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We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting, where voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur. In particular, we focus on how information about the distribution of preferenc...
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Context 1
... percent said that the election "reflected poorly on Virginia," (Jenkins, 1994). In the Virginia Table 3.1. ...Context 2
... Table 3.1 about here-- As we see in Table 3.1, Coleman would have had enough support to defeat both Robb and North in two-way races, and to at least tie North, if not narrowly defeat him, in a three-way race, if voting were based strictly on the utility/preference ratings used here. ...Context 3
... Table 3.1 about here-- As we see in Table 3.1, Coleman would have had enough support to defeat both Robb and North in two-way races, and to at least tie North, if not narrowly defeat him, in a three-way race, if voting were based strictly on the utility/preference ratings used here. ...Context 4
... it is useful to examine how the favorability rankings compare with reported vote intention. In Table 3.3, I present this comparison, and we see that an overwhelming percentage of respondents who rated Robb or North first also voted for that candidate. ...Context 5
... Table 3.3 about here-- From this table, we see not only that over half of Coleman's supporters voted for another candidate, but that they defected to Robb at a rate of 2.5 to 1. We can easily see that if everyone had voted sincerely, Robb would have finished a distant third. ...Context 6
... was Ventura's ability to keep the votes of his supporters that allowed him avoid the problems minor party candidates often face with strategic voters. Table 3.4, similar to table 3.1, shows the results of runoffs based on the feeling thermometer ratings of the three candidates. ...Context 7
... Table 3.4 about here - Perhaps the simplest way to distinguish between the two competing explanations is to examine a crosstabulation of the respondent's most preferred candidate and the candidate he or she plans to vote for. If the discrepancy is due to strategic voting, we would observe many of Ventura's supporters intending to vote for one of the major party candidates. ...Similar publications
This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels—collective but costly and non-binding price agreements—lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less competitive and pick higher prices in general. To test th...
In the first chapter, we tightly bound from the outside the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs in repeated games of private monitoring. To do this, we develop a tractable new solution concept for standard repeated games with perfect monitoring: Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium generalizes the operator approach of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchett...
We study strategic voting in a setting where voters choose from three options and Condorcet cycles may occur. We introduce in the electorate heterogeneity in preference intensity by allowing voters to differ in the extent to which they value the three options. Three information conditions are tested: uninformed, in which voters know only their own...
Citations
... As noted below, the findings were not significantly different in the two settings. 2. Fixing the number of parties to three (Forsythe et al., 1993;Rietz, 2008;Tyszler, 2008), four (Ferland, 2014;Labbé St-Vincent, 2013) or five Hix et al., 2013) is the most widespread practice in experiments. The average number of parties receiving at least 5% of the votes under PR systems is 4.3 and it is 3 under FPTP (Katz, 1997: 147). ...
... 20 Goeree & Holt (2005) use data on the participation game reported by Schram & Sonnemans(1996a, 1996b and find a maximum likelihood estimate of 0.8 for early rounds and 0.4 for late rounds. Tyszler (2008) reports an ML estimate of 0.55 using Brazilian data from a pilot experiment similar to the experiment reported in this chapter. 21 For u m = 8, for example, when µ = 1, the MLE probability of voting sincerely is 0.56 and of voting strategically it is 0.36. ...
Voting is likely the tool most strongly associated with the idea of democratic decisions, be it at national or local elections, decisions within a parliament, committees, juries or even at company boards. In turn, the outcomes of voting processes potentially affect a large constituency. Therefore, understanding voter behavior is of major interest in a variety of fields. In this thesis I approach voter behavior from the perspective of Political Economics. More generally, I address various aspects of individual behavior in the common arena. Specifically, this thesis investigates the impact of information on the extent of strategic voting, explores the motives behind economic voting and applies a similar toolbox to understand contributions to the public good in a non-trivial scenario. This is done using a combination of theoretical (behavioral modeling) and experimental analysis.
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.
