David Masclet

CIRANO, Québec, Quebec, Canada

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Publications (69)20.35 Total impact

  • Gabin Langevin, David Masclet, Fabien Moizeau
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    ABSTRACT: We use data from the Trajectoires et Origines survey to analyze the labor-market outcomes of both second-generation immigrants and their French native counterparts. Second-generation immigrants have on average a lower probability of employment and lower wages than French natives. We find however considerable differences between second-generation immigrants depending on their origin: while those originating from Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey are less likely to be employed and receive lower wages than French natives, second-generation immigrants with Asian or Southern- and Eastern-European origins do not differ significantly from their French native counterparts. The employment gap between French natives and secondgeneration immigrants is mainly explained by differences in their education; education is also an important determinant of the ethnic wage gap. Finally we show that these differences in educational attainment are mainly explained by family background. Although the role of discrimination cannot be denied, our findings do point out the importance of family background in explaining lifelong ethnic inequalities.
    Working Paper du CREM. 09/2013;
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    ABSTRACT: Le marché du travail offre de nombreux exemples de discrimination, tant au niveau des salaires que dans les recrutements. Cet article a pour objectif de contribuer à la littérature en mettant en évidence l’existence de pratiques discriminatoires à l’embauche dans le cadre d’une expérience en laboratoire en effort réel. Dans cette expérience, l’employeur (le principal) doit recruter un employé (l’agent) afin de réaliser un effort de production. Le principal résultat de cette étude est qu’en l’absence d’une information pertinente sur la productivité des agents, le principal fonde sa décision d’embauche sur des signaux tels que le sexe ou le niveau de diplôme de l’agent. Ces résultats traduisent l’existence d’une discrimination à l’embauche à l’égard des femmes. De plus, cette discrimination n’a pas pour origine un favoritisme intra-groupe et serait potentiellement de nature statistique. Nous montrons à travers cette expérience l’intérêt de l’usage des expérimentations en laboratoire comme outils pertinents afin de tester les mécanismes amenant à la discrimination et l’efficacité des actions visant à sa disparition.
    REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE. 04/2013; 123:333-351.
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    David Masclet, Thierry Pénard
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    ABSTRACT: Feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like eBay or Amazon Marketplace. This article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders, through a set of experiments based on the trust game. Our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system. However, such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation. Our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems, by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation, and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders. In particular, a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner's rating decision before making their own decision provides better results, both in terms of trust and earnings.
    Applied Economics. 12/2012; 44(35):4553-4573.
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    ABSTRACT: This paper investigates experimentally gender and race discrimination in hiring decisions through a simple controlled setting where employers can observe workers’ individual characteristics before recruiting them. In this paper, we explore whether discrimination, if any, is statistical or taste-based. For this purpose, we varied across our treatments the level of information available to the employer during the hiring stage regarding workers’ potential ability. When no relevant information on ability is provided, we observe both significant gender and race discrimination. The introduction of information on ability or competitiveness reduces discrimination significantly, suggesting that discrimination is mainly due to a lack of information rather than preferences. Our findings indicate however that the reduction in discrimination strongly depends on the nature of the additional information available.
    CREM Working Paper - WP 2012-38. 11/2012;
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    ABSTRACT: We present a new experimental design that permits us to explore gender differences in both performance and compensation choice. We design a game in which participants are asked to choose between a flat wage and a tournament scheme and to perform under each scheme. Our data indicate that men and women of similar ability differ in both performance and compensation choice. Men are more likely to choose a tournament than a flat wage scheme. These findings reflect both higher women (men)’s concerns for equality (competitive preferences) and stronger men’s overconfidence. Our data also indicate significant gender differences in effort provision. Men increase significantly more their effort than women when moving from a flat wage to a tournament. More surprisingly, our data show that women provide significantly more effort than men under a flat wage scheme despite the absence of any penalty for shirking and the fastidious and boring dimension of the task. This gender gap remains highly significant after controlling for several individual and social preferences. As such, we believe that an interpretation in terms of gender differences in intrinsic motivation is the most consistent with all of our experimental findings.
    CREM Working paper ; WP 2012 - 36. 08/2012;
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    SIMON CORNÉE, DAVID MASCLET, GERVAIS THENET
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    ABSTRACT: We experimentally examine to what extent long-term "lender—borrower" relationships mitigate moral hazard. The originality of our research lies in recruiting not only students but also commercial and social bankers. The opportunity to engage in bilateral long-term relationships mitigates the repayment problem. Lenders take advantage of their long-term situation by increasing their rates. Consequently, borrowers are incited to take more risk. Improving information disclosure ameliorates the repayment but does not incite lenders to offer more credits. Social bankers exhibit a higher probability of granting a loan and make fairer credit offers to borrowers than the other subject pools do.
