Table 4 - uploaded by Brock Stoddard
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Average percentage contributions by total endowment level.
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... variables are significant and take the expected signs; and the inequality interacted with 80 endowment remains negative and is still the only significant inequality variable. We test for whether the difference between the rich and the poor under inequality is robust to changes in the total Table 4. It is. ...
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We investigate the extent to which a real-effort effect and an inequality effect impact individuals’ prosocial behavior in the multilevel public goods game. We explore two symmetrical treatments: one where everyone participates in a preliminary task to obtain their initial endowment, and another where no one does, to assess the real-effort effect....
An index of public financial management among Indian states
Citations
Direct reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation when players are sufficiently equal, such that they have similar influence on each other. In the light of ubiquitous inequality, this raises the question of how reciprocity evolves among unequal players. Existing studies on inequality mainly focus on payoff-driven learning rules, which rely on the knowledge of others’ strategies. However, inferring one’s strategy is a difficult task even if the whole interaction history is known. Here, we consider aspiration-driven learning rules, where players seek strategies that satisfy their aspirations based on their own information. Under aspiration-driven learning rules, we explore the evolutionary dynamics among players with inequality in endowments and productivity. We model the interactions among unequal players with asymmetric games and characterize the condition where cooperation is feasible. Remarkably, we find that aspiration-driven learning rules lead to a higher level of cooperation than payoff-driven ones over a wide range of inequality. Moreover, our results show that high aspiration levels are conducive to the evolution of cooperation when more productive players are equipped with higher endowments. Our work highlights the advantages of aspiration-driven learning for promoting cooperation among unequal players and suggests that aspiration-based decision-making may be more beneficial for the collective.
This paper investigates the impact of economic inequality on people’s perceptions of fairness and willingness to cooperate. Using experimental and survey data, we distinguish people’s injunctive perceptions of fairness from experimentally observed behavioral patterns. We find that impartial observers hold shared perceptions of fair contribution rules. Individuals with their own money at stake hold conflicting views over fair contribution rules. We find that contribution patterns are more scattered under strong inequality than under weak inequality. Overall, we observe that voluntary contributions are lower under strong inequality than under weak inequality. Our results contribute to the debate about the behavioral consequences of income and wealth inequalities in modern societies.
Community‐based conservation is a widely adopted wildlife governance approach, but questions remain about the conditions under which this form of wildlife governance achieves success. Particularly, participating communities are often marked by considerable wealth and risk heterogeneities that are driven by differences in livestock or agricultural holdings and varying exposure to wildlife depredation of those holdings.
The effect of these types of heterogeneity on successful conservation collective action is understudied, particularly in the case of risk heterogeneity. This lacuna limits policymakers' ability to effectively match the design of community‐based programs to their particular settings.
Using established behavioural experimental techniques, we model the incentive structures underlying community‐based wildlife conservation where actors differ in wealth and exposure to human–wildlife conflict. We conduct a modified binary linear voluntary contribution mechanism game, in which we vary subject endowments and risk of incurring a loss when participating in collective action and we find that the type of heterogeneity matters to collective action success.
On their own, the presence of either economic or risk heterogeneities (but not both) dampen cooperation compared with homogeneous groups, as do ‘balanced’ distributions of both heterogeneities (where individuals facing high risk levels receive high endowments and vice versa). However, groups with ‘unbalanced’ heterogeneities (where those facing high risk levels receive low endowments and vice versa) demonstrate cooperation at similar levels to that of homogeneous groups.
At the individual level, risk drives cooperative behaviour, although its impact is influenced by relative wealth levels when both forms of heterogeneity are present.
These findings suggest the need for a more in‐depth look at the role and interaction of risk and wealth heterogeneities in conservation management.
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How people cooperate to provide public goods is an important scientific question and relates to many societal problems. Previous research studied how people cooperate in stable groups in repeated or one-time-only encounters. However, most real-world public good problems occur in groups with a gradually changing composition due to old members leaving and new members arriving. How group changes are related to cooperation in public good provision is not well understood. To address this issue, we analyze a dataset from an online public goods game comprising approximately 1.5 million contribution decisions made by about 135 thousand players in about 11.3 thousand groups with about 234 thousand changes in group composition. We find that changes in group composition negatively relate to cooperation. Our results suggest that this is related to individuals contributing less in the role of newcomers than in the role of incumbents. During the process of moving from newcomer status to incumbent status, individuals cooperate more and more in line with incumbents. Little is known about the dynamics of human cooperation in groups with changing compositions. Using data from a large-scale and long-term online public goods game, this study shows how group changes are associated with temporarily lower cooperation.
