Kevin Esterling

Publications of Kevin Esterling

• Explaining the Diffusion of Web-Based Communication Technology among Congressional Offices: A Natural Experiment Using State Delegations

  Authors: Kevin Esterling, David Lazar, Michael Neblo

  Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper Series. 01/2009;

  Do legislators learn to use new communication technologies from each other? Using data from the official homepages of members of the U.S. House of Representatives, we test whether web-basedDo legislators learn to use new communication technologies from each other? Using data from the official homepages of members of the U.S. House of Representatives, we test whether web-based communication technology diffuses through congressional state delegations. We use a natural experimental design that exploits ignorable state boundaries to distinguish between causal diffusion processes and spatial heterogeneity. Using nonlinear conditional autoregressive models for the statistical test, we find that web communication technology practices are weakly driven by communication within state delegations, and with the effect slightly more pronounced among Democrats than among Republicans.

• Networks, Hierarchies, and Markets: Aggregating Collective Problem Solving in Social Systems

  Authors: David Lazer, Ines Mergel, Curt Ziniel, Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo

  Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper Series. 01/2009;

  How do decentralized systems collectively solve problems? Here we explore the interplay among three canonical forms of collective organization--markets, networks, and hierarchies--in aggregatingHow do decentralized systems collectively solve problems? Here we explore the interplay among three canonical forms of collective organization--markets, networks, and hierarchies--in aggregating decentralized problem solving. We examine these constructs in the context of how the offices of members of Congress individually and collectively wrestle with the Internet, and, in particular, their use of official websites. Each office is simultaneously making decisions about how to utilize their website. These decisions are only partially independent, where offices are looking at each other for lessons, following the same directives from above about what to do with the websites, and confront the same array of potential vendors to produce their website. Here we present the initial results from interviews with 99 Congressional offices and related survey of 100 offices about their decisions regarding how to use official Member websites. Strikingly, we find that there are relatively few efforts by offices to evaluate what constituents want or like on their websites. Further, we find that diffusion occurs at the "tip of the iceberg": offices often look at each others' websites (which are publicly visible), but rarely talk to each other about their experiences or how they manage what is on their websites (which are not publicly visible). We also find that there are important market drivers of what is on websites, with the emergence of a small industry of companies seeking to serve the 440 Members. Hierarchical influences--through the House and through the party conferences--also constrain and subsidize certain practices.

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• Who Wants to Deliberate--And Why?

  Authors: Michael Neblo, Kevin Esterling, Ryan Kennedy, David Lazer, Anand Sokhey

  Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper Series. 01/2009;

  Interest in deliberative theories of democracy has grown tremendously among political theorists over the last twenty years. Many scholars in political behavior, however, are skeptical that it is aInterest in deliberative theories of democracy has grown tremendously among political theorists over the last twenty years. Many scholars in political behavior, however, are skeptical that it is a practically viable theory, even on its own terms. They argue (inter alia) that most people dislike politics, and that deliberative initiatives would amount to a paternalistic imposition. Using two large, representative samples investigating people's hypothetical willingness to deliberate and their actual behavior in response to a real invitation to deliberate with their member of Congress, we find: 1) that willingness to deliberate in the U.S. is much more widespread than expected; and 2) that it is precisely people who are less likely to participate in traditional partisan politics who are most interested in deliberative participation. They are attracted to such participation as a partial alternative to "politics as usual."

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• Members of congress websites: diffusion at the tip of the iceberg.

  Authors: David Lazer, Ines Mergel, Curt Ziniel, Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo

  Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research, Bridging Disciplines & Domains, DG.O 2007, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, May 20-23, 2007; 01/2007

• Connecting to congress: improving deliberation in the information age.

  Authors: Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo, David Lazer

  Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research, Bridging Disciplines & Domains, DG.O 2007, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, May 20-23, 2007; 01/2007

• Technology adoption and institutional change in the United States senate: an analysis of web site content.

  Authors: Kevin Esterling, David Lazer, Michael Neblo

  Proceedings of the 7th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research, DG.O 2006, San Diego, California, USA, May 21-24, 2006; 01/2006

• Connecting to Congress.