    Journal of money credit and banking 01/2012; 44(5). · 1.09 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: We examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by sequentiality. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects observe the contributions from earlier decisions in each round (“sequential treatment with information”) to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially within rounds, but cannot observe earlier contributions (“sequential treatment without information”). We also investigate whether average contributions are affected by the length of the sequence by varying group size. Our results show that sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions, but that the level of contributions increases when subjects are informed about the contributions of lower‐ranked subjects. We provide evidence that the so‐called “leadership effect” vanishes within rounds, and that group size has no significant impact on the average level of contributions in our sequential contribution games. (JEL C92, H41, D63)
    Economic Inquiry 01/2012; 50(3):567–584. · 0.98 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: We use skin conductance responses and self-reports of hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available. The application of sanctions activates a "virtuous emotional circle" that accompanies cooperation. Emotionally aroused cooperators relieve negative emotions when they punish free riders. In response, the free-riders experience negative emotions when punished, and increase their subsequent level of cooperation. The outcome is an increased level of contribution that becomes the new standard or norm. For a given contribution level, individuals attain higher levels of satisfaction when sanctioning institutions are in place.
    02/2011;
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    ABSTRACT: We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people's moral motivation is "weak." Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group members and on an intrinsic "moral ideal." We show that the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents lead to the decline of the average contribution over time. The model is compatible with persistence of over-contributions, variability of contributions (across and within individuals), and the "restart effect." Furthermore, it offers a rationale for conditional cooperation.
    Journal of Public Economic Theory 01/2011; · 0.37 Impact Factor
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    Klaus Abbink, David Masclet, Daniel Mirza
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    ABSTRACT: We study the relationship between inequality and inter-groups conflicts (riots), focusing on social inequality. Disadvantaged societal groups experience discrimination and thus have limited access to some social and labour resources like education or employment. First, we experimentally investigate whether social inequality is a driving force of inter-group conflicts. Second, we investigate the factors that make preferences for riot translate into actions. Riots require coordination. Our experiment consists of a two-stage game. First, subjects play a proportional rent-seeking game to share a prize. Social inequality is modeled exogenously by attributing to some subjects (the advantaged group) a larger share of the price than other subjects (the disadvantaged group) for the same amount of effort. In a second stage players can coordinate with the other members of their group to reduce (“burn”) the other group members’ payoff. Treatments differ in the degree of social inequality set between the two groups. We observe frequent social conflicts, where, as expected, disadvantaged groups riot more than advantaged groups. Surprisingly, the frequency of riots decreases with the degree of inequality. A control treatment allows us to identify resignation as the driving force behind this phenomenon.
    01/2011;
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    ABSTRACT: We study antisocial preferences in simple money-burning tasks. A decision maker can choose whether or not to reduce another person’s payoff at an own cost. We vary across tasks the initial endowment of the decider and the victim. We find that most conventional expectations are refuted: Subjects burn more when inequality is advantageous than when it is disadvantageous. Equitable distributions are particularly prone to destruction. These effects are reversed, however, when the equivalent tasks are framed as creation instead of destruction.
    01/2011;
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    ABSTRACT: Andreoni (1995) showed that pure framing effects may influence contribution in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) by comparing a standard public goods game, called the positive frame condition (giving to the public good), with a negative frame condition (taking from the public good) where the subjects' choice to purchase a private good makes the other subjects worse off. This paper aims at testing the robustness of such framing effects in the context of Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM). Our approach is original in that it combines both framing and provision point dimensions by comparing maintaining (taking from the public good) and creating (giving to the public good) contexts using Provision Point experiments. Consistent with previous findings, we find that individuals tend to be less cooperative in the maintaining frame than in the creating frame. Our results also show that the framing effects are stronger under a PPM than under a VCM and increase with the provision point level. These results may have important consequences for the management of environmental resources.
    Ecological Economics 01/2011; 70(6):1200-1210. · 2.86 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: We present a new experimental evidence of how framing affects decisions in the context of a lottery choice experiment for measuring risk aversion. We investigate framing effects by replicating the Holt and Laury’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 92:1644–1655, 2002) procedure for measuring risk aversion under various frames. We first examine treatments where participants are confronted with the 10 decisions to be made either simultaneously or sequentially. The second treatment variable is the order of appearance of the ten lottery pairs. Probabilities of winning are ranked either in increasing, decreasing, or in random order. Lastly, payoffs were increased by a factor of ten in additional treatments. The rate of inconsistencies was significantly higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in increasing and random than in decreasing treatment. Both experience and salient incentives induce a dramatic decrease in inconsistent behaviors. On the other hand, risk aversion was significantly higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in decreasing and random than in increasing treatment, in high than in low payoff condition. These findings suggest that subjects use available information which has no value for normative theories, like throwing a glance at the whole connected set of pairwise choices before making each decision in a connected set of lottery pairs. KeywordsRisk aversion–Lottery choice experiment–Framing effects–Experience effects–Incentive effects
    Experimental Economics 01/2011; 15(1):128-144. · 1.36 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short-run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare ? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the long run. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats.
