Benjamin D England

Publications (2)4.57 Total impact

• Article: Magnitude and accuracy differences between judgements of remembering and forgetting.

  Michael J Serra, Benjamin D England
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  ABSTRACT: Metacognition researchers have recently begun to examine the effects of framing judgements of learning (JOLs) in terms of forgetting (rather than remembering) on the judgements' magnitude and accuracy. Although a promising new direction for the study of metamemory, initial studies have yielded inconsistent results. To help resolve these inconsistencies, in four experiments we had college students (N = 434) study paired associates and make JOLs framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting over two study-test trials. Our goals were to further document the effects of framing on the magnitude and accuracy of JOLs and to consider explanations for why specific patterns tend to emerge. The present experiments provide evidence that (a) judgements of forgetting are psychologically anchored at the midpoint of the JOL scale, whereas judgements of remembering are anchored at a lower point, (b) differences in absolute accuracy (calibration) by frame are largely artefactual and stem from differences in anchoring, (c) differences in JOL magnitude and absolute accuracy by frame do not obtain when memory cues are salient to participants, and (d) a forget frame impairs the relative accuracy (resolution) of JOLs across trials by reducing participants' reliance on cues such as memory for past test performance.
  Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006) 05/2012; 65(11):2231-57. · 1.96 Impact Factor
• Article: The contributions of anchoring and past-test performance to the underconfidence-with-practice effect.

  Benjamin D England, Michael J Serra
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  ABSTRACT: In the underconfidence-with-practice effect, people's judgments of learning (JOLs) typically underestimate memory performance across multiple study-test phases. Whereas the past-test hypothesis suggests that this underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on earlier test performance to make subsequent JOLs (despite new learning), the anchoring hypothesis suggests that the underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on a fixed psychological anchor point low on the JOL scale to make their JOLs. To contrast the predictions of these hypotheses, we had college students study, make JOLs, and test over several dozen paired-associate items across two study-test phases. We parametrically manipulated the presence or absence of testing and judging within participants during Phase 1. Contrary to the past-test hypothesis, items tested during Phase 1 demonstrated less underconfidence during Phase 2 than did nontested items. Furthermore, participants did not increase JOLs from Phase 1 to Phase 2 for items that they had not recalled or for items that had not been tested at all, suggesting that the underconfidence stemmed largely from participants' overreliance on a psychological anchor point to make their JOLs. Past test performance, however, seems to be a major cue that participants use to adjust their JOLs away from the anchor, reducing underconfidence. This was most evident when we used a between-participants manipulation (Exp. 2) to cause our participants to anchor their JOLs either high or low on the JOL scale, producing differential underconfidence independent of any adjustment. Taken together, these results support the anchoring hypothesis over the past-test hypothesis for explaining underconfidence with practice.
  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 04/2012; 19(4):715-22. · 2.61 Impact Factor