  Authors: David Lazer, Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo, Jane E. Fountain, Ines Mergel, Curt Ziniel

  Proceedings of the 7th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research, DG.O 2006, San Diego, California, USA, May 21-24, 2006; 01/2006

• Home (Page) Style: Determinates of the Quality of the House Members' Web Sites.

  Authors: Kevin Esterling, David Lazer, Michael Neblo

  IJEGR. 01/2005; 1:50-63.

• Style conscious: how members of congress learn new ways to communicate.

  Authors: David Lazer, Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo

  Proceedings of the 2005 National Conference on Digital Government Research, DG.O 2005, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, May 15-18, 2005; 01/2005

• Connecting to congress: project highlights.

  Authors: David Lazer, Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo, Jane E. Fountain, Ines Mergel, Curt Ziniel

  Proceedings of the 2005 National Conference on Digital Government Research, DG.O 2005, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, May 15-18, 2005; 01/2005

• Home (Page) Style: House Members on the Web.

  Authors: Kevin Esterling, David Lazer, Michael Neblo

  01/2004

• The Structure of Signaling: A Combinatorial Optimization Model with Network-Dependent Estimation

  Authors: Kevin Esterling, David Lazer, Daniel Carpenter

  07/2000;

  Who talks with whom in national policymaking? How do lobbyists allocate their social resources to best receive information? And how does network position condition which lobbyists get access? WeWho talks with whom in national policymaking? How do lobbyists allocate their social resources to best receive information? And how does network position condition which lobbyists get access? We analyze communication networks among lobbyists and government actors in national politics. We begin by wedding rational choice models to network analysis with a formal analysis of lobbyists' choice of contacts in a network, adopting the classic combinatorial optimization approach of Boorman (1975). The model predicts that when the demand for political information is low, a cocktail equilibrium prevails: lobbyists will invest their time in gaining "weak tie" acquaintances rather than in gaining "strong tie" trusted partners. When the demand for information in a policy domain is high, then both cocktail equilibria and "chum" equilibria (all strong-tie networks) prevail. We then turn to an empirical analysis of lobbying networks and access, using the data of Laumann and Knoke in The Or...

• Explaining the Diffusion of Web-Based Communication Technology among Congressional Offices: A Natural Experiment using State Delegations

  Authors: David Lazer, Kevin Esterling, Michael Neblo

  Do legislators learn to use new communication technologies from each other? Using data from the official homepages of members of the U.S. House of Representatives, we test whether web-basedDo legislators learn to use new communication technologies from each other? Using data from the official homepages of members of the U.S. House of Representatives, we test whether web-based communication technology diffuses through congressional state delegations. We use a natural experimental design that exploits ignorable state boundaries to distinguish between causal diffusion processes and spatial heterogeneity. Using nonlinear conditional autoregressive models for the statistical test, we find that web communication technology practices are weakly driven by communication within state delegations, and with the effect slightly more pronounced among Democrats than among Republicans.

• Information and contact-making in policy networks: a model with evidence from the U.S. health policy domain

  Authors: Daniel Carpenter, Kevin Esterling, David Lazer

  Computer and Information Science Faculty Publications.

  Theory: The political information that lobbyists seek is distributed in a communications network. Individual lobbyists must therefore choose their contacts carefully. We wed rational choice theory toTheory: The political information that lobbyists seek is distributed in a communications network. Individual lobbyists must therefore choose their contacts carefully. We wed rational choice theory to network analysis in a combinatorial optimization model of lobbyists’ choice of contacts in a network. The model demonstrates the growing importance of political "friends" relative to acquaintances as contacts when the competition for information among groups rises.Hypotheses: Our model predicts that when the general demand for political information is low, a cocktail equilibrium prevails: lobbyists will invest their time in gaining "weak tie" political acquaintances rather than in gaining "strong tie" political friends (Granovetter 1973). As the demand for information rises, lobbyists follow a chum strategy, investing in strong ties.Method: We test these hypotheses in an analysis of inter-organizational contact making in U.S. health politics, using the data of Laumann and Knoke (1987), with OLS regressions of average group contacts across policy events and maximum likelihood count models of contacts across interest groups.Results: Both the events-level analysis and the group-level analysis show that as lobbyists' demand for information rises, they make more strong ties. We also find that older organizations have more strong ties by virtue of reputation effects, but we find no evidence for the hypothesis that strong-tie investments are increasing in a group's fiscal resources.