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Anticipated cooperative collision avoidance (ACCA) service architecture with two connected vehicle original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Vehicle OEM A communicates over the UDP/IP and HTTP protocols, and vehicle OEM B communicates over the TCP/IP with MQTT protocol.
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Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications enable real-time information exchange between vehicles and infrastructure, which extends the perception range of vehicles beyond the limits of on-board sensors and, thus, facilitating the realisation of cooperative, connected, and automated mobility (CCAM) services that will improve road safety and traffic...
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... is important noting that this work focuses on the ACCA service architecture designed and implemented in the context of the 5GCroCo project [14]. Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of the ACCA service, illustrating the communication interfaces between vehicles and the applications that are deployed outside of the vehicles. For the sake of brevity, we shall refer these applications as backend services hereafter. ...
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... achieve the low-latency benefits, the backend services are deployed close to end-users, i.e., at the edge clouds configured on the MEC infrastructure. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, two edge cloud instances are depicted in Figure 1, where each edge cloud instance is operated by a different mobile network operator (MNO), e.g., MNO1 and MNO2, and these two edge cloud instances are connected to a centralised cloud deployment. There are two types of vehicles, i.e., OEM A and OEM B, which indicate two different automakers. ...
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... are two types of vehicles, i.e., OEM A and OEM B, which indicate two different automakers. A vehicle can communicate with the backend service at the edge cloud through an MNO using the preferred V2X communication protocol, i.e., either UDP/HTTP for vehicle OEM A or MQTT for vehicle OEM B, as can be seen in Figure 1. It is obvious that the use of MQTT for V2X communication is a natural choice when the backend services are also based on MQTT. ...
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... client may subscribe to topics specifying part of such path as well as using wildcards. In the ACCA service architecture that is depicted in Figure 1, the messages exchanged between different clients are belonging to either inQueue topic or outQueue topic roots. The inQueue topics (e.g., inQueue/v2x/denm/source_id/roi) are used to publish messages from OBUs towards the Edge Geoservers, and from the Edge Geoservers towards the TMS. ...
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... have considered three different test cases to validate the functionalities and V2X communication interfaces of the OBU. For each test case, we have used a different combination of V2X communication protocols between the OBUs connected with one edge cloud, which consists of an Edge Geoserver and an Edge MQTT broker, as depicted in Figure 1. The schematic representation of the test cases is shown in Figure 7 and the operation of the OBUs in each test case is described below. ...
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... have measured the application-level latency in two different scenarios based on the ACCA service architecture that is presented in Figure 1. In the first scenario, a road hazard is detected by one vehicle, and its OBU transmits a DENM message to the edge cloud application. ...
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... the first campaign, OBU 1 and OBU 2 were connected to the same edge cloud and the V2X information exchange between both OBUs did not traverse through the TMS. In the second campaign, the OBUs were connected to two different edge clouds, with OBU 1 and OBU 2 being connected to edge cloud 1 and 2, respectively, establishing the communication between both edge clouds through the TMS, as shown in Figure 1. ...
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div class="section abstract"> With the proliferation of ADAS and autonomous systems, the quality and quantity of the data to be used by vehicles has become crucial. In-vehicle sensors are evolving, but their usability is limited to their field of view and detection distance. V2X communication systems solve these issues by creating a cooperative perception domain amongst road users and the infrastructure by communicating accurate, real-time information.
In this paper, we propose a novel Consolidated Object Data Service (CODS) for multi-Radio Access Technology (RAT) V2X communication. This service collects information using BSM packets from the vehicular network and perception information from infrastructure-based sensors. The service then fuses the collected data, offering the communication participants with a consolidated, deduplicated, and accurate object database. Since fusing the objects is resource intensive, this service can save in-vehicle computation costs. The combination of diverse input sources improves the object detection accuracy, which can benefit the vehicle's ADAS or autonomous driving functions.
A testbed was developed to evaluate the performance of the system under three network architectures – local RSU, Edge and the Cloud. The CODS resided in virtual machines in the corresponding three locations. The OBUs and RSU used had multi-RAT (C-V2X PC5 and 5G Uu) connectivity. A connected thermal camera was used as the infrastructure sensor in our setup.
The paper presents the performance evaluation of various CODS realizations, deployment details of the testbed on a live network and introduces our promising experimental results, explaining the trade-offs of the different deployment schemes and their effects on system fidelity and communication characteristics.
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