International economic theory suggests that people should embrace economic integration because it promises large gains. But policy reversals such as Brexit indicate a desire for economic disintegration. Here we report results of an experiment of how size and cross-country distribution of gains from integration influence individuals’ inclination to cooperate to reap its intended benefits and to embrace or reject integration. The design considers an indefinitely repeated helping game with multiple equilibria and strategic uncertainty. The data reveal that inequality of potential gains neither affected behavior nor reduced support for economic integration. However, integration may lead to disappointing, unequally distributed welfare gains, undermining support for the policy. This suggests that to better assess integration policies, we should account for the spillover effects of integration on behavior. Miscalculating this behavioral aspect may undermine the intended development goals and motivate calls for dramatic policy-reversals.
Individuals vary in their access to resources, social connections and phenotypic traits, and a central goal of evolutionary biology is to understand how this variation arises and influences fitness. Parallel research on humans has focused on the causes and consequences of variation in material possessions, opportunity and health. Central to both fields of study is that unequal distribution of wealth is an important component of social structure that drives variation in relevant outcomes. Here, we advance a research framework and agenda for studying wealth inequality within an ecological and evolutionary context. This ecology of inequality approach presents the opportunity to reintegrate key evolutionary concepts as different dimensions of the link between wealth and fitness by (i) developing measures of wealth and inequality as taxonomically broad features of societies, (ii) considering how feedback loops link inequality to individual and societal outcomes, (iii) exploring the ecological and evolutionary underpinnings of what makes some societies more unequal than others, and (iv) studying the long-term dynamics of inequality as a central component of social evolution. We hope that this framework will facilitate a cohesive understanding of inequality as a widespread biological phenomenon and clarify the role of social systems as central to evolutionary biology.
We experimentally study the impact of inequality on the effectiveness of contests for funding public goods in a development context. We observe that the typical result of a lottery funding mechanism leading to greater funding for the public good than predicted by theory extends to groups with inequality. However, while theory suggests that increased inequality should lower total contributions to a lottery funded public good, we observe the opposite pattern. This result differs from prior results for the standard voluntary contribution mechanism where increased inequality has been found to reduce public good provision. Moreover, we find that the poor do not contribute a greater share of their endowment to the public good than do the wealthy. Thus, overall our study demonstrates the potential for community development projects, when funded with a lottery mechanism, to be highly successful even in the presence of inequality and may facilitate a progressive redistribution of wealth.
Over the past decade, inequality has become one of the most complex and troubling challenges in the global economy. Many scientists are determined to eliminate inequality to achieve full cooperation. However, our research shows that not all inequalities hinder cooperation. In this article, we study the effects of inequality by introducing the disassortative mixing of the investment amount and enhancement factor assigned to certain individuals in the public goods game. Compared with the traditional version, we find that cooperation can be effectively promoted by aligned inequality, which means that individuals with the highest (lowest) investment capabilities contribute the greatest (lowest) investment amounts. The promotion of cooperation mainly depends on the heterogeneous contribution ability of players. Specifically, cooperators with high contribution ability can maximize collective benefits, causing cooperators with low contribution ability to form compact clusters and resist invasion by defectors. Our research indicates that the diversity of individual endowment and productivity may have a non-negligible influence on the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals. The frequency of cooperation ρc as a function of the enhancement factor r for different correlation coefficients.
This paper experimentally explores the link between poverty and decisions that lead environmental degradation. In the experiment, individuals with different wealth levels play a game that describes environmental degradation as a contribution to an activity that generates a negative externality. The experimental data show that wealth levels not related to the environment (exogenous poverty) play no significant role in environmental decisions. However, the variation in wealth as a consequence of the contribution to environmental degradation (endogenous poverty) affects the behavior of individuals, that enter a spiral of poverty and environmental degradation. These results suggest the existence of a poverty-environment trap.
