Vincent Vannetelbosch

Catholic University of Louvain, Walloon Region, Belgium

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Publications (61)18.5 Total impact

  • Ana Mauleon, Jose J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We analyze the formation of bilateral R&D collaborations in an oligopoly when each firm benefits from the research done by other firms she is connected to. In contrast to myopic stability, farsighted stability leads to R&D networks consisting of two minimally connected components, with the largest one comprising three-quarters of firms.
    Economics Letters 12/2014; 125(6):340-342. · 0.45 Impact Factor
  • Ana Mauleon, Jose J. Sempere‐monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance affect the formation of strategic alliances. We adopt the concept of contractual stability to predict the alliances that are going to emerge in the long run. We find that any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule. In addition, the grand alliance which is the efficient structure is stable. If we allow for side payments to compensate former partners, then some less efficient structures that were stable without side payments are no more stable. Moreover, we show that the stability of alliances under the unanimity rule to exit is robust to the type of firms, myopic or farsighted. Finally, there is no contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority decision rule.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
    Journal of Public Economic Theory 11/2014; · 0.37 Impact Factor
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    Gilles Grandjean, Marco Mantovani, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication -i.e. who is talking with whom -on the choice of messages, on their credi-bility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coor-dination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Ac-cording to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pairs of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communi-cation. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Neverthe-less, at the individual level, players' beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible. Tercieux as well as par-ticipants to presentations in Brussels, Lisbon, London, Maastricht, Milan, and Prague, for their valuable comments and suggestions to improve the paper. The authors would also like to thank Lorenz Kurrek and Christian Voigt for excellent lab assistance. Ana Mauleon and
    09/2014;
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    ABSTRACT: Pairwise stability [Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996] is the standard stability con-cept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others react to their actions. A different perspective assumes that agents are perfectly farsighted, proposing related stability concepts. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theo-ries, but find evidence against both of them: the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule of behavior, which we interpret as a form of limited farsight-edness. On aggregate, the selection among multiple pairwise stable networks (and the performance of farsighted stability) crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them, and not on efficiency or cooperative con-siderations. Individual behavior analysis corroborates this interpretation, and suggests, in general, a low level of farsightedness (around two steps) on the part of the agents., as well as participants to presentations in Barcelona, Bilbao, Paris and Utrecht for valuable comments and suggestions to improve the paper. Financial support from Spanish Min-istry of Sciences and Innovation under the project ECO2009-09120 and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition under the project ECO2012-35820 are gratefully acknowledged. Kirchsteiger acknowledges financial support by the BNB (Banque National de Belgique) grant on "The Evolution of Market Institutions" and by the ARC grant on "Market Evolution, Competition and Policy" (AUWB-08/13-ULB6). This paper supersedes "Myopic or farsighted? An experiment on network formation", CEPR Discussion Paper Nr. 8263, 2011.
    06/2014;
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    Nicolas Carayol, Rémy Delille, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players suffer or benefit equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.
    02/2014;
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
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    ABSTRACT: We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royal- ties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties.
    International Journal of Economic Theory 12/2013; · 0.38 Impact Factor
  • Mikel Bedayo, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among the seller, the buyer and the intermediaries at equilibrium. We show that a trading network is pairwise stable if and only if it is a core periphery network where the core consists of all weak (or impatient) agents who are linked to each other and the periphery consists of all strong (or patient) agents who have a single link towards a weak agent. Once agents do not know the impatience of the other agents, each bilateral bargaining session may involve delay, but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium. When an agent chooses another agent on a path from the buyer to the seller to negotiate bilaterally a partial agreement, her choice now depends both on the type of this other agent and on how much time the succeeding agents on the path will need to reach their partial agreements. We provide sufficient conditions such that core periphery networks are pairwise stable in presence of private information.
    02/2013;
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    Manuel Förster, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions about some common issue by taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents' preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 01/2013;
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
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    ABSTRACT: We consider a model of wage determination with private information in a duopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.
    Bulletin of Economic Research 06/2012; · 0.19 Impact Factor
  • Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
