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Arbitrarisation. (A) Egyptian hieroglyph representing a bull-head, (B) Phoenician glottal stop [?], first letter of the Phoenician alphabet (C) The first letter of the Greek alphabet: Alpha [a] – (as a capital and as a small letter).
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Language—often said to set human beings apart from other animals—has resisted explanation in terms of evolution. Language has—among others—two fundamental and distinctive features: syntax and the ability to express non-present actions and events. We suggest that the relation between this representation (of non-present action) and syntax can be anal...
Citations
... Mirror neurons are found in various brain regions of the human brain, particularly the posterior inferior frontal gyrus and premotor cortex, and their activation is crucial for action observation, action understanding, and imitation learning of action behaviors [17,18]. In addition, the functional areas of language function and mirror neuron system overlapped in the left Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), ventral premotor cortex, parietal lobule cortex, and superior temporal sulcus cortex [19]. According to the theory of speech action perception, the production of a sentence or a single time involving an action will produce a mapping in the cerebral motor cortex under the corresponding word meaning, which may promote the recovery of hand motor function, and the MNS system may play a mediating role in the interactive promotion process of the two [20]. ...
Post-stroke aphasia and hand movement dysfunction are common and disabling conditions. Observations indicate that most patients with post-stroke aphasia also suffer from hand movement dysfunction. Research in human evolution, behavior, and neuroscience has revealed a strong connection between language function and hand-motor function, with the latter playing a critical role in language use. Consequently, there is an urgent need for the development of new, comprehensive, and efficient rehabilitation methods for post-stroke aphasia that is accompanied by hand dysfunction. One promising approach involves investigating the shared neural networks between language and hand function as a foundation for novel treatment methods. This article aims to review the current state of clinical research on comprehensive treatments for stroke-induced aphasia and hand dysfunction, as well as to explore their underlying neural mechanisms. The results of this study may provide a valuable reference for the advancement of treatment technologies that effectively address both dysfunctions and enhance clinical outcomes.
Most researchers in the field of language evolution share the assumption that before the evolution of language could even begin, a complex social development must have taken place, establishing new forms of collaboration and trust between the members of a group, not seen among any other apes. The reason for this is that linguistic communication requires trust since it is typically not backed up by direct evidence. According to Dor, Knight, and Lewis (2014, p. 4), virtually all researchers agree that an unprecedented level of collective cooperation and trust was needed for the first steps toward the evolution of language to occur. This paper aims to show that this dominant assumption is unnecessary. We support our claim through a methodological suggestion: the investigation into language evolution should not begin with the traditional assumptions about language, but with the use of contemporary evolutionary theory to inform us how language should be conceptualized to be evolutionary explainable. One well-supported view is the function-first approach (von Heiseler, 2020), where a new function is initially fulfilled by a behavioral shift that exploits an already existing structure (Mayr, 2001, pp. 224-229). Since in a novel configuration, the new behavior is adaptive, the elements that were used for this behavior will adapt by natural selection to fulfill the new function. This process usually begins with a change in the evolutionary configuration (an arrangement of the physiological, environmental, and social components and constraints that jointly constitute the development and sustainment of an adaption by natural selection), making the new function adaptive.
Humans distinguish themselves from other primates by their cognitive abilities and social structure. This paper aims to show that the distinctive structure of human societies is the foundation of the evolution of human cognition and not merely a result of already human-like existing individuals coming together. It is suggested that, triggered by a geological event, the social structure of our ancestors fundamentally changed to an evolutionary configuration where-driven by a novel reputation economy and its non-cognitive functional precursor-culture and the brain coevolved in a runaway process. It is argued that many distinctive human traits-such as language, human cooperation, theory of mind, epistemic vigilance, overimitation, the desire for recognition, sensitivity to values, social emotions, and the notion of moral agency-can be explained by an adaptation to the novel evolutionary configuration, as individuals needed to communicate and understand past actions and how they were valued in a given society. A gradual scenario is presented which explains how the system developed from a configuration in which absent actions were instinctively and unconsciously displayed using natural signs to a social system in which knowledge of past actions was transmitted by stories and translated into reputation and social status-making both cooperative behavior and linguistic communication reproductively beneficial. This major transition in evolution changed the relation between social status and the exploitation of the environment in a way that can eventually unite the hunting hypothesis and the social intelligence hypothesis of human evolution.
