Vincent Vannetelbosch

Catholic University of Louvain, Walloon Region, Belgium

Are you Vincent Vannetelbosch?

Claim your profile

Publications (55)12.97 Total impact

  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royal- ties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties.
    International Journal of Economic Theory 12/2013; · 0.38 Impact Factor
  • Mikel Bedayo, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among the seller, the buyer and the intermediaries at equilibrium. We show that a trading network is pairwise stable if and only if it is a core periphery network where the core consists of all weak (or impatient) agents who are linked to each other and the periphery consists of all strong (or patient) agents who have a single link towards a weak agent. Once agents do not know the impatience of the other agents, each bilateral bargaining session may involve delay, but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium. When an agent chooses another agent on a path from the buyer to the seller to negotiate bilaterally a partial agreement, her choice now depends both on the type of this other agent and on how much time the succeeding agents on the path will need to reach their partial agreements. We provide sufficient conditions such that core periphery networks are pairwise stable in presence of private information.
    02/2013;
  • Manuel Förster, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinions about some common question of interest. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert some effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions taking weighted averages of neighbors’ opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents’ preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society, and thus, make the society reaching a consensus. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. In sufficiently homophilic societies, manipulation accelerates (slows down) convergence if it decreases (increases) homophily. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We find that if the ability of the manipulating agent is weak and the agents underselling (overselling) their information gain (lose) overall influence, then manipulation reduces misinformation and agents converge jointly to more accurate opinions about some underlying true state.
    01/2013;
  • Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems and give these an intuitive interpretation. Whenever some of the conditions are not satisfied, it is important to know the kind of agents that are being investigated in order to use the appropriate stability concept. Furthermore, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of a dominance invariant roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
    01/2012;
  • Source
    GILLES GRANDJEAN, ANA MAULEON, VINCENT VANNETELBOSCH
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable sets (Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch 2009). We first show that under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. We then investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide or not with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks.
    Journal of Public Economic Theory 11/2011; 13(6):935 - 955. · 0.37 Impact Factor
  • Source
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with her coalition members and with individuals outside her coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability imposes that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and effiency. Moreover, this new framework can provide in- sights that one cannot obtain if coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and independently.
    Review Economic Design 09/2011; · 0.29 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Different solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set, ...) can be defined using either a direct or an indirect dominance relation. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems. Furthermore, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of an absolutely stable roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
    07/2011;
  • Source
    Georg Kirchsteiger, Marco Mantovani, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.
    02/2011;
  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: What is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international network externalities in consumption? To address this question, we set up a spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous effect on prices.
    Economics Bulletin. 11/2008; 12(25):1-7.
  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.
    Theoretical Economics. 04/2008; 6(3).
  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, José J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.
    Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique 01/2008; 41(3):971-997. · 0.61 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, Wouter VERGOTE
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: A vast and often confusing economics literature relates competition to investment in innovation. Following Joseph Schumpeter, one view is that monopoly and large scale promote investment in research and development by allowing a firm to capture a larger fraction of its benefits and by providing a more stable platform for a firm to invest in R&D. Others argue that competition promotes innovation by increasing the cost to a firm that fails to innovate. This lecture surveys the literature at a level that is appropriate for an advanced undergraduate or graduate class and attempts to identify primary determinants of investment in R&D. Key issues are the extent of competition in product markets and in R&D, the degree of protection from imitators, and the dynamics of R&D competition. Competition in the product market using existing technologies increases the incentive to invest in R&D for inventions that are protected from imitators (e.g., by strong patent rights). Competition in R&D can speed the arrival of innovations. Without exclusive rights to an innovation, competition in the product market can reduce incentives to invest in R&D by reducing each innovator's payoff. There are many complications. Under some circumstances, a firm with market power has an incentive and ability to preempt rivals, and the dynamics of innovation competition can make it unprofitable for others to catch up to a firm that is ahead in an innovation race.
    Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Papers. 01/2008;
  • Source
    Jean-Francois Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency.
    International Journal of Games Theory 07/2007; · 0.58 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Vincent Vannetelbosch, HUASHENG SONG
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We reconsider the Goyal and Moraga-González (Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 32 (2001), pp. 686-707) model of strategic networks in order to analyse how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. When governments cannot subsidize R&D, this conflict will occur if public spillovers are not very small. However, when governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a conflict is considerably reduced. Indeed, a conflict will arise only if public spillovers are very small or quite large. Copyright © 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
    Manchester School. 02/2007; 75(6):742-766.
  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network g[set membership, variant] G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.
    Games and Economic Behavior 11/2006; 67(2):526-541. · 0.83 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Olivier Tercieux, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Jackson and Watts (J Econ Theory 71: 44–74, 2002) have examined the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks. We provide a refinement of pairwise stability, p-pairwise stability, which allows us to characterize the stochastically stable networks without requiring the “tree construction” and the computation of resistance that may be quite complex. When a \frac12\frac{1}{2}-pairwise stable network exists, it is unique and it coincides with the unique stochastically stable network. To solve the inexistence problem of p-pairwise stable networks, we define its set-valued extension with the notion of p-pairwise stable set. The \frac12\frac{1}{2}-pairwise stable set exists and is unique. Any stochastically stable networks is included in the \frac12\frac{1}{2}-pairwise stable set. Thus, any network outside the \frac12\frac{1}{2}-pairwise stable set must be considered as a non-robust network. We also show that the \frac12\frac{1}{2}-pairwise stable set can contain no pairwise stable network and we provide examples where a set of networks is more “stable” than a pairwise stable network.
    International Journal of Games Theory 09/2006; 34(3):351-369. · 0.58 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: A unionized duopoly model to analyse how unions affect the incentives for merger is considered. It is found that both firms will merge if and only if unions are weak. However, once surplus-maximizing unions have the option to delegate the wage bargaining to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members), both firms may have incentives to merge even if the union bargaining power is strong. Moreover, the option of strategic delegation may harm both the unions and the firms.
    Applied Economics Letters. 01/2006; 13(1):1-5.
  • Source
    P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We show that the length of compulsory education has a causal impact on regional labour mobility. The analysis is based on a quasi-exogenous staged Norwegian school reform, and register data on the whole population. Based on the results, we conclude that part of the US-Europe difference, as well as the European North-South difference in labour mobility, is likely to be due to differences in levels of education in the respective regions.
    Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization, Research Memoranda. 01/2006;
  • Source
    Olivier Tercieux, Vincent Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008). We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the model, and we show that the collocation equations are locally Lipchitz continuous and directionally differentiable. In numerical experiments, we successfully implement a globally convergent variant of Broyden's method on a preconditioned version of the collocation equations, and the method economizes on computation cost by more than 50% compared to the value iteration method. We rely on a continuity property of the equilibrium set to obtain increasingly precise approximations of solutions to the continuum model. We showcase these techniques with an illustration of the dynamic core convergence theorem of Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008) in a nine-player, two-dimensional model with negative quadratic preferences.
    International Journal of Games Theory 01/2006; 34(3):351-369. · 0.58 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Ana Mauleon, José J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a different product is stable for low degrees of product differentiation; (iii) the mixed distribution network in which one retailer distributes both products while the other retailer sells only one is stable for high degrees of product differentiation and large link costs. We show that the distribution networks that maximize social welfare are not necessarily stable. Thus, a conflict between stability and social welfare is likely to occur, even more if the degree of product differentiation is either low or high.
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 06/2005; · 1.01 Impact Factor

Publication Stats

248 Citations
12.97 Total Impact Points

Institutions

  • 1994–2013
    • Catholic University of Louvain
      • • Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
      • • Institute for Economic and Social Research
      Walloon Region, Belgium
  • 2005
    • University of Valencia
      Valenza, Valencia, Spain
  • 2004
    • Maastricht University
      • Department of Economics
      Maestricht, Limburg, Netherlands
  • 1999–2000
    • Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
      Leioa, Basque Country, Spain
  • 1997
    • Tilburg University
      • CentER for Research in Economics and Business " CentER"
      Tilburg, North Brabant, Netherlands