    Economic Inquiry 09/2010; · 0.98 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: Cet article présente les résultats d'une expérience portant sur l'incidence de la manipulation de la réputation dans des systèmes d'évaluation décentralisés comme ceux mis en œuvre sur les places de marché électroniques tel eBay ou PriceMinister. Nos résultats expérimentaux indiquent que les agents n'hésitent pas à manipuler leur réputation même lorsque cela est coûteux, ce qui accroît artificiellement le nombre d'évaluations positives. La manipulation affecte les décisions d'évaluation des participants et a un impact négatif sur le niveau de confiance, dû à un moindre crédit accordé aux évaluations positives.
    Revue économique 01/2010;
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    ABSTRACT: In this paper, we investigate individuals’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others’ output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among peers.
    HAL, Post-Print. 01/2010;
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    ABSTRACT: The World Trade Center attack has shed light on the urgent need to implement preventing measures against terrorism and to enhance cooperation in the global security system for all countries. However, international coordination cannot be taken for granted. It is often ineffective and likely to fail for several reasons. Perhaps the more prominent reason to explain failure in coordination is that collective actions against terrorism may suffer from the well known free riding problem (Sandler and Enders, 2004). In this paper we experimentally investigate cooperation dilemma in counterterrorism policies by measuring to what extent international deterrence policy may suffer from free riding. In our game, contributions to the group account do not aim to increase the production of the public good but instead seek to decrease the probability that a stochastic event destroys the good. A country could choose to free ride by investing nothing in the international deterrence policy and instead invest all its resources in its own national protection or even choose to ignore totally terrorism by investing on alternative projects. We also look at the effects of institutions that allow sanctioning and rewarding of other countries to facilitate coordination on deterrence policy. We find that, in absence of institutional incentives and after controlling for risk aversion, most of countries defect by investing very weakly in collective actions against terrorism while largely investing to protect themselves. In contrast, the introduction of punishment/reward incentive systems improves significantly the contribution level to the collective security account.
    Journal of Public Economic Theory 10/2009; · 0.37 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: We study antisocial preferences in simple money-burning tasks. A decision maker can choose whether or not to reduce another person’s payoff at an own cost. We vary across tasks the initial endowment of the decider and the victim. We find that most conventional expectations are refuted: Subjects burn more when inequality is advantageous than when it is disadvantageous. Equitable distributions are particularly prone to destruction. These effects are reversed, however, when the equivalent tasks are framed as creation instead of destruction.
    09/2009;
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    ABSTRACT: We run a series of experiments in which subjects ha ve to choose their level of contribution to a pure public good. The design differs from the standard p ublic good game with respect to the decision proced ure. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, s ubjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which di ffers from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects can observe the exact contributions from ea rlier decisions ("sequential treatment with information") to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially but cannot observe earlier contributions ("sequential treatmen t without information"). The results indicate that sequentiality increases the level of contribution to the public g ood when subjects are informed about the contributi on levels of lower ranked subjects while sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions. Moreover, we observe t hat earlier players try to influence positively the contributio ns of subsequent decision makers in the sequence, b y making a large contribution. Such behaviour is motivated by the belief that subsequent players will reciprocate by also making a large contribution. We also discuss the ef fect of group size on aggregate contributions. Fina lly, we imagine a model of behaviours where agents' preferences incorporate a "weak" moral motivation element. This model organizes consistently the patterns observed in the lab.
    01/2009;
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    ABSTRACT: This paper demonstrates, through a controlled experiment, that the “Laffer curve” phenomenon does not always reflect a conventional income - leisure trade-off. Whether out of reason or out of emotion, taxpayers may also be willing to punish intentionally unfair tax setters by working less than they would under the same exogenous circumstances. We conduct a real effort experiment in which a player A (the “tax receiver”) is matched with a player B (the “worker”) to elicit the conditions under which tax revenues will increase under a certain threshold and decrease thereafter. We ran four different treatments by manipulating work opportunities and the power to tax. Consistent with the history of tax revolts, the working partner overreacts to the perceived unfairness of taxation when the tax rate exceeds 50%, most strongly so in the high effort treatment. With two types of players, selfish and empathic, our model predicts the emergence of a social norm of fairness under asymmetric information, and elicits the optimal and emotional patterns of punishments and rewards consistent with the norm’s enforcement. The social norm allows players to coordinate tacitly on a “focal equilibrium”, which offers a solution to the indeterminacy raised by the Folk theorem for infinitely-repeated games and a behavioral justification for the tit-for-tat strategy. The social norm of fairness enhances productive efficiency in the long run.
    Journal of Economic Psychology. 01/2009;

Publication Stats

547 Citations
20.35 Total Impact Points

Institutions

  • 2012
    • CIRANO
      Québec, Quebec, Canada
  • 2004–2012
    • Université de Rennes 1
      • Faculté des Sciences Economiques
      Roazhon, Brittany, France
  • 2008–2011
    • Université de Rennes 2
      Roazhon, Brittany, France
  • 2003–2008
    • French National Centre for Scientific Research
      Lutetia Parisorum, Île-de-France, France
  • 2007
    • Université du Québec à Montréal
      Montréal, Quebec, Canada
  • 2005
    • Tilburg University
      Tilburg, North Brabant, Netherlands
  • 2000
    • Purdue University
      West Lafayette, Indiana, United States