Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publications (24)2.09 Total impact

• Source

  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Absolutely stable roommate problems

  Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
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  ABSTRACT: Different solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set, ...) can be defined using either a direct or an indirect dominance relation. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems. Furthermore, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of an absolutely stable roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
  07/2011;
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  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation

  Georg Kirchsteiger, Marco Mantovani, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.
  CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic). 03/2011;
• Article: Connections Among Farsighted Agents

  Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon
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  ABSTRACT: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.
  FEEM: Sustainable Development (Topic). 08/2009;
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  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Strategic union delegation and incentives for merger

  Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: A unionized duopoly model to analyse how unions affect the incentives for merger is considered. It is found that both firms will merge if and only if unions are weak. However, once surplus-maximizing unions have the option to delegate the wage bargaining to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members), both firms may have incentives to merge even if the union bargaining power is strong. Moreover, the option of strategic delegation may harm both the unions and the firms.
  Applied Economics Letters. 01/2006; 13(1):1-5.
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  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers

  Ana Mauleon, José J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a different product is stable for low degrees of product differentiation; (iii) the mixed distribution network in which one retailer distributes both products while the other retailer sells only one is stable for high degrees of product differentiation and large link costs. We show that the distribution networks that maximize social welfare are not necessarily stable. Thus, a conflict between stability and social welfare is likely to occur, even more if the degree of product differentiation is either low or high.
  Economics of Networks eJournal. 07/2005;
• Article: Networks of manufacturers and retailers

  Ana Mauleon, Jose SEMPERE-MONERRIS, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer anda retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution & non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution & exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a different product is stable for low degrees of product differentiation; (iii) the mixed distribution network in which one retailer distributes both products while the other retailer sells only one is stable for high degrees of product differentiation and large link costs. We show that the distribution networks that maximize social welfare are not necessarily stable. Thus, a conflict between stability and social welfare is likely to occur, even more if the degree of product differentiation is either low or high.
  07/2005;
• Article: R&D networks among unionized firms

  Ana Mauleon, JosŽ SEMPERE-MONERRIS, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conflict. However, once unions settle wages such conflict disappears: the complete network is the unique pairwise and strongly stable network and is the efficient network whatever the spillovers.
  11/2004;
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  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures

  P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device.
  International Journal of Games Theory 07/2004; 32(4):519-531. · 0.30 Impact Factor
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  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures

  Ana Mauleon, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
  International Journal of Game Theory. 01/2004; 32(4):519-531.
• Source

  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Rationalizability for social environments

  Ana Mauleon, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well known solution concepts. We also provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set.
  Games and Economic Behavior 01/2004; 49(1):135-156. · 0.83 Impact Factor
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  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity

  Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which te union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition such that it is always optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing delegates and we we find that the efficiency loss due to strategic delegation may be quite important.
  05/2002;
• Article: Union Delegation and Incentives for Merger

  Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We analyze a unionized duopoly model to examine how unions affect the incentives for merger. We find that, once the union has the option to delegate, an increase in the union bargaining power can create incentives for the firms to merge.
  03/2002;
• Article: Product Market Integration, Wage Bargaining and Strike Activity

  Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We develop a spatial two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigage the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that, when product markets are separated, the wage level and the strike activity are decreasing with the transportation cost and the home market size. However, when markets are integrated, wages and strikes are now increasing with the transportation cost. Finally, we find that the opening of markets for competition has an ambiguous impact on both the negotiated wage and the strike activity.
  10/2001;
• Source

  Available from: Mauleon Ana

  Article: Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines

  Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient
  09/2001;
• Article: The equivalence of the Dekel–Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability

  P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that a player believes that with small probability her opponents choose strategies that are irrational, or assuming that their is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same refinement if strategy perturbations are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and if there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243–267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
  Economic Theory 03/2000; 15(3):677-687. · 0.66 Impact Factor
• Article: Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games

  P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way “best responses against small perturbations” are defined. It is shown that applying the spirit of these definitions to rationalizability leads to three different refinements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, respectively. We prove that weakly perfect rationalizability is weaker than both perfect and proper (Schuhmacher, 1995) rationalizability and in two-player games it is weaker than trembling-hand perfect rationalizability. By means of examples, it is shown that no other relationships can be found.
  International Journal of Games Theory 01/1999; 28(1):53-68. · 0.30 Impact Factor
• Source

  Available from: P. Jean-Jacques Herings

  Article: Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games

  P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent Vannetelbosch
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way "best responses against small perturbations" are defined. It is shown that applying the spirit of these definitions to rationalizability leads to three different refinements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, respectively. We prove that weakly perfect rationalizability is weaker than both perfect and proper (Schuhmacher, 1995) rationalizability and in two-player games it is weaker than trembling-hand perfect rationalizability. By means of examples, it is shown that no other relationships can be found.
  International Journal of Game Theory. 01/1999; 28(1):53-68.
• Source

  Available from: P. Jean-Jacques Herings

  Article: The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability

  P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well known solution concepts. We also provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set.
  Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 01/1998;
• Source

  Available from: uclouvain.be

  Article: Debt Valuation and Marketability Risk

  Pierre Tychon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: This paper studies the valuation of corporate debt contracts in an intertemporal setting under uncertainty taking into account the possibility that the bondholder will be unable to sell his asset. The model considers a coupon paying debt contract with default risk in a binomial setting. Randomly matched investors who place different values upon the firm in bankruptcy bargain for the price of the asset in a secondary market. With this framework we are able to isolate the influence of liquidity risk in the pricing of risky debt contracts. This influence is shown to be function of the heterogeneity of investors' valuations and the range of uncertainty concerning potential bankruptcy costs. In particular, even though mean bankruptcy costs may be relatively low, uncertainty about them can generate relatively large spreads. Furthermore this model is capable of generating a large variety of shapes for the term structure of yield spreads. Finally, the model captures the fact that early after the issue, a bond is relatively liquid and later becomes relatively illiquid depending on the underlying asset value.
  10/1997;
• Source

  Available from: Jose J. Sempere-Monerris

  Article: Bargaining with Externalities: Licensing of an Innovation

  JosŽ J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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  ABSTRACT: The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between bargaining organizational forms and the licensing of cost-reducing innovations, in order to assess the patent holders optimal policy as well as their welfare properties. Trading mechanisms based on bargaining models with voluntary matching become more relevant when the market for an innovation is small. Our main findings are that when we exclude the use of a reservation price different to the continuation value of the game, it is no longer true that the auction mechanism yields always higher profits to the patentee than a fixed fee. Furthermore, the patent holder prefers the take-it-or-leave-it to the fixed fee, the alternating bids or the simultaneous bids mechanism. Also, bargaining mechanisms allow the patentee to overcome the credibility problem associated with the reservation price. Regarding the social viewpoint (a social agency maximizing the domestic welfare under the assumption that the patentee is a foreign laboratory), it is the best the licensing through the simultaneous bids mechanism. Moreover, licensing through the take-it-or-leave-it is better than licensing through auction mechanisms.
  06/1997;