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A mousetrap.
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Self, person, and identity are among the concepts most central to the way humans think about themselves and others. It is often natural in biology to use such concepts; it seems sensible to say, for example, that the job of the immune system is to attack the non-self, but sometimes it attacks the self. But does it make sense to borrow these concept...
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![Figure 1: Overview of the context model: core ontology and extensions [22]](profile/Tomasz-Miksa/publication/326340616/figure/fig1/AS:668181685338113@1536318336249/Overview-of-the-context-model-core-ontology-and-extensions-22_Q320.jpg)
![Figure 2: Overview of the ArchiMate concepts [23].](profile/Tomasz-Miksa/publication/326340616/figure/fig2/AS:668181685350402@1536318336339/Overview-of-the-ArchiMate-concepts-23_Q320.jpg)
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... [3,4] Bu sürecin temelinde kişiliği biçimlendiren ve yönlendiren, bireyi birey yapan, başkalarından ayıran duygu, tutum ve davranışların tümünün bütünlüğünü anlatan benlik kavramı yer almaktadır. [5,6] Benlik, bireyin kendini algılayış, kavrayış biçimidir ve diğer insanlarla olan ilişkilerini içermektedir. [5] Genel olarak, başkalarının kişiye ilişkin görüşlerinden kişiye yansıyanlar, kişinin kendine özgü değerlendirmeleri ile kendine ilişkin bilinçli algılarından oluşmaktadır. ...
... [5] Genel olarak, başkalarının kişiye ilişkin görüşlerinden kişiye yansıyanlar, kişinin kendine özgü değerlendirmeleri ile kendine ilişkin bilinçli algılarından oluşmaktadır. [5,6] Bu oluşumda önemli olan ideal benlik ile gerçek benlik arasındaki tutarlılıktır. İdeal benlik, "kişinin nasıl olması gerektiği" iken gerçek benlik "bir insanın gerçekte nasıl algılandığı" ile ilgilidir. ...
... [5] Dolayısıyla birey kendinden ne derece haberdar ve kendini ne kadar gerçekçi biçimde algılıyorsa benlik bir o kadar olumlu yönde gelişimini sürdürmektedir. [5,6] Yirmi dört saat hizmet vermesi ve sürekli etkileşim gerektirmesi nedeniyle hemşirelik mesleği açısında da benlik gelişimi oldukça önem teşkil etmektedir. [3,7] Örneğin, KOAH tanılı bir hasta "sen ne yaşadığımı nerden bileceksin, hiç nefes alamayıp öleceğini düşündün mü" dediğinde hemşire; kişisel değerlerini, davranış, tutum ve duygusal durumunu, hasta ile ilgili duygu ve düşüncelerini, hastaya karşı içten davranıp davranmadığının farkına varabiliyorsa hastanın bakım ve öncelikleri planlayabilir. ...
... First Part -Memory and personal identity Introduction In philosophy, there are two parallel traditions of reflection on selves and persons (Schechtman 2016). One of them is the epistemological tradition and focuses on the possibility of self-knowledge, on the transparency of self-access, and on the different levels of self-knowledge (Neisser, 1988;Fernández, 2013;Perry, 2017). ...
Dans cette thèse, je propose de repenser la mémoire afin de repenser l'identité personnelle. Je pars de la question suivante : Comment est-il possible que les personnes, malgré les changements qui les affectent, se reconnaissent comme mêmes à différents moments du temps ? Une réponse classique à la question diachronique de l'identité personnelle est qu’elle repose sur la mémoire : les souvenirs fondent notre continuité psychologique. Cependant, les récentes recherches empiriques sur la mémoire épisodique montrent qu'elle a une dimension constructive et qu'elle n'est pas seulement une capacité de stockage fidèle du passé. Qu'est-ce que cela change à la question de l'identité personnelle ? J’explore d’abord la théorie mémorielle de l'identité personnelle de John Locke, et je soutiens qu'être une personne, selon Locke, c'est se reconnaître comme telle à différents moments du temps et donc, dans cet acte d'auto-reconnaissance, constituer son identité personnelle. Je soutiens cependant que la vision conservatrice de la mémoire de Locke doit être révisée et je propose de repenser le concept de mémoire en m’appuyant sur les sciences contemporaines de la mémoire. Je soutiens qu’elle a une dimension constructive et propose une théorie de la mémoire constructive de l'identité personnelle. La mémoire épisodique est à la fois une capacité qui me permet de me reconnaître et, parce que cette reconnaissance n'est pas une simple reconnaissance mais la construction d'une représentation de moi-même à travers la collecte d'informations provenant de diverses sources, elle peut produire et constituer mon identité personnelle.
This dissertation offers a theory of emotion called the primitivist theory. Emotions are defined as bodily caused affective states. It derives key principles from William James’s feeling theory of emotion, which states that emotions are felt experiences of bodily changes triggered by sensory stimuli (James, 1884; James, 1890). However, James’s theory is commonly misinterpreted, leading to its dismissal by contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Chapter 1 therefore analyzes James’s theory and compares it against contemporary treatments. It demonstrates that a rehabilitated Jamesian theory promises to benefit contemporary emotion research. Chapter 2 investigates James’s legacy, as numerous alterations of his theory have influenced the field of emotion research over the past fifty years, including so-called neo-Jamesian theories. This chapter argues that all these variations of the Jamesian theory assume that emotions require mental causes, whether in the form of evaluative judgments or perceptual contents. But this demand is not present in James’s theory. Nor, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, is this assumption necessary or even preferable for a fecund theory that explains human and non-human emotions. Thus, Chapter 3 offers the details of the primitivist theory of emotion: emotions are affective states that contribute to perceptual states by affectively representing relationships between the sensed environment and the sensing organism. Rather than relying on prior perceptual contents as triggers, emotions operate concurrently with, and as influencers of, exteroception. The information they carry can be conceptualized according to the theory of affordances proposed by ecological psychologist James J. Gibson (1979): emotions inform emoters of their potential responses to ecological concerns. Chapter 4 then explains how the primitivist theory is compatible with uniquely human emotion episodes, namely instances in which we identify and conceptualize our emotional experiences according to introspective and contextual cues. It argues that one resource available for categorizing our emotional episodes is a felt bodily map: different emotion concepts correspond with patterns of increased or decreased activity across the body. Finally, Chapter 5 situates the primitivist theory within the debate about natural kinds in psychology. While emotion constitutes a natural kind, discrete emotions do not.
