Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Catholic University of Louvain, Лувен-ла-Нев, Walloon, Belgium

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Publications (60)19.11 Total impact

  • Ana Mauleon, Jose J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We analyze the formation of bilateral R&D collaborations in an oligopoly when each firm benefits from the research done by other firms she is connected to. In contrast to myopic stability, farsighted stability leads to R&D networks consisting of two minimally connected components, with the largest one comprising three-quarters of firms.
    Economics Letters 12/2014; 125(6):340-342. DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.003 · 0.45 Impact Factor
  • Ana Mauleon, Jose J. Sempere‐Monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance affect the formation of strategic alliances. We adopt the concept of contractual stability to predict the alliances that are going to emerge in the long run. We find that any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule. In addition, the grand alliance which is the efficient structure is stable. If we allow for side payments to compensate former partners, then some less efficient structures that were stable without side payments are no more stable. Moreover, we show that the stability of alliances under the unanimity rule to exit is robust to the type of firms, myopic or farsighted. Finally, there is no contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority decision rule.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
    Journal of Public Economic Theory 11/2014; DOI:10.1111/jpet.12137 · 0.37 Impact Factor
  • Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
    International Journal of Games Theory 11/2014; 43(4):925-943. DOI:10.1007/s00182-014-0411-4 · 0.43 Impact Factor
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    Gilles Grandjean, Marco Mantovani, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication -i.e. who is talking with whom -on the choice of messages, on their credi-bility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coor-dination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Ac-cording to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pairs of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communi-cation. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Neverthe-less, at the individual level, players' beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible. Tercieux as well as par-ticipants to presentations in Brussels, Lisbon, London, Maastricht, Milan, and Prague, for their valuable comments and suggestions to improve the paper. The authors would also like to thank Lorenz Kurrek and Christian Voigt for excellent lab assistance. Ana Mauleon and
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    ABSTRACT: Pairwise stability [Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996] is the standard stability con-cept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others react to their actions. A different perspective assumes that agents are perfectly farsighted, proposing related stability concepts. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theo-ries, but find evidence against both of them: the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule of behavior, which we interpret as a form of limited farsight-edness. On aggregate, the selection among multiple pairwise stable networks (and the performance of farsighted stability) crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them, and not on efficiency or cooperative con-siderations. Individual behavior analysis corroborates this interpretation, and suggests, in general, a low level of farsightedness (around two steps) on the part of the agents., as well as participants to presentations in Barcelona, Bilbao, Paris and Utrecht for valuable comments and suggestions to improve the paper. Financial support from Spanish Min-istry of Sciences and Innovation under the project ECO2009-09120 and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition under the project ECO2012-35820 are gratefully acknowledged. Kirchsteiger acknowledges financial support by the BNB (Banque National de Belgique) grant on "The Evolution of Market Institutions" and by the ARC grant on "Market Evolution, Competition and Policy" (AUWB-08/13-ULB6). This paper supersedes "Myopic or farsighted? An experiment on network formation", CEPR Discussion Paper Nr. 8263, 2011.
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    Nicolas Carayol, Rémy Delille, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players suffer or benefit equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.
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    P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network outside of GK there is a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K leading to some network in GK. Third, there is no proper subset of GK satisfying the first two conditions.We show that a level-K farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set. There is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G1 consisting of all networks that belong to closed cycles. Level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of G1 for generic allocation rules. We then provide easy to verify conditions for a set to be level-K farsightedly stable and we consider the relationship between level-K farsighted stability and efficiency of networks. We show the tractability of the concept by applying it to a model of criminal networks.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 01/2014; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2488995
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
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    ABSTRACT: We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royal- ties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties.
    International Journal of Economic Theory 12/2013; DOI:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12020.x · 0.38 Impact Factor
  • Mikel Bedayo, Ana Carmen Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among the seller, the buyer and the intermediaries at equilibrium. We show that a trading network is pairwise stable if and only if it is a core periphery network where the core consists of all weak (or impatient) agents who are linked to each other and the periphery consists of all strong (or patient) agents who have a single link towards a weak agent. Once agents do not know the impatience of the other agents, each bilateral bargaining session may involve delay, but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium. When an agent chooses another agent on a path from the buyer to the seller to negotiate bilaterally a partial agreement, her choice now depends both on the type of this other agent and on how much time the succeeding agents on the path will need to reach their partial agreements. We provide sufficient conditions such that core periphery networks are pairwise stable in presence of private information.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 02/2013; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2210328
