Publications (27)9.49 Total impact
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Dataset: 1471-2105-9-361
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Article: Preface to the special issue on the occasion of the 3rd Spain–Italy–Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING 3)
Top 04/2012; 17(2):415-416. · 0.87 Impact Factor -
Chapter: How to Share Railways Infrastructure Costs?
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ABSTRACT: In this paper we propose an infrastructure access tariff in a cost allocation problem arising from the reorganization of the railway sector in Europe. To that aim we introduce the class of infrastructure cost games. A game in this class is a sum of airport games and what we call maintenance cost games, and models the infrastructure costs (building and maintenance) produced when a set of different types of trains belonging to several agents makes use of a certain infrastructure. We study some properties of infrastructure cost games and provide a formula for the Shapley value of a game in this class. The access tariff we propose is based on the Shapley value of infrastructure cost games.07/2011: pages 91-101; -
Article: Using coalitional games on biological networks to measure centrality and power of genes.
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ABSTRACT: MOTIVATION: The interpretation of gene interaction in biological networks generates the need for a meaningful ranking of network elements. Classical centrality analysis ranks network elements according to their importance but may fail to reflect the power of each gene in interaction with the others. RESULTS: We introduce a new approach using coalitional games to evaluate the centrality of genes in networks keeping into account genes' interactions. The Shapley value for coalitional games is used to express the power of each gene in interaction with the others and to stress the centrality of certain hub genes in the regulation of biological pathways of interest. The main improvement of this contribution, with respect to previous applications of game theory to gene expression analysis, consists in a finer resolution of the gene interaction investigated in the model, which is based on pairwise relationships of genes in the network. In addition, the new approach allows for the integration of a priori knowledge about genes playing a key function on a certain biological process. An approximation method for practical computation on large biological networks, together with a comparison with other centrality measures, is also presented.Bioinformatics 11/2010; 26(21):2721-30. · 5.47 Impact Factor -
Article: Does Game Theory Have a Role to Play in Policy Making in Natural Resources and the Environment?
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ABSTRACT: This paper presents selected contributions from the 6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice Dedicated to Development, Natural Resources and the Environment that was held in Zaragoza (Spain) from 10 to 12 of July 2006. The dramatic increase in the application and use of game theory models for policy making in natural resources and the environment justifies the attention that is devoted to such topics. We provide examples for such applications, underlying the role they played. The contributions of the papers in this special section and the links between them are presented, together with a short synthesis of the range of contributions that are worth mentioning and would support policy making in fishery, water, and environmental regulation.ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic). 04/2010; -
Article: From Experience to Experiments in South African Water Management: Defining the Framework
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ABSTRACT: Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, Working Papers. 01/2009; -
Article: Transversality of the Shapley value
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ABSTRACT: A few applications of the Shapley value are described. The main choice criterion is to look at quite diversified fields, to appreciate how wide is the terrain that has been explored and colonized using this and related tools.Top 02/2008; 16(1):1-41. · 0.87 Impact Factor -
Article: DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT?
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ABSTRACT: This paper presents selected contributions from the 6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice Dedicated to Development, Natural Resources and the Environment that was held in Zaragoza (Spain) from 10 to 12 of July 2006. The dramatic increase in the application and use of game theory models for policy making in natural resources and the environment justifies the attention that is devoted to such topics. We provide examples for such applications, underlying the role they played. The contributions of the papers in this special section and the links between them are presented, together with a short synthesis of the range of contributions that are worth mentioning and would support policy making in fishery, water, and environmental regulation.International Game Theory Review (IGTR). 01/2008; 10(03):221-228. -
Article: SHARE OPPORTUNITY SETS AND COOPERATIVE GAMES
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ABSTRACT: In many share problems there is an a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem. Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems. Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are investigated. The average lexicographic value for share sets and for cooperative games is studied.International Game Theory Review (IGTR). 01/2008; 10(02):205-218. -
Article: The class of microarray games and the relevance index for genes
TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research. 02/2007; 15(2):256-280. -
Article: Multicriteria games and potentials
TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research. 02/2007; 15(1):138-145. -
Article: Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources
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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of water resources. With an increase in the competition over various water resources, the incidents of disputes have been in the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of various water uses, such as multi-objective water projects, irrigation, groundwater, hydropower, urban water supply, wastewater, and transboundary water disputes. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. In particular, the various approaches for cost sharing and for allocation of physical water infrastructure and flow can serve as a basis for stable and efficient agreement, such that long-term investments in water projects are profitable and sustainable. The latter point is especially important, given recent developments in water policy in various countries and regional institutions such as the European Union (Water Framework Directive), calling for full cost recovery of investments and operation and maintenance in water projects. The CGT approaches discussed and demonstrated in this paper can provide a solid basis for finding possible and stable cost-sharing arrangements.12/2006; -
Chapter: Axiomatization for Approximate Solutions in Optimization
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ABSTRACT: Approximate solutions to optimization problems are characterized by means of properties like consistency, non-emptiness, behaviour w.r.t. inclusion, invariance w.r.t. translation, multiplication.04/2006: pages 207-221; -
Article: Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 1. basic theory
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ABSTRACT: Game theory provides useful insights into the way parties that share a scarce resource may plan their use of the resource under different situations. This review provides a brief and self-contained introduction to the theory of cooperative games. It can be used to get acquainted with the basics of cooperative games. Its goal is also to provide a basic introduction to this theory, in connection with a couple of surveys that analyze its use in the context of environmental problems and models. The main models (bargaining games, transfer utility, and non-transfer utility games) and issues and solutions are considered: bargaining solutions, single-value solutions like the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and multi-value solutions such as the core. The cooperative game theory (CGT) models that are reviewed in this paper favor solutions that include all possible players and ignore the strategic stages leading to coalition building. They focus on the possible results of the cooperation by answering questions such as: Which coalitions can be formed? And how can the coalitional gains be divided to secure a sustainable agreement? An important aspect associated with the solution concepts of CGT is the equitable and fair sharing of the cooperation gains.The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series. 01/2006; -
Article: Water allocation strategies for the Kat Basin in South Africa : comparing negotiation tools and game theory models
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ABSTRACT: Governments and developing agencies promote participatory approaches in solving common pool resource problems, such as in the water sector. Two main participatory approaches have been applied separately, namely negotiation and mediation. In this paper the authors apply the Role-Playing Game that is a component of the Companion Modeling approach, a negotiation procedure, and the Cooperative Game Theory (Shapley value and the Nucleolus solution concepts) that can be mirrored as a mediated mechanism to a water allocation problem in the Kat watershed in South Africa. While the absolute results of the two approaches differ, the negotiation and the cooperative game theory provide similar shares of the benefit allocated to the players from various cooperative arrangements. By evaluating the two approaches, the authors provide useful tips for future extension for both the Role-Playing Games and the Cooperative Game Theory applications.The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series. 01/2006; -
Article: Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 2. application to natural and environmental resources
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ABSTRACT: This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series. 01/2006; -
Article: Balancedness of infrastructure cost games
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ABSTRACT: In this paper we study the class of infrastructure cost games. A game in this class models the infrastructure costs (both building and maintenance) produced when a set of users of different types makes use of a certain infrastructure, which may consist of several facilities. Special attention is paid to one facility infrastructure cost games. Such games are modeled as the sum of an airport game and a maintenance cost game. It turns out that the core and nucleolus of these games are very closely related to the core and nucleolus of an associated generalized airport game. Furthermore we provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an infrastructure cost game is balanced.European Journal of Operational Research 02/2002; · 1.82 Impact Factor -
Article: Preface.
Annals OR. 01/2002; 109:13. -
Article: A potential approach for ordinal games
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ABSTRACT: Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well known solution concepts. We also provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set.TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research. 01/2001; 9(1):69-75. -
Article: Balanced games arising from infinite linear models
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ABSTRACT: Kalai and Zemel introduced a class of flow-games showing that these games have a non-empty core and that a minimum cut corresponds to a core allocation. We consider flow-games with a finite number of players on a network with infinitely many arcs: assuming that the total sum of the capacities is finite, we show the existence of a maximum flow and we prove that this flow can be obtained as limit of approximating flows on finite subnetworks. Similar results on the existence of core allocations and core elements are given also for minimum spanning network models (see Granot and Huberman) and semi-infinite linear production models (following the approach of Owen).Mathematical Methods of Operational Research 11/1999; 50(3):385-397. · 0.48 Impact Factor
Top co-authors
Top Journals
Institutions
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2006–2013
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Università degli Studi di Genova
- • Scuola di Scienze Matematiche, Fisiche e Naturali
- • Dipartimento di Matematica (DIMA)
Genova, Liguria, Italy
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