This paper contributes to two debates: the debate about language evolution and the debate about the foundations of human collaboration. While both cooperation and language may give the impression of being adaptations that evolved for the “good of the group,” it is well established that the evolution of complex traits cannot be a direct result of group selection. In this paper I suggest how this tension can be solved: both language and cooperation evolved in a unique two-level evolutionary system which was triggered by a well-documented geological event—the drying out of the climate—in East Africa, which subsequently reduced the intermating between groups and thus made it possible that the mechanism that produced differences between groups (including social forms of selection such as female choice) could be the target of natural selection on the group level. If a social form of selection (e.g., sexual selection) produced differences in fitness between groups, the displacement process between groups would indirectly select those forms of social selection that produce groups that would displace all others. The main hypothesis presented in this paper is that, in this situation, a backchannel between the two levels of selection naturally evolves. A backchannel between the two levels would, for example, emerge when sexual selection (or any other form of social selection) was sensitive to the individual’s contribution to the group. Examples of systems utilizing a backchannel are nerve cells being better nourished when used more frequently, enabling them to be conducive to the survival of the whole organism, or a law firm in which all employees get paid to the extent that they contribute to the survival and success of the firm. In both cases, the selection on the higher level informs the selection on the lower level. The aim of the paper is to illuminate these rather opaque claims, to which the reader probably has many objections in this abridged form.
This paper contributes to two debates: the debate about language evolution and the debate about the foundations of human collaboration. While both cooperation and language may give the impression of being adaptations that evolved for the “good of the group,” it is well established that the evolution of complex traits cannot be a direct result of group selection. In this paper I suggest how this tension can be solved: both language and cooperation evolved in a unique two-level evolutionary system which was triggered by a well-documented geological event—the drying out of the climate—in East Africa, which subsequently reduced the intermating between groups and thus made it possible that the mechanism that produced differences between groups (including social forms of selection such as female choice) could be the target of natural selection on the group level. If a social form of selection (e.g., sexual selection) produced differences in fitness between groups, the displacement process between groups would indirectly select those forms of social selection that produce groups that would displace all others. The main hypothesis presented in this paper is that, in this situation, a backchannel between the two levels of selection naturally evolves. A backchannel between the two levels would, for example, emerge when sexual selection (or any other form of social selection) was sensitive to the individual’s contribution to the group. Examples of systems utilizing a backchannel are nerve cells being better nourished when used more frequently, enabling them to be conducive to the survival of the whole organism, or a law firm in which all employees get paid to the extent that they contribute to the survival and success of the firm. In both cases, the selection on the higher level informs the selection on the lower level. The aim of the paper is to illuminate these rather opaque claims, to which the reader probably has many objections in this abridged form.
This paper proposes a social account for the origin of the truth value and the emergence of the first declarative sentence. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis: that the cognitive evolution of humans is first and foremost an adaptation to social demands. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing is used for a new purpose. Applied to the emergence of declarative sentences, this suggests something already existing—natural signs (which have a logical or causal relation to what they denote)—were used for the declarative function and thereby integrated (in the form of indexical objects implying a past action) into communication. I show that the display of an indexical object (such as the display of hunting trophies) can imply a conceptual structure similar to that informing the syntax of sentences. The view developed in this paper is broadly consistent with the argumentative theory of Mercier and Sperber, which suggests that reasoning is less adapted to decision making than to social purposes such as winning disputes or justifying one’s actions. In this paper I extend this view to the origin of the concept of truth. According to my proposal, the first declarative sentence (articulated in a simple sign language) emerged as a negation of a negation of an implicit statement expressed by the display of an indexical object referring to a past action. Thereby, I suggest that the binary structure of the truth value underlying any declarative sentence is founded on disagreements based on conflicts of interest. Thus, I deny that the concept of truth could have evolved for instrumental reasons such as solving problems, or through self-questioning about what one ought to believe.
This paper discusses indexical signaling as a possible precursor of declarative sentences in the evolution of language. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing is used for a new purpose. Applied to the emergence of declarative sentences, this suggests that for language evolution to begin, something already existing was used for a declarative function (expressing a proposition). Thus, the evolutionary hypothesis presented here is that before human language began to develop, natural signs (such as indexical objects) were integrated into communication. I show that such a behavioral display can imply a conceptual structure similar to that informing the syntax of sentences: the displayer represents the thematic role of agent, while an indexical object (e.g. a hunting trophy) plays the role of patient.