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    ABSTRACT: Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems and give these an intuitive interpretation. Whenever some of the conditions are not satisfied, it is important to know the kind of agents that are being investigated in order to use the appropriate stability concept. Furthermore, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of a dominance invariant roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
    01/2012;
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    GILLES GRANDJEAN, ANA MAULEON, VINCENT VANNETELBOSCH
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    ABSTRACT: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable sets (Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch 2009). We first show that under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. We then investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide or not with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks.
    Journal of Public Economic Theory 11/2011; 13(6):935 - 955. · 0.37 Impact Factor
  • Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: One form of bounded rationality is a breakdown in the commonality of the knowledge that the players are rational. In Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining game, assuming time preferences with constant discount factors, common knowledge of rationality is necessary for an agreement on a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) partition to be reached (if ever). In this note, assuming time preferences with constant costs of delay, we show that common knowledge of rationality is not necessary to reach always an agreement on a SPE partition. This result is robust to a generalisation, time preferences with constant discount factors and costs of delay, if the players are sufficiently patient.
    International Game Theory Review 11/2011; 01(03n04).
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    ABSTRACT: We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with her coalition members and with individuals outside her coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability imposes that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and effiency. Moreover, this new framework can provide in- sights that one cannot obtain if coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and independently.
    Review Economic Design 09/2011; · 0.29 Impact Factor
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    Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
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    ABSTRACT: Different solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set, ...) can be defined using either a direct or an indirect dominance relation. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems. Furthermore, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of an absolutely stable roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
    07/2011;
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    Georg Kirchsteiger, Marco Mantovani, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.
    02/2011;
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
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    ABSTRACT: What is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international network externalities in consumption? To address this question, we set up a spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous effect on prices.
    Economics Bulletin. 11/2008; 12(25):1-7.
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
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    ABSTRACT: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.
    Theoretical Economics. 04/2008; 6(3).
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    Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, Wouter VERGOTE
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    ABSTRACT: A vast and often confusing economics literature relates competition to investment in innovation. Following Joseph Schumpeter, one view is that monopoly and large scale promote investment in research and development by allowing a firm to capture a larger fraction of its benefits and by providing a more stable platform for a firm to invest in R&D. Others argue that competition promotes innovation by increasing the cost to a firm that fails to innovate. This lecture surveys the literature at a level that is appropriate for an advanced undergraduate or graduate class and attempts to identify primary determinants of investment in R&D. Key issues are the extent of competition in product markets and in R&D, the degree of protection from imitators, and the dynamics of R&D competition. Competition in the product market using existing technologies increases the incentive to invest in R&D for inventions that are protected from imitators (e.g., by strong patent rights). Competition in R&D can speed the arrival of innovations. Without exclusive rights to an innovation, competition in the product market can reduce incentives to invest in R&D by reducing each innovator's payoff. There are many complications. Under some circumstances, a firm with market power has an incentive and ability to preempt rivals, and the dynamics of innovation competition can make it unprofitable for others to catch up to a firm that is ahead in an innovation race.
    Theoretical Economics 01/2008; · 0.87 Impact Factor
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    Ana Mauleon, José J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.
    Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique 01/2008; 41(3):971-997. · 0.61 Impact Factor
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    Jean-Francois Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency.
    International Journal of Games Theory 07/2007; · 0.58 Impact Factor

Publication Stats

309 Citations
18.50 Total Impact Points

Institutions

  • 1994–2013
    • Catholic University of Louvain
      • • Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
      • • Institute for Economic and Social Research
      Walloon Region, Belgium
  • 1999–2011
    • Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
      Leioa, Basque Country, Spain
  • 2005
    • University of Valencia
      Valenza, Valencia, Spain
  • 2004
    • Maastricht University
      • Department of Economics
      Maestricht, Limburg, Netherlands
  • 1997
    • Tilburg University
      • CentER for Research in Economics and Business " CentER"
      Tilburg, North Brabant, Netherlands