Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline route

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline route

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Physical control systems are increasingly controlled by reconfigurable, network-enabled devices to increase flexibility and ease commissioning and maintenance. Such capability creates vulnerabilities. Devices may be remotely reprogrammed by a malicious actor to act in unintended ways, causing physical damage to mechanical equipment, infrastructure,...

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... 4. The Turkish government initially blamed the explosion on a mechanical failure. Later, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) claimed responsibility, though it is suspected that Russia was behind the attack. The attack caused a spill of 30,000 barrels of oil and shut down the pipeline for three weeks. Due to the routing of the pipeline, shown in Fig. 5, this cost British Petroleum $5 million per day in transit tariffs and the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan $1 billion in lost export revenue [8]. The pipeline itself was built with security in mind. Most of it is buried, and substations are surrounded with fences and barbed wire. Cameras monitor most of its length, and ...

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... While there has been considerable attention to attacks on Information Technology (IT) systems, such as data theft and ransomware, the vulnerabilities and dangers posed by industrial control systems (ICS) have received significantly less attention. Events such as the cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid, as well as attacks on oil and gas plants and nuclear facilities in Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively, have demonstrated not only the capability but also the willingness of nation-states and advanced cyber adversaries to disrupt and/or cause damage to an adversary's critical infrastructure [1]. Part of the reason for the lack of attention to cyberattacks on ICS is because of an underlying assumption that the control systems (that operate the pumps, valves and machines) are isolated from the public internet. ...
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