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    Manuel Förster, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We investigate the role of manipulation in boundedly rational opinion dynamics. Agents are subject to persuasion bias and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in a social network. They can exert effort to manipulate the social network of other agents in their favor and update their opinions about some issue of common interest by taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. We show that manipulation can connect a segregated society and thus lead to mutual consensus. Second, we show that manipulation fosters opinion leadership; and surprisingly non-self-confident agents might get more influential even by being manipulated. Finally, comparative simulations reveal that manipulation is beneficial to information aggregation when preferences and abilities for manipulation are homogeneous, but detrimental in case abilities are concentrated at few powerful agents.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 01/2013; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2442297
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
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    ABSTRACT: We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments on a previous draft. Vincent Vannetelbosch and Ana Mauleon are, respectively, Senior Research Associate and Research Associate of the National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS). Financial support from Spanish Ministry of Sciences and Innovation under the project ECO 2009-09120, support from the Belgian French Community's programme Action de Recherches Concertée 05/10-331, and support of an SSTC grant from the Belgian Federal government under the IAP contract P6/09 are gratefully acknowledged. Cecilia Vergari acknowledges the financial support from the University of Bologna under the 2010-2011 RFO scheme.
    Bulletin of Economic Research 06/2012; 66(4). DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00455.x · 0.19 Impact Factor
  • Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
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    ABSTRACT: Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems and give these an intuitive interpretation. Whenever some of the conditions are not satisfied, it is important to know the kind of agents that are being investigated in order to use the appropriate stability concept. Furthermore, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of a dominance invariant roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 01/2012; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1984892
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    GILLES GRANDJEAN, ANA MAULEON, VINCENT VANNETELBOSCH
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    ABSTRACT: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable sets (Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch 2009). We first show that under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. We then investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide or not with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks.
    Journal of Public Economic Theory 11/2011; 13(6):935 - 955. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01526.x · 0.37 Impact Factor
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: One form of bounded rationality is a breakdown in the commonality of the knowledge that the players are rational. In Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining game, assuming time preferences with constant discount factors, common knowledge of rationality is necessary for an agreement on a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) partition to be reached (if ever). In this note, assuming time preferences with constant costs of delay, we show that common knowledge of rationality is not necessary to reach always an agreement on a SPE partition. This result is robust to a generalisation, time preferences with constant discount factors and costs of delay, if the players are sufficiently patient.
    International Game Theory Review 11/2011; 01(03n04). DOI:10.1142/S0219198999000177
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    ABSTRACT: We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with her coalition members and with individuals outside her coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability imposes that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and effiency. Moreover, this new framework can provide in- sights that one cannot obtain if coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and independently.
    Review Economic Design 09/2011; 17(4-2011039). DOI:10.1007/s10058-012-0132-8 · 0.29 Impact Factor
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    Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent J Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
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    ABSTRACT: Different solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set, ...) can be defined using either a direct or an indirect dominance relation. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems. Furthermore, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of an absolutely stable roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
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    ABSTRACT: Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 02/2011; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1871709
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    Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari
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    ABSTRACT: What is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international network externalities in consumption? To address this question, we set up a spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous effect on prices.
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    Ana Mauleon, José J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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    ABSTRACT: We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.
    Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique 08/2008; 41(3):971-997. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00493.x · 0.61 Impact Factor
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    Ana Carmen Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote
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    ABSTRACT: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 04/2008; 6(3). DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1117904

Publication Stats

333 Citations
19.11 Total Impact Points

Institutions

  • 1994–2014
    • Catholic University of Louvain
      • • Institute for Economic and Social Research
      • • Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
      Лувен-ла-Нев, Walloon, Belgium
  • 1999–2011
    • Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
      Leioa, Basque Country, Spain