DEI staffing levels. Initial results show that these two factors have a relationship with the number of deplatforming incidents.
