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Adjusted odds ratio of each predictor for the decision to switch partners Estimates of how much each predictor affected the decision to switch partners, when controlling for the five others. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates a greater likelihood of partner switching; an odds ratio less than 1 indicates a lower probability of partner switching. Bars are 95% confidence intervals. Reciprocation by the participant = percent of 3P that the participant returned to the truster (0–100%). Punishment by the partner = whether the truster punished the participant’s response (1, 0). Trust = P, the number of points the participant sent to the responder (0–100). Defection by the responder = the responder defected or reciprocated on the participant (1, 0). Amount paid to punish the responder = number of points the participant paid to punish the responder (0–50).
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Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate motivations to reciprocate and punish accordingly. The...
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Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment for behaviors that harm the interests of groups with different reputations. However, conventional pairwise int...
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Fundamental frequency ( f o ) is the most perceptually salient vocal acoustic parameter, yet little is known about how its perceptual influence varies across societies. We examined how f o affects key social perceptions and how socioecological variables modulate these effects in 2,647 adult listeners sampled from 44 locations across 22 nations. Low male f o increased men’s perceptions of formidability and prestige, especially in societies with higher homicide rates and greater relational mobility in which male intrasexual competition may be more intense and rapid identification of high-status competitors may be exigent. High female f o increased women’s perceptions of flirtatiousness where relational mobility was lower and threats to mating relationships may be greater. These results indicate that the influence of f o on social perceptions depends on socioecological variables, including those related to competition for status and mates.
Negatively sanctioning cheaters promotes cooperation. But do all negative sanctions have the same consequences? In dyadic cooperation, there are two ways that cooperators can sanction failures to reciprocate: by inflicting punishment or withdrawing cooperation. Although punishment can be costly, it has been proposed that this cost can be recouped if punishers acquire better reputations than non-punishers and, therefore, are favored as cooperation partners. But the evidence so far is mixed, and nothing is known about the reputations of those who sanction by withdrawing cooperation. Here, we test two novel hypotheses about how inflicting negative sanctions affects the reputation of the sanctioner: (i) Those who withdraw cooperation are evaluated more favorably than punishers, and (ii) both sanctioners are viewed as less exploitable than non-sanctioners. Observers (US online convenience sample, n = 246) evaluated withdrawers as more cooperative and less vengeful than punishers and preferred withdrawers as a partner. Sanctioners were also viewed as more difficult to exploit than non-sanctioners, with no difference between punishers and withdrawers. The results were the same when punishment was costly (US college sample, n = 203) with one exception: Costly punishers, who lost their payoffs by punishing, were viewed as more exploitable than withdrawers. Our results indicate that withdrawing cooperation has advantages over punishing: Withdrawers are favored as cooperative partners while gaining a reputation as difficult to exploit. The reputational consequences of the three responses to defectors—punishing, withdrawing cooperation, and not sanctioning at all—were opposite to those predicted by